IPO

International Philosophy Olympiad

Home

Topics

2006 (Italy)

For a large classes of cases - though not for all - in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. (Ludwig Wittgenstein)

To know a thing we must love it, and to love a thing we must know it. (Kitaro Nishida)

2005 (Poland)

If I had to choose between betraying my country and betraying my friend, I hope I should have the guts to betray my country." (E.M.Forster)

„Today, the truth is dispersed across many universes of discourse which can no longer be arranged in a hierarchy. However, in each of these discourses, we search tenaciously for insights that can convince

Paraguay

all." (Jürgen Habermas)

3

„Hedonism, pessimism, utilitarism, eudemonism - all these systems that measure the value of things taking into account the *pleasure* or *pain* that go along with them, that is to say, according to any non-core condition or facts, ar• seen as if they do not go in depth and being naive. Any man with his *constructive* faculty in place and a conscience of an artist, can only regard this with irony and pity from a distance." (Friedrich Nietzsche)

4

„Language is a labyrinth of paths. You approach from *one* side and know your way about; you approach the same place from another side and no longer know your way about'." (Ludwig Wittgenstein)

2004 (South Korea)

The decisive argument which is employed by common sense against freedom consists in reminding us of our impotence. Far from being able to modify our situation at our whim, we seem to be unable to change ourselves. I am not "free" either to escape the lot of my class, of my nation, of my family, or even to build up my own power or my fortune or to conquer my most insignificant appetites or habits. (Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness)

The will to truth requires critique - let us define our task in this way - the value of truth must for once, by way of experiment, be called into question ... (Friedrich Nietzsche: On the Genealogy of Morals, 3-24)

In fact, history does not belong to us, but we belong to history. (Hans-Georg Gadamer: Truth and Method, 1989)
Does science need philosophy?

2003 (Argentina)

The laws of conscience, which we pretend to be derived from nature, proceed from custom. (Michel de Montaigne, Essais, 1595, chapitreXXII)

The maxims of the philosophers on the conditions under which public peace is possible shall be consulted by states which are armed for war (I. Kant, Perpetual Peace)

The existence of this inclination to aggression, which we can detect in our selves and justly assume to be present in others, is the factor which disturbs our relations with our neighbour and which forces civilisation into such a high expenditure of energy. In consequence of this primary mutual hostility of human beings, civilised society is perpetually threatened with disintegration. (Freud, Civilisation and its Discontents)

2002 (Japan)

So you would have us qualify our former notion of the just man by an addition. We then said it was just to do good to a friend and evil to an enemy, but now we are to add that it is just to benefit the friend if he is good and harm the enemy if he is bad? (Plato, Republic)

Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it. (George Santayana 1863-1952, The Life of Reason, ch.12)

But to be able to say that a point is black or white, I must first know under what conditions a point is called white or black; in order to be able to say: "p" is true (or false), I must have determined under what conditions I call "p" true, and thereby determine the sense of the proposition. (L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico Philosphicus)

It is another paradox, but God as the true absolute must be Satan too. Only then can God be said to be truly omniscient and omnipotent. [¡¦] The absolute God must include absolute negation within himself, and must be

the God who descends into ultimate evil. (Nishida Kitaro,1870-1945, Last Writing - Nothingness and the Religious Worldview)

2001 (USA)

The laws of conscience, which we pretend to be derived from nature, proceed from custom [¡¦]. (Michel de Montaigne: Essais. 1595, chapter XXII)

If we extend unlimited tolerance even to those who are intolerant, if we are not prepared to defend a tolerant society against the onslaught of the intolerant, then the tolerant will be destroyed, and tolerance with them. (K.R. Popper: The Open Society and its Enemies. Vol.I. Routledge, London 1945, p. 265)

I just had to consult myself about what I want to do, everything I feel to be good is good, everything I feel to be bad is bad¡¦ (Rousseau)

Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition, which is called war; and such a war as is of every man, against every man. (Hobbes, Leviathan, Ch. XIII)

2000 (Germany)

Time is not something which exists of itself [...]. Time is, therefore, a purely subjective condition of (human) intuition [...] and in itself, apart from the subject, it is nothing. (Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B 49 A33 / B 51 A35)

The passing from the state of nature to civil society produces a remarkable change in man; it puts justice as a rule of conduct in the place of instinct, and gives his actions the moral quality they previously lacked. (Jean-Jacques Rousseau: The Social Contract)

A process which led from the amoeba to man appeared to the philosophers

to be obviously a progress - though whether the amoeba would agree with this opinion is not known. (Bertrand Russell)
All men naturally desire knowledge. (Aristotle, The Metaphysics, Book I. 980a)

1999 (Hungary)

It is impossible to conceive anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which can be taken as good without qualification, except a good will. (Immanuel Kant)

Desire is the essence of the human being. (Benedictus Spinoza)

What we call 'laws' are hypotheses or conjectures which always form a part of some larger system of theories and which, therefore, can never be tested in isolation. (Karl R. Popper)

Is knowledge power?

1998 (Romania)

Tatsachlich haben wir zwei Arten von Moral nebeneinander: eine, die wir predigen, aber nicht praktizieren, und eine andere, die wir praktizieren, aber selten predigen. (B. Russell)

Wir sehen die Welt so, wie wir sie sehen wollen. (Schopenhauer)

Der Mensch wird durch die anderen geschaffen. (Montaigne)

Ubrigens ist mir alles verhaert, was mich bloss belehrt, ohne meine Tatigkeit zu vermehren oder unmittelbar zu beleben. (Goethe)

1997 (Poland)

Is philosophy a science?

Der Kunstler laernt uns durch sein Auge in die Welt blicken. (Schopenhauer)

Justice without force is powerless, force without justice is tyrannical. (Pascal)

The idea that one should seek the truth for its own sake doesn't make sense to us pragmatists. We cannot regard the truth as the aim of an investigation. The aim of an investigation is rather to come to an agreement between people about what to do and about the intended ends as well as the means, which we can realize these ends with. [...] All the descriptions we can give of things are descriptions which conform with our ends. [...] All we have to know is whether there are competing descriptions which are more useful to our purposes. (Richard Rorty: Relativism: To discover and to invent. In: Information Philosophie 1/1997, p. 14-16)

1996 (Turkey)

Nothing is true, everything is permitted... (Nietzsche)

The evil in the world originates always from ignorance, and good will may cause as much damage as malice, if it is not enlightened. (Camus)

The limits of your language are the limits of your world. (Wittgenstein)

So act that you treat humanity in your person, as well as in the person of every other human being, also as a goal, never as a means. (Kant)

1995 (Bulgaria)

Everyone is someone else and no one is himself. (M. Heidegger)

Actually it is impossible for us to consider ourselves non-existent. (M. Unamuno)

Should we start from the premise that one is totally forbidden to do injustice, or should we consider that under some circumstances that is permitted? (Plato)

To be a philosopher means to travel all the time; questions in philosophy are more essential than answers. (K. Jaspers)

1994 (Bulgaria)

Der Mensch ist fur den Menschen ein "Gott". (Spinoza)

Wo ist die Zeit geblieben? Bin ich nicht in einen tiefen Brunnen gefallen? Die Welt schlaft. (Nietzsche)

Wenn Beine und Arme einen eigenen Willen hatten, waren sie nicht (in der Lage der) Glieder geblieben. (Pascal)

1993 (Bulgaria)

Home is far more a state of mind than landscape. (G. Bachelard)

Children are antiquities. (G. Bachelard)

Everything we see could be otherwise. (Wittgenstein)

Without "now" there wouldn't be time and without time there wouldn't be "now". (Aristotle)

International Philosophy Olympiad since 1993
www.philosopiad.org

What is IPO? | Hosting Country of This Year | How to Participate? | Let's Talk | Q&A | Site Map

Hosting Country of This Year

WRITING SUBJECTS for 12th IPO

1. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness / Das Sein und Das Nichts / L'etre et le neant*
   ○ The decisive argument which is employed by common sense against freedom consists in reminding us of our impotence. Far from being able to modify our situation at our whim, we seem to be unable to change ourselves. I am not "free" either to escape the lot of my class, of my nation, of my family, or even to build up my own power or my fortune or to conquer my most insignificant appetites or habits.
   ○ Das entscheidende, vom gesunden Menschenverstand gegen die Freiheit benutzte Argument besteht darin, uns an unsere Ohnmacht zu erinnern. Weit entfernt, daß wir unsere Situation willkürlich ändern können, scheint es sogar, daß wir nicht einmal uns selbst ändern können. Ich bin weder "frei", dem Schicksal meiner Klasse, meines Volkes, meiner Familie zu entgehen, noch auch mir Einfluß oder ein Vermögen zu schaffen, noch meine unbedeutendsten Neigungen oder meine Gewohnheiten zu besiegen.
   ○ L'argument décisif utilisé par le bon sens contre la liberté consiste à nous rappeler notre impuissance. Loin que nous puissions modifier notre situation à notre gré, il semble que nous ne puissions pas nous changer nous-mêmes. Je ne suis ¡ìlibre¡í ni d'échapper au sort de ma classe, de ma nation, de ma famille, ni même d'édifier ma puissance ou ma fortune, ni de vaincre mes appétits les plus insignifiants ou mes habitudes.

2. Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals: 3-24 / Zur Genealogie der Moral: 3-24 / La Généalogie de la morale*
   ○ The will to truth requires critique - let us define our task in this way - the value of truth must for once, by way of experiment, *be called into question...*
   ○ Der Wille zur Wahrheit bedarf einer Kritik - bestimmen wir hiermit unsere Aufgabe: Der Wert der Wahrheit ist

versuchsweise einmal in *Frage zu stellen...*

❍ Volonté de la vérité demande une pensée critique - on définit notre propre devoir par laquelle - la valeur de cette vérité doit être expérimentalement *mise á l'épreuve...*

3. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method / Wahrheit und Methode / Vérité et Méthode*
   ❍ In fact, history does not belong to us, but we belong to history.
   ❍ In Wahrheit gehört die Geschichte nicht uns, sondern wir gehören ihr.
   ❍ En réalité, l'histoire ne nous appartient pas, mais nous lui appartenons.

4. No Quatations
   ❍ Does science need philosophy?
   ❍ Braucht die Wissenschaft die Philosophie?
   ❍ La science a-t-elle besoin de la philosophie?

IPO 2004 AWARD ESSAYS

- Gold
  ❍ Leopold HESS (Poland)
- Silver
  ❍ Joanna KUSIAK (Poland)
  ❍ Lukas STEINACHER (Austria)
  ❍ Mert Bahadir REISOGLU (Turkey)
- Bronze
  ❍ Seungwon CHANG (Korea)
  ❍ Matija LAVRINC (Slovenia)
  ❍ German DIAZ (Argentina)
  ❍ Valeriya T. VITKOVA (Bulgaria)
  ❍ Elena BELLODI (Italy)
  ❍ David KOVACS (Hungary)
  ❍ Andreea Elena SIMION (Romania)

The will to truth requires critique -let us define our task in this way- the value of truth must for once,
by way of experiment, *be called into question¡¦*

Leopold Hess (Poland)

Well, that is a controversial statement, sending a shiver down our spine, isn't it? Instinctively we reject it, as it shakes the fundaments of our culture. How can one call in question the value of truth, or maybe rather Truth (this word was always treated like a sacred one and it feels like a blasphemy to start it with a small letter)? How can one criticize the will to truth? And nevertheless, that is just what Nietzsche did. Was he right?

Almost three millenniums of European history shout: "No". Since the times of Tales, the search of truth has always been the inspiration of human thoughts and deeds, the motor of progress, the parent of philosophy and science. Indeed, we can't imagine our culture developing without it. For all of us, especially for philosophers, the truth was always the most important. As Aristotle said: amicus Plato, sed magna amica veritas. And it means not only that he dared to criticize Plato's philosophy, but also that probably, if it was necessary, he would sacrifice his friend in the name of Truth. And we would understand it.

But still, there are arguments against the truth[1], even if it needs some courage to admit it. The problem with truth is that, if it is to be real, it has to be one and only, absolute Truth. And absolutes hate rivalry. We know it well from our history - the teacher of life, as Cicero said. Europe remembers the burning pyres of John Hus, Giordano Bruno and thousands and thousands of others - the effects of one and only truth of the Church - but still many people were able to believe in one and only truth of Marx or Hitler - and once again masses of victims burned in fire or froze to death in the snows of Siberia. And even today millions starve, so close to Seoul, in the name of truth.

Let's assume these are but tragic accidents. Nevertheless truth is often, as Foucault would say, a mean of power and slavery. It is a source of political and cultural discrimination of ethnic, religious, sexual or any other minorities - even in the so-called liberal democracies. This may sound very leftist, but, unfortunately, it is not an exaggeration. If we believe, as we often do, there is only one true and proper way of life, tolerance and freedom become hollow sounds.

The truth or the will of truth can also be a source of more subtle, 'inner' slavery. Our minds are often bound by opinions, customs etc. which are 'obviously true'. And even if we realize it, we are sometimes not able to think in other way. This is a slavery much worse than a political one.

"But, one might say, truth is a mean of power and slavery, only if we assume that we can know it for sure. And usually we just search the truth, not have it. This gives a field for criticism, freedom and tolerance." You're right, of course, but actually very few people can admit that they don't know the truth for sure and they're still searching (they are sometimes

called philosophers¡¡). Most of normal, reasonable people are absolutely sure of what they know and believe. And there's also a bigger problem. If we can only search truth and not have it or know it, how can we ever find it? Isn't the search futile? Aren't we just chasing shadows? Isn't that terribly frustrating? Oh, yes, it is. And in our search of ever-running truth don't we lose something; don't we forget about our lives? Of course, I don't want to say we should just 'cultivate our own garden', like Voltaire wrote in Le Candide. But maybe we should rather search a good life than truth. One could say (e.g. Aristotle) there is no good life without the search for truth. And there is no culture and civilization. But aren't the culture and civilization just sources of suffering and pain, as Rousseau or Freud wrote?

So it seems there might be a conflict between the truth and good life (whatever this might mean)[2]. However the search of truth was always the essence of philosophy. But maybe that was wrong. Maybe we should have replaced metaphysics[3] with ethics (understood very widely as the whole of reflection over our lives) on the throne of "the prime philosophy". [4] Maybe we could live better lives if we considered truth as nothing but a pragmatic instrument. In fact there is quite a lot of philosophers who think like that (e.g. R. Rorty), mainly thanks to Nietzsche (and American pragmatists like James, Dewey or Santayana).

Why would that live without truth and 'will to truth' be better? First of all it would be free. Free of the boundaries of common truths, free of totalitarism and discrimination. Free for tolerance, individual opinions and faith, free for art. Also it could be better, since we would turn all our intellectual effort, frustrated in the vain search of truth, to problems of ethics and our own existence. Maybe we could get closer to Nietzsche's ideal of Superhuman or any other ideal of mankind.

"But, one could say again, without the search of truth, the science is impossible, so the progress and development is impossible." Is it really? Do the modern scientists search the truth or rather the ways of solving problems and satisfying our needs? But let's assume there is no progress without the ideal of truth. Do we really need the progress? Do we need better technologies and machines etc.? Weren't our ancestors happy without computers and cars and without the theory of relativity? Don't get me wrong, I do not think there were more happy than we are, I'm not a hippie, but I think we should not assume they were less happy. Indeed, conditio humana has very little to do with civilization. People from ancient times or from non-European cultures (who did not know our conception of progress or truth) lived in different cultural situations, different societies and political systems, but they were the same people. Of course, some aspects of the human condition do change, sometimes drastically[5]. But some things don't ever change. People always loved and hated, cried and laughed, they always asked the questions "how should I live", "what should I do". And I believe they didn't need, and we do not need in our times, computers and spacecraft, as well as the absolute truth of

Christianity, communism or any other, to answer these questions. Thinking that all the people do need these is just another manifestation of the imperialism of truth.

So there are strong arguments against the truth. But there are also ones for it.. Firstly, we don't know if a man can lead a good life without searching for truth and knowledge. It is quite believable this is the actual best and most noble of human activities. And maybe the most natural. All the people, by nature, desire knowledge, says Aristotle. Secondly, the world still needs true ideas of justice and peace and freedom, and ways of achieving them. Thirdly, even if we treat truth as simply pragmatic, we still need it to solve our problems. We need true facts, opinions etc. for practical reasons. So we cannot refute the truth in general, but only redefine it.

Now, after all this, we can ask ourselves: can we or should we call in question the value of truth? But wait a moment - that's just what we did on these pages. After all, calling into question does not mean negation or refutation, just a revision and reconsideration. For many centuries philosophers reviewed and criticized many particular truths - the truths of common sense or religion, the truths of other philosophers. Nietzsche just said that it is time to call into question the very idea of truth. He crossed a certain border and opened a 'meta-level' of reflections on truth[6]. In fact, crossing the borders of thought is the real essence of philosophy.

We should all ask ourselves the question about the value of truth, but the answers have to be individual. Nietzsche rejected the will to truth, considering all truths to be in fact lies, metaphors used to falsify the reality. I wouldn't be so radical. The truth is certainly a value, but only as long as it is not given priority over life and freedom (in a very wide sense of this word). And I still would claim ethics and existential reflection to be more important than metaphysics or any other intellectual activity.

---

[1] Or rather -against the search of truth or the ¡®will to truth¡¯. I am not going to say ¡®there is no truth¡¯, as it is a self-refuting thesis- if there is no truth, this thesis isn¡¯t true as well, so we come to a paradox.

[2] This might be illustrated by a paradoxical statement of Dostoevsky, who said that if he was to choose between the absolute Truth and Jesus Christ, he would choose Christ.

[3] As you see, I understand ¡®truth¡¯ in a narrow sense, referring to the knowledge of the world. In this sense the principles and theses of ethics or considering individual existence of a person can¡¯t be ¡®true¡¯ (nor they can be false, of course)

[4] Pierre Hadot in Philosophy as an Exercise of Spirit says that ethics was, implicite even if not explicite, the prime philosophy in ancient Greece, as all of the philosophical considerations were supposed to lead to a better and happier life. It is a somewhat risky thesis when referred to the pre-Aristotelian and Aristotelian thought, but it is obviously true when we consider the Hellenistic philosophy. On the other hand, Franz Brentano claimed that the Hellenistic philosophy is the first stadium of degeneration of thought, as it forgot about metaphysics (the theory) and turned to ethics (the practice)

[5] E.g. the relation between an individual and the community.

[6] Of course, many philosophers before had considered the nature of truth, but very few had ever asked if the truth is really a value.

Is the truth beyond our cognition?

Joanna Kusiak (Poland)

1) Introduction

A man, as a human being, has a natural need to look for the truth. Hence philosophy - the very human nature is connected with constant asking why, with attempts at answering the question about the essence of the world as well as the essence of ourselves. This implies all the questions about the truth in the metaphysics, science, aesthetics, ethics etc. But we can interpret Nietzsche's thesis as a postulate not to search for the truth any more. Does it make sense to ever-repeat our trials if we have failed so many times? In this essay I would like to consider why should be the value of truth called into question, what the possible answers to this questions are and how it does affect our existence. It is important to highlight that Nietzsche's way of experiment means not only and not so much some empiric (scientific) methods. In fact, all the human reflection - rational, intuitive or even mystic - is an experiment, in which we, in many different ways, try to find out whether our theses on some essential problems are true - whatever it could mean.

2) Why is some (objective, transcendent) truth impossible?

If we consider the truth as something transcendent, there are many arguments that it is impossible to reach it. Those were sceptics who first gave the plenty of reasons that we are to fail. Then, this thesis has been often repeated over the years of philosophical tradition. Sceptics' ideas can be related to a common sense of an average man and can be derived

from everyday's experience. Why also is the truth impossible?

a) the truth is beyond our competence (Kant, Wittgenstein)

It was Kant who completed Hume's ideas showing that we are not able to reach the truth. There are in fact two worlds - the first one consists of phenomena (appearances), the second one is the world of things in itself - noumena. We are able to know much about the former, but the fact is, that we know mostly this, what we ourselves put into this world (space, time, cathegories etc.). It is a kind of inter-subjectivity, so, in a Heiddegerian-like interpretation of the word, it is a subjectivity that is common, among us and affects our lives. However, it cannot proclaim the rights to any objectivity. The truth in ontological meaning (vide Plato) is beyond our competence. Hence every attempt at reaching it has to be a failure and implies antinomies. We can only postulate some metaphysical ideas to implement the idea of moral law and freedom (there is no freedom in the world of starry sky - of appearances). Such a way of thinking was also presented in the first philosophy of Wittgenstein (Tractatus logico-philosophicus), who was sure that what cannot be expressed has to be passed by in silence.

b) What we call laws are hypotheses (Popper)

According to Popper all that we consider as a truth (especially in science) is just a hypothesis. In fact, we can say that Popper rejects the truth as well as the falsity - the former is unreachable, the latter is not worth proclaiming and has to be falsificated. However, he never rejects the sense of our attempts. We have to search for the truth in order to be ever-nearer to it. The period of corroboration has much a pragmatical meaning. We have to put a hypothesis just to enable the science to develop - but it will always lead us to falsification and consequently to form the new hypothesis. Partly from this, a conception of Feyerabend that anything goes in science is derived. But the very conclusion of their ideas is that no one and objective truth is probable to be discovered. However, it should not disturb neither our development nor our existence.

c) Everything changes (Heraclitos, Bergson)

One more reason of our inability to reach the truth is that there is nothing in the world static and passive. Here Heraclitos as well as Bergson is to be mentioned. Panta rei - is the life, the world, the truth a part of elan vital? Probably is our intellect incompetent. We would like (vide Descartes) everything to be simple, clear and distinct. But the truth may be neither clear nor distinct, and in fact too complicated for the intellect, which, like a searchlight at night, cuts only a piece of reality and - in ontological meaning - a piece of truth. Bergson postulates to use an intuition - but there are both arguments for and against. We can never be sure that there is any common dimension, any objectivity or even inter-subjectivity of every man's intuition. Consequently there is no certainty

that we find objective truth is allowed to be proclaimed.

d) Postmodern de(con)struction (Derrida)

Derrida rejects the notion of the truth by treating the reality like a great puzzle. To continue this metaphor, it really does for him no matter if the picture fits. He claims that his concept is derived from Nietzsche. However, the destruction is here not followed by any lasting construction that was present in Nietzsche's philosophy, as an idea of new values on the top of which the will to power is placed. Unlike Derridian, Nietzsche's nihilism was both passive and active. However, criticizing Derrida do not allow us to abolish his argument that every philosophical conception (also of the truth) is not full, it lacks something and therefore can be destructed.

e) Mysticism, Zen, Taoism

The western societies consider every notion as having two possibilities - either to be true or false. But the eastern mystics are convinced that it is our error - they say that something can be both true and false - and even something more at the same time. This idea has to be also mentioned even if it is treated by the western philosophers at least with reserve. However, in some of the aspects (naturally not fully, I am aware that is a provocative thesis), it can be compared to Hegel's conception, where everything is true and necessary. And the synthesis has in itself both thesis and antithesis - and even something more.

3. The immanent truth

Those are we who look for the truth. Consequently, we have to consider often repeated in the history of philosophy thesis, that there is no point in trying to transcendent somewhere beyond us to reach the truth. Since the times of Socrates, we must be aware of the possibility that the truth lives inside us ad we have only to find the way to give birth to it - or to find a midwife to help us.

a) Kierkegaard and Nietzsche - beyond good and evil, beyond truth and false

When Nietzsche says that the notion of truth has to be rejected, he means the upon-mentioned one objective truth which actually can never be fully justified. He calls himself a dynamite that destroys all those inflexible ideas - all that was reached by the philosophy up to his time. Paradoxically, though hating the Socrates has Nietzsche's philosophy much from his one. Want yourself - such an aphorism describes perfectly the rules of overman. In another aphorism he talks about the situation of him and his contemporaries (in fact also about our situation) - someone has wiped our horizon with a piece of sponge (own translation - aut.) That also means that if we are like a ship, trying to reach the coast of truth, we would never manage to do it. But maybe this voyage is the truth in itself -

when we are cruising, we are the true. That meant also Kierkegaard when he wrote that the truth is subjectivity. Every man has to find the truth in his own existence. This is not relative in a sophistic, pragmatic way - it is just present inside everyone of us, to paraphrase St.Augustin's thought.

b) Postmodern (de)construction (Rorty, new rethoric)

It was Rorty who supplements Derridian destruction with some construction that allows us to escape from the void of sense, as Waldenfels calls it. Rorty postulates not to use the notion of truth - nobody and nothing is true, they are just the others. That implicates some plurality, but also it prevents us from ruling of such conception (in philosophy, politics, science and culture as well) that has the strongest voice to drown out the others. I would add to it what Husserl and Waldenfels consider as very important - the experience of strangeness. In fact, we all are strangers, but the truth about this strangeness is derived from our immanence (I find the stranger inside me). Hence, there is a common dimension. We should treat every Kierkegaard's truth-subjectivity with the Plessner's idea of the open immanence. We should be opened for the truth of the strangeness, like in a Socratic dialogue. Steiner postulates the idea of alternity - nothing is neither true nor false, neither better nor worse. The otherness has the same laws. This leads of course to a kind of anarchy, but this an-archy could be as well understood Heideggerian-like. Then it consists also of arche in an ancient Greek's meaning. Hence the otherness may be the essence of our lives, the truth.

c) The problem of some common dimension

Even when we, after Husserl, find the strangeness inside us and open us for the strangeness and its truth, there is no certainty that this would be enough to reach any dialogue. The Socratic truth is discovered when we talk to each other, trying to understand the stranger as well as ourselves. Here could help what Perelman calls a new rhetoric - the fair rhetoric. When we are not able to understand some aspects of the plurality. Hence we are to search for some cross-points, but also to listen to stranger's voice even without rational understanding. This would give us, due to Perelman, the whole picture of the world. From the two ways - destroying the otherness (also in the aspect of truth) and accepting the immanent truth of the strangeness, the second one is much better.

d) The impossibility to self-abstract

As Heidegger mentions, our Being is always Being-in-the world (in-der-Welt-sein). This implicates that we are so strongly connected to the world that it makes no sense to look for the truth somewhere beyond. There is no transcendent truth, my in-der-Welt-sein is the truth itself. As Merleau-Ponty notices, the truth of the world is a synthesis of all the possible horizons of experience. This synthesis is never full, but we have an acces to the truth from our side. The truth is a-letheia, something has to be

covered in order for something to be re-covered (dis-covered).

4.Conclusion

We have the choice how to answer the Nietzsche's calling the truth into question. We can, for example, reject the notion of the truth. In opposite stays the dogmatism with all its advantages and disadvantages - but should it really be the attitude of philosophers? Another possibility is to admit that here are two main aspects of the truth - the transcendent and the immanent. I would propose to differ from them. For the scientific aims, the best idea seems to be the one of Popper, rejecting relativism and dogmatism as well, enabling us to develop the science and supporting some pragmatical aspects of living. As far as ethics is considered, it would be good either to accept Kantian postulates of practical reasons (with the conscious these are only the postulates), or to try to find the truth in our Being-in-the world, Being-with-people and Being-oneself. Generally, I am convinced that we definitely should not resign from our searchings - and so is my interpretation of Nietzsche's philosophy. I answers this ambiguous Nietzsche's quotation with another one that is also taken from his writings: Why not to err? There is no way to succeed but erring. Moreover, there is another advantage of constant asking. Hence I end up with Elzenberg's citation: The wisdom is just a side effect of our trials both to reach the truth and to systematize our acts and thoughts. Moreover, it is often that it is the only effect.

Jean-Paul Sartre on freedom

Lukas Steinacher (Austria)

"I am not 'free'[¡¡]"- that is the central thesis of this excerpt taken from "Being or Nothingness." And Jean-Paul Sartre, the author, against expectation does not base it on mere abstract theories. His central argument instead is taken from the experience of "common sense". (l.1) Therefore he describes the experience of "impotence", which he mainly grounds on the fact that we are "far from being able to modify our situation at our whim". (l.2) According to this point Sartre is obviously right. The examples given in the quotation make it clear. You cannot decide neither when you are born, nor where and-most important- you even cannot determine if you want to be born anyway. Concerning these facts you hardly could deny Sartre's that "the Other is the hell". However this sentence, as far as we can make it out from the thoughts developed before, is only valid in the sense that the Other roles you your freedom and for this reason disables you to decide from the autonomy of your will.

However Sartre claims wider validity for his thesis than just the meaning

of dependency on the conditions of birth would have. For when he says that we are "unable to change ourselves" and justifies it with the same argument as above- the social dependency- the consequence must be that the individual has no qualities but the ones given to him by his social group. Every person at the moment of his birth would then be a "tabula rasa" not only in the narrow sense that he/she does not have experienced anything, but in the radical meaning it is a "nothingness."

Let us take this thought for true for a moment to see if it is persuasive or not. If we follow Sartre's type of argument, we will soon see that the common sense does not only suggest the idea of dependency, but the idea of freedom as well. Let us stick to an example of every-day-life to let this thought become clearer. If anyone hits another person the hidden one will not believe that the other one would not have been able to decide different. This is mainly because the hidden person for himself sees the possibility of acting a different way. He would basically justify this belive as follows: The person who has hidden me theoretically must have seen the possibility not to hit me (because I see that myself) he has decided to me, but it was him who did it - he knew what he was doing. He might have been in anger, but he would have had to control himself."

We see from this hypothetical situation. Common sense postulates the freedom of the will as well, as he might give us the impression of dependency. Therefore in case of our topic "Is the human being principally free or not?" common sense does not give a clear, but even contradictory answer. For this reason we have to find other arguments the question we are dealing with.

The example given, as well as the quotation itself, should be a hint for us to find a solution for our problem, which at the same time, if it is persuasive, must enable us to solve the "antinomy of common sense" we have discovered before.

In the example the fictive person thought: "He [the hitting person] knows what he has done." If we once take this for guaranteed, we are providing that the person has a self-consciousness and is able to reflect. So we cannot pass over the Cartesian Cogito. As it seems the key to the question of freedom is layed down in the opportunity of reflection. Reflection itself includes freedom: it is nothing else but the freedom of realization. It is this kind of freedom Sartre himself makes use of: He reflects on the entity of human being. This reflection includes the thought, I reflect¡¦-and this thought makes it necessary to see oneself as a free individual in so far as the reflection is based upon my will, because it enables me to recognize that it would even possibly not to reflect in this moment. You easily recognize that we developed the thought from an idea of absolute impotence-with the help of cogito to Kant's idea of the transcendental Ego. Kant's theory might even enable us to get a more precisely idea of the problem of freedom as it has shown up in the experience of common sense. The "antinomy" we saw there is nothing but

one of the antinomies of practical reason, which is based on the fact that according to the laws of theoretical reason and the sector of the outward world which it refers to, everything is following unbreakable material laws; however there is also the experience of an autonomic will, which shows up, as we saw, as soon as you develop self-consciousness. (Herein, moreover, you can see another argument against Sartre's statement, because if you guess yourself just being a product of the outer world you could never develop an inner sense, could never discover an Ego, which you have to assume for any kind of reflection.) Kant, as you know, solves the practical antinomy with his theory of freedom, whereas he sets up to different worlds: the "sensual" and the "intelligible" one. It is clear as well that Kant was not able to solve the problem of freedom fully for it is necessary to make clear how the "transcendental entity of apperception" can cause anything in the sensual world, when itself is only a part of the intelligible world.

Nontheless it will be justified from the arguments given above to work with the idea of the autonomy of the will as a basis of our further argumentation. To accept this idea, by the way, does not mean to state that we are practically free- the consequence is only that we theoretically could be free in acting. Nothing else is meant by Kant when he claims freedom to be a "postulate of reason." As we have seen right at the beginning of this essay it is sure that we depend to a high extent on our (natural as well as social) living circumstances. However our will(no matter if good or bad) is standing up against this binding pressure of nature. He calls us to free ourselves and to become mature beings. Our worthiness is based on the consciousness of this postulate of reason and the possibility to follow it.

However here the notorious question comes up again: Are we able to follow our will, is in fact, our freedom a practical one?

Two anthropological qualities seem most important to me as regards this question. One is that we, as social beings, who can from a naturalistic point of view be characterized as "shortcoming beings" ("Maengelwesen" - Gehlen), the other is that we are mortal. Both illustrate our impotence and make up the decisive difference to the idea of God which especially since Aristotle can be defined as the "ens summe perfectum." It was Aristotle, too, who invented the idea of human as the "zoon politicon." He knew the dependency of humans well, he knew that they could not live without each other; however Aristotle's definition of man did not end at the point of pure dependency from nature, whose necessary development the state would. In common with the athenic tradition he thought of the state as a construct built by man and therefore politics as being based on the unity of the citizens' will. Does this idea of democracy based on the autonomy of the will have any justification if we at the same time have in mind that the state develops out of an anthropological necessity? If the development of a state- or let us say for the beginning more generally: a social construct- is a necessity the question must now be: Is there an absolute

contradiction of necessity and freedom: Do they exclude each other a priori or might there be even an idea of a state, where one is including the other?

Before we discuss this question let us first have an overview about the generally possible access to the question of freedom. If you ask for freedom you can ask for it in two different ways:

1) What is one free from?

2) What is he/she free for?

It is easy to see that a definition of freedom, which takes only care of the first question will not be satisfying. In this case the superiest form of freedom, one can think of would be to be free from everything. However if you are free from everything you are as well a Nothingness as if you are free from nothing, because you then will not be able to define yourself. To be able to define something it is necessary to recommand its borders: If you have essential qualities they fix you and you are not completely free, but on the other hand if you do not have one, you are a Nothingness. Only the second question can tell us the way out of this paradox. If you are clear about what your essential qualities are, you are able to define what you are able to be free for seen from the "constitution" in the widest sense of the word and therefore you are then able to say what you should be free for. It is only possible to get this knowledge if you build up the ideal of yourself, because without this image you cannot say what is the aim of your will, because you are not clear about the "good will". According to this aspect Heidegger is right, when he says that you have to think about ontology before you think about ethics. If you have no idea about the essential conditions of human being you cannot found an ethic that fits to these conditions. That does not mean that only practical aspects are important to consider if you think about the possibility of a good life. Instead you have to bring the ideal to reality by considering its conditions.

Considering these conditions leads us according to Aristotle to the theory of politics and state. According to freedom we get a special hint in Hegel's theory. His idea is this of a dialectic development of state. The state develops from the state of necessity to the state of freedom(!) where the idea of "Sittlichkeit" has come true. This is reached, when every single will has become a unity with the "absolute reason" as Hegel imagines it.

However I would not follow Hegel in his idea in so far, as he states the development as a necessary process. According to the fundament we have worked out with the help of Kant's theory I am persuaded that the only possibility to reach this aim is laid down in the autonomy of the will. Therefore we will have to accept the idea that the state in reality may fail, because we have to accept the possibility of wrong decision.

We have to allow failing for the sake of freedom as long as we do not

forget the ideal we are wanting to become reality. This concept obviously is an exceptional one and therefore it is not to be read as a practical advice.

It is instead written as a recommand of the necessity of utopia as an idea to go for and it is written as an apology of freedom; for the sake of humanity you are not allowed to deny freedom. Otherwise you are denying the possibility of man to be good-even if it is only within the borders of here and now.

FREEDOM ON A CHESSBOARD

Mert Bahadir Reisoglu (Turkey)

The remark of Sartre quoted above calls the ability to be free into question. It urges us to ask ourselves if we can be free while our freedom is limited by the society and even by our inability to control ourselves. It is a trick, for while Sartre seems to be reviewing the common claims of those who reject the possibility of freedom, he secretly defines what freedom is. Thus, in the disguise of an objective investigation of the counter-arguments that raises the question of 'Is it possible to be free?' the answer hides secretly in the structuring of the argument limiting the freedom of the reader to think of the problem in new ways.

Thus, instead of trying to answer this question of freedom, I'll analyze the ways in which Sartre defines what freedom is and thus raise a criticism against the existentialist idea according to which one can be free by making choices in one's life. According to my argument which follows the contemporary so-called antihumanist philosophy the argument of Sartre on the possibility of freedom depends on the assumption that human being is a subject, the very actor of his own actions. Therefore, for Sartre, being free is to be able to control oneself, to be sure that one's actions belong to oneself which one decides on his own. By making choices, by being 'himself'' one can be free despite the authority of the society and his own inability to control his own life. This idea requires a clear distinction between the self and others, as well as between the reason and the rest of the being of a human (such as instincts, emotions, etc.). However, to deny these binary oppositions and to accept that a human being is a 'thing among other things' (Heidegger), a being the identity of which depends on the whole structure of things will alter the definition of freedom made by Sartre. Freedom does not depend on making choices and determining who we are, but on the possibility of escaping one structure to enter into another, in other words, on being a traveller, on changing continuously and altering the structure in which the person looks for new ways to move.

After this brief summary about the argument of my essay which needs more clarification on the following pages, I can start analyzing the quotation of Sartre to see what type of a structure he imposes on the reader, and to try to find ways of escape.

If we look at the claims of those who reject the possibility of freedom, we can see that their claims depend on three different aspects of freedom :

1-) To be able to escape from the oppression of the society ('to escape the lot of my class, of my nation, of my family)

2-) To be able to control oneself ('to conquer my most insignificant appetites and habits')

These two distinctions serve to reach to a definiton of freedom and need to be investigated separately with regard to their links to the traditional philosophy and to the assumptions they bring forth.

People who are not familiar with the Western idea of the individual as opposed to the rest of society might ask why it is necessary to escape the class, the nation and the family to acquire freedom. This idea depends on the opposition between the self and others, and mainly stems from the Enlightenment philosophy in which the society is considered to be composed of separete individuals who are - in Lyotard's terms- in a constant 'Brownian motion' - an analogy to the movement of the atoms of a gas in a closed container. As separate atoms, individuals come together with their own goals and wishes, and give up their will for the common good obeying a social contract (Rousseau). In the new structure of society, they still continue pursuing their own goals in new ways and being a member of a society imposes several limits on their freedom. Hence, each individual has to face two choices : to accept the rules of the society and be a member in it or to reject its rules and to escape.

This type of argument seems to correspond to two different ethical considerations. On one side, the problem of being free is seen as an ethical choice between individual wishes, desires and the common good of everyone. On the other side, to be free is considered a political problem of oppression versus being oneself and rebelling against the rules of the society.

The first type of the conception of freedom which can be seen in religions as well as in the theories that emphasize the unity of the society takes the society itself as the most important. To be free is not to pursue one's own goals but to give up these needs, to serve to the society, which can be done by the help of ethical choices. The second one takes as its basis the individual itself, supporting not the integration of the individual into a unity but its differentiation from the whole claiming that serving to others is a totalitarian point of view which rejects freedom. It is said that in our contemporary society we are not able to be ourselves, to follow our own

ends. Society imposes us rules that we must obey, giving us certain roles and demanding efficiency from us. Thus, we are stripped off from our identity. This can be seen in the works of most existentialist writers as well as in the avant-garde movement. In Camus' Stranger, Mersault, as a atomic individual who cannot figure out the meaning of his life, kills an Arab in his nausea whereas Breton, the founder of the surrealist movement, claims that 'The best surrealist action to make is to take a rifle and shoot over people.All of these explain the standpoint of Sartre according to whom 'The hell is others. One must either be a cog in a machine or to overcome that machine. The freedom of the individual depends on his ability to free himself from the chains of the society.

However, to reach to the true self beyond the tags and labels of the society, one must have a certain conception what the self is and what being ourselves means. For Sartre this is to be able to conquer our most insignificant appetites and habits, to be able to control ourselves. As the reader might guess, this force which decides what to do and what not to do, which decisions that will determine who we are to make is the reason itself. This is a separation, a dichotomy between the consciousness, reason and the rest part of our being. This idea can be traced back to the Platonic idea which states that reason governs all the other parts of our being like a horseman on a horse. But Sartre is mostly considered as a Cartesian who believes in the power of the ego and in our consciousness. When we obey the rules of our reason (as Descartes as well as Kant would agree) we can be free. Instincts, desires, unreasonable wishes prevent us from being ourselves, thus from being free.

Thus, for Sartre, being free is a combination of these two : It is to be able to control ourselves by reason, to be able to act rationally and to make decisions with clear thinking, by being conscious of our true selves not obeying the rules of the society but the rules of our reasoning. This is the way in which we act freely.

After having laid out the structure of the argument of Sartre in which he can prove that we can be free in our contemporary society, I can come to my criticism about the very elements of this structure, namely, the dichotomy between the self and the rest of the being or the dichotomy between the self and the others.

As Marx and then structuralists have shown, society is not a composition of different individuals who pursue their own goals, but a structure in which every individual acquires his own role. Our very goals, wishes and desires are determined in this very structure. Therefore, even if one escapes the institutions that have been formed such as the family, one is still not free, for his identity, his social being have been determined by the power relationships (Foucault). There is no outside of the structure.

This idea can best be understood while considering the self. Our selves are not dependent on reason for reason can be affected by our whole

being. The effect of the subconscious (Freud), the effect of society and economical relationships (Marx) and power relationships and our will to power (Nietzsche) each influence who we are. It can be said that our choices and reasoning also effects this process, but it is clear that our perception of ourselves is open to change and society has a big influence on our identity. Our identity is not a unified whole, but it is directly relational to every other being (Heidegger). The hell is not others who influence our ethical choices but ethics (which is the way to acquire freedom) 'is the face of the other' (Levinas).

This introduces several problems to the existentialist idea of Sartre since while we make decisions, our decisions are in fact determined by the structure itself. In other words; to use Deleuzian terms, the domain of our possible choices is determined by an either-or mechanism in which we can choose something or the opposite of it, say yes or no, to be ourselves or not to be ourselves.

In this structure in which our every action is determined previously, in which the social terrain is structured like a chessboard, whatever we choose and whatever we do, we cannot be free since it is impossible to go against the society or to control our own actions. By trying to be an individual in fact we imprison ourselves to that identity which is a cog in a machine so that to be outside the mechanism is the same with being inside the mechanism/ To be an individual is not enough to be free. Instead, to reject the idea that freedom is to be ourselves, to be able to control ourselves and to determine who we are, what we are, and to try to distinguish ourselves from others and others' wishes with the illusion of a self is necessary to get freedom.

Therefore, the poststructuralist option in which we don't try to discover our identity and to control ourselves and hence to distinguish ourselves from others in an individualism but try to find new ways to exist, to seek to alter the conditions and not totally to reject the structure but to try to find its shortcomings and 'lines of flight' (Deleuze) is the best way to be a traveller, a person who continually seeks freedom and who in his travel from one existence to the other. As a conclusion, and as a line of flight from the structure of Sartre it is necessary to respond to Sartre's remark with a quotation from Foucault : "In our age what we can do best is not to discover ourselves but to reject who we are."

Existence and Freedom: Why Mankind can never be truly free

Seungwon Chang (Korea>

Man, ever since the beginning of human existence, has never been free. Social freedom, though it has been upheld by many esteemed philosophers, may actually be nothing but an illusion. Moreover, the notion that we are free seems ridiculous considering various circumstances. Sartre's opinion that we are not able to escape from the reality of our actual existence is a very good argument of this thesis. By saying that we are not free to "escape the lot of my class, of my nation ¡¡¡.to build up my own power or my fortune or to conquer my most insignificant appetites or habits," Sartre was trying to tell us that many aspects of social life are far beyond the control of ourselves.

Then why is it that we have no control of these matters, which are essential parts of our life and therefore presumably absolutely necessary to our existence? There may be many reasons, but I believe that one of the most important reasons is that the relationship between an individual and a society simply does not allow it. In the case of the individual and the society, there is a distinct difference in the powers either party can exercise upon the other. The individual is usually the loser, and thus we can deduct that one only has a weak influence on the society itself. Although there is the exception of social scientists and instigators, most individuals only have a flimsy appeal to society itself.

There is another aspect of society that we must not forget. According to the Taoist observations, society and all manmade things are nothing but wei, or artificialities. Moreover, Taoists claim that wei, as it is created by men, is imperfect and therefore prone to error and absurdity. This explains why personal freedom is hard to achieve in society when many philosophers and sociologists assert that freedom is a natural right of human beings.

However, these simple observations are not sufficient to explicate the true reason why we are impotent in achieving freedom. There is a deep, profound reason why we cannot acquire freedom. Therefore, I will attempt to delve into the matter, and explain why we are not free to do what we want.

First of all, I would like to define what freedom is. There is a closely related term to freedom - liberty - that many people use in an analogous way. But I dare to make a distinction between the two terms; liberty, I believe, is more of a political, economical type of freeness while freedom is the ability to do what we desire to. In defining thus, we can distinguish the freedom is in question today from the liberty that many people in the Enlightenment era craved for. I do not say that the philosophers of that era thought any differently as we do now; in fact Rousseau and Locke all asserted that mankind must be given the freedom to live as it desired. However, the common people of the day possibly believed that freedom meant a release from the tyrannical government of the aristocrats. Therefore, we arrive to one reason why true freedom is hard to find in our society of today; our forefathers who created the present system of

government were more interested in the political freedom of mankind and less enthused about true freedom itself.

The second reason that we are not truly free is that mankind was never truly free from the beginning of its existence. As the English intellect Houseman said in his poem, "In a world I haven't made, I am a wanderer, afraid." We human beings were all born in this world not out of our own will, but by some other will, whether it be God, fate, or Providence. Our existence therefore, cannot be said to be truly free. We did not have the freedom to choose whether we are born or not, nor did we have the freedom of choosing our nationality, race, sexuality, etc. The claim of H.G. Gadamer that we belong to history is a different phrasing of this fact. What he was trying to say is that we are but a part of history, and it is not us humans that make history, but some other great force that also provided for our existence. Therefore, we are but small dots in the endless line of history, and we do not have much control of history, both the present and the future. Thus we can say that we are "wanderers" in this strange world that we did not make, and we can do nothing to change it.

Third, we should consider the kind of society we are living in right now. There are two types of society I will discuss here, Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft. A Gesellschaft is, as you probably know, a society that is based on mutual interest and contract. On the other hand, a Gemeinschaft is a kind of a community, and it is not necessarily based on interest. This fact is very important because our society is a Gesellschaft. According to the theory of social contract, men have created a contract to protect themselves from the dangers of natural openness. If such is the case, we can see why men are not truly free; if society itself is a binding contract, then we are forced to uphold that contract, and therefore we are restrained for the sake of preserving it. Though the contract was created to safeguard mankind's freedom, we are again tied down because of our commitment to the contract.

Fourth, there is the age long debate of fatalists. The fatalistic claim that everything is done according to fate is quite radical and hard to accept without skepticism. We, though not perfectly, seem to exercise some freedom in our life; we can choose to eat something or not, and we can choose to study or sleep. However, if we look more closely into the matter, we can see some disturbing facts. For instance, if the weather outside is bad, we will choose to not go on a picnic. But who is it that made the weather bad? In the above case, we would have gone on a picnic if the weather is fine. Thus, the weather made us do something, and we were not free to choose. Let us take another example. Suppose that a person is walking in the street, and he or she suddenly feels hungry. Obviously, that person will go somewhere and eat, because he feels the need to. That person "chose" to eat, but in fact he was compelled to by his hunger.

Of course, the factors I mentioned are not absolute. A person could

choose to go on a picnic when the weather is bad if he doesn't mind getting wet. Nor does he or she have to eat when he or she feels hungry. They could go on a diet of a fasting. Although this is true, we still cannot deny that these factors play a large part in the making of the decision. Here is an example. Suppose you like green instead of blue, so you buy a blue pen instead of a green one. At this point we can wonder, "Why is it that I like green?" Our appetites and tastes are something we cannot explain or control; we were simply created to be that way. We can never answer questions like, "Why do I like thinking?" or "Why do I hate beef?" What is important here is that these appetites and tastes which we have no control of play a huge part in our decision-making process.

Fifth, there is the problem of integration. Individual beings are integrated or incorporated into society. Then they are organized into various groups or classes. The terms mentioned just before - incorporate, organize - must be considered seriously. Incorporate comes from the Latin word corpus, which means body. Organize comes from the Greek word organa, which literally means barrel organ, but has been expanded to mean body parts. Therefore, we can deduct that the terms mean something corporal, or body related. From this arises the question of organicism. As the terms plainly show, becoming a part of society is akin to becoming an organ inside an organism. Having deducted this, we can now discover another reason why human beings cannot be free; if we are nothing but organs, then how can we decide things for ourselves? A stomach or a heart does not think for itself; it merely does what the brain commands it to do. Similarly, many of us human beings are forced to do what the creme de la creme of our society tells us to do, and thus our freedom is somewhat crippled.

One point I must mention here is the personalist point of view. Some personalists like Herbert Spencer flamboyantly argued that it is the characteristic of the individual that defines a society's traits, and therefore the individual can be deemed more influential. While I agree that this is true in the premature stages of society, this does not quite match the societies of today. For example, when the first human tribes gathered thousands and thousands of years ago, they probably had similar traits and personalities because they were closely related. Also, as the groups were relatively small, an individual would have had much more impact on the whole group. These members probably played a big part in creating customs and traditions of there respective groups. As the groups grew larger, groups with similar characteristics probably came together, because it is the nature of humans to socialize with those that have similar tastes. But when these groups eventually became nations and countries, the groups now grew into enormous masses of people, and the effect an individual has on the whole shrunk to almost nothing. By now, the characteristics of the societies would have been established, because of the groups' traditions and experiences. However, newborn members of these groups at this national stage have no power to change the tradition that has been established; in fact, they are forced to accept it.

Some will claim that as the generation changes, the traits and characteristics of a nation will change. That is true. But we must realize that we do not have a control over a generation's characteristic. Various external elements create generations, and we are not free to choose what our generation is like. Also, there is the problem of outsiders. The famous French writer Camus said that outsiders tend to go against the flow, and they are always away from the crowd. If a generation forms a person's character, we cannot explain the strange behavior of these outsiders. There are two reasons why outsiders go against the flow; they are influenced by different external elements than the population, and they tend to hold a skeptical view. Though outsiders may seem like they are free, and thus a proof that man is free, in truth they are not. As I explained above, most of there behavior comes from external elements that the normal population does not experience. Also, a psychological approach could be used here. Outsiders may be experiencing the opposite of the Newman effect. A Newman effect is the tendency of people to please others. But outsiders, feeling a deep resent of social restrictions imposed on them against their will, try to not please people to compensate for their mental damage. Though this may seem to be a ridiculous surmise, it does provide some insight for their behavior.

Sixth, the "alienated reification" of Feuerbach can also be used to explain why men are not truly free. Alienated reification on a social basis shows that every social idea is reified separately for each society. This theory explains why members of the same society hold a similar view on important abstract matters. Because of this social sympathy, a person's character is more or less formed as the society wants him or her to be. That being the case, our freedom to be what we wish to be is greatly lessened.

Seventh, there are economic explanations. Karl Marx's materialism holds that all societies are formed by its economic structure, and that political, social structure is dependant on the form of the economy. He asserted that mankind is Homo Faber, or producing man. While the materialistic viewpoint is somewhat extreme, we cannot deny that economy plays an important part in the creation of a society, and the formation of its political, social systems. Therefore, as the society is altered by economy, so is personal character and our ability to choose.

Another important effect that economy on our freedom is that it defines our lifestyle. If a person is born into a poor family, he or she is less likely to go to a university or a college than a person of a richer family. It does not matter whether he or she wants to go to college; his or her family simply cannot support it. Also, even if a poor person wants to live in a mansion, he or she cannot, because he or she does not have sufficient funds. Thus we can say that our freedom is limited by our economic status.

Some will ask why we cannot simply do whatever we want to. Those people say that the poor student in the previous paragraph could barge into a classroom and start listening. However, that is absolutely ridiculous. Every part of our society is a sort of an agreement, and we as members of society must respect these agreements. If such agreements are broken, then our society would fall into what Durkheim called anomie. Therefore, we can see that economic hindrance of freedom is in touch with the social contract theory. This is in accordance with the argument in my seventh paragraph.

Eighth, we can take a psychological approach to the matter of freedom. The person we are is usually represented by our ego. The state of consciousness that we are in quotidian life seems to make all decisions. However, Freudian theory suggests that there is a "superego" which we do not recognize normally. This superego is a sort of a supervisor that looks at our conscious ego and stops it when it feels that the ego is doing something morally incorrect. While some argue that we are still free because the superego is a part of ourselves, this is not true. The superego is really a different personality than our ego, and we have almost no control over it. If we do not have control over it, we can not say that we can make it follow our own free will. Therefore, the superego is not a part of our free will, and quite the contrary is true of it. The superego is something that restricts our freedom.

When talking of superegos, we must be careful not to mix it with the conscious anguish we have. Anguish is a product of the conscientious, and we are aware of it. Thus we can say that we make a choice with less or more free will. However, superego happens unconsciously or subconsciously, and we cannot exercise any power over it. The superego bans us to even think of the matters that it thinks is not worthy. Hence we must not say that we are free because we do not feel the function of the superego, or mistake it for mere inner conflict.

Finally, there is the question of human existence itself. Some people will say that this is far fetched, but if you change your thought a little bit, you can see that this is very important to the matter of freedom. If our existence is not free, it is logical to assume that we do not have freedom. Therefore it is very important to look into the matter of human existence.

Zhuangzhi, a Chinese Taoist, once had a dream. He dreamt that he was a butterfly, and he was very happy, flying around and playing among the flowers. Suddenly he woke up. After he woke up, he was stumped with a question. Was he Zhuangzhi, or was he the butterfly? He could not tell if he was the butterfly dreaming that he was Zhuangzhi, or if he was Zhuangzhi who dreamt of being a butterfly.

What we can infer from here is that the material world we see is not absolute but relative. Therefore, we cannot be sure that our existence in this world is true or not. This world may just a dream we have created for

ourselves, or it could be a game that we are playing. We could be actors in a grand play, and we could be wanderers of a distant dimension. But nothing is for sure. We cannot say with surety that what we are experiencing is true. If such is the case, and if a different outer world exists, then how can we say that we are free? If this is just a play, then there will be script that we are following without knowing it. Thus we arrive at the question of ultimatum again. We cannot deny that there may be some universal order that the world is following. Then, our lives and our decisions may be predefined, and what we think of as free willed acts may in fact be our destiny. Though these are only assumptions, they are quite likely, and we have no evidence to the contrary. Therefore, we cannot reject the notion that we may be ruled by some preset order.

But a deeper problem arises from this train of thought. If we cannot define that the world we live in is true, can we define what is true at all? If there seems to be nothing definite, how can we tell if something is true or not? We cannot tell that freedom exists or not, and we cannot even be sure of our existence. Descartes' assertion, "Cogito ergo sum" is too weak to be evidence that we exist. The thought that we think and that we have the ability to think may also be an illusion. Descartes failed in denying human existence only because he had a profound belief that human contemplation truly exists. However, contemplation and speculation may also be nonexistent. It may be nothing but illusion.

Some will argue that we can never deny ourselves, because nothingness cannot imagine itself to be existent. But I will ask you this: have you ever been nothing? None of us have had an experience as being nothing. Thus how can we be sure that nothingness cannot imagine itself to be something? It is hard for us humans to even fathom what another human is thinking. Hence, we can, with certain limits, presume that nothingness could seem as existence.

If such is the case, if we are nothing, and if nothing is existence, then there is no point in arguing that there is freedom in our choices, because they will a mount to nothing. While this thesis is perhaps too grandiose, it does give us a certain point, and that is freedom cannot be confirmed with our singular experience. The traditional Yin-yang theory is also in accordance with this thought. Death and Life, Light and Darkness, and many other polarized elements would revolve around each other until one day they become one cosmic force, or chi . A material proof of this is the Mobius strip. In the strip, there is no difference between the front and the back. It ultimately becomes one, and there is only one side to be seen. If it is hard to imagine how two different things can become one, think of the Mobius strip. In all, we can say that freedom is the same is being not free, and thus freedom can exist and not exist. Simply said, we cannot be sure of the trueness or the existence of freedom, and therefore we cannot say we humans enjoy it.

In the pages above I have attempted to give many reasons why men

cannot be truly free in many branches of the social scientists. The reasons given were political, social, philosophical, and social reasons. Also, attempts were made to explain the true sense of freedom through the problem of human existence.

Freedom, I believe, is just an illusion that mankind has created. However, it is a useful illusion, like money value is. Money does not have any value, but it still serves a useful purpose, and everyone accepts the idea. It is my profound belief that freedom is no different from money. Whether it is a mirage or not, it serves a noble purpose for the whole of mankind; it helps us keep our sanity, our self esteem, and our ego. Freedom should be sought for even if it does not exist. Freedom is just like veritas, an absolute and ultimate value that we human beings must try to conquer but will probably not be able to. But still, Confucius said that we "should follow our goal, even if it seems impossible, for some day we may achieve it." And what does it mean to us if we don't find it? The whole process of striving for freedom is one of the most valuable and noble things that we can ever do, even if it ends up to be a wild goose chase.

Does science need philosophy?

Matija Lavrinc (Slovenia)

1.Introduction

Science is highly esteemed nowadays. In our everyday lives we meet with expressions like "scientifically proved" or "confirmed by the scientists" which are trying to imply that some thing is definitely true (especially in the marketing). It plays an important role in our educational system. Science is in a way a synonym for the right way of approaching the truth, for the objective and proven knowledge - and this concept is not unjustified. Scientific and (especially) technological progress in the modern age have changed our live dramatically - we believe that mostly in positive way. Science has been able to explain and predict some aspects of our world very accurately. On the contrary, philosophy is not very appreciated among many people. This is well seen in the fact that the concept of philosophizing is many times being used to express useless thinking or talking (talking just for the talking itself). The view that in the age of science philosophy is no longer needed is generally held by many. (Comte was one of the first who was claiming this - his concept of progress was divided into three stages - the religious, the metaphysical and the positive stage. The metaphysics should therefore make room for positive, that is scientific stage).

2.Hypothesis

I think that concepts like this are can be very misleading and they stem from misunderstanding of the relationship between philosophy and science. So, in order to find out the answer to the given question, we must first look at how philosophy and science are related. (I would like to add at this point that in this essay I am mainly concentrating on the part of philosophy concerned with the problem of truth (the same problem that science is dealing with). There is of course another very important aspect of philosophy interested in the meaning of life, in the purpose of our being.)

3. Philosophy - the predecessor of science

The first connection is that science developed out of philosophy. What is true, how are the events in the world connected, why did something happen - this are the basic questions of science today, and they were the basic questions of philosophy for ancient Greeks. Science is interested in the explanation of the world (and consequentially in the prediction of events). Thales from Miletus, known as the first philosopher, was looking for the basic substance of the world (he came to the conclusion that everything is composed of water, which is of course wrong, but it is the question that is important). Also, he explained the flooding of the river Nile by winds (also not right) - this was the first time that some natural event was explained by other natural event and not in terms of some supernatural forces. Democritus, also ancient Greek philosopher, set the thesis that the basic matter is atom - and more than two thousand years after that this view has been confirmed scientifically (it was later found out that atoms are not undividable as predicted by Democritus, but that is the point of a progress - and also, science still seeks for the undividable parts of reality). Pythagoras saw the reality in numbers and it was Pythagoreans that first predicted that the world resembles some mathematical features and that it can be described in the mathematical language (something that today seems very clear to us, for we would be lost in physics without math). So the questions that has concerned philosophy are the same questions that has concerned science - philosophy used to be the universal science. And when the answers were found (and new questions arose, more specific ones), this universal science was divided on different parts (physics, chemistry), each dealing with its task more specifically.

I would like to add that beside philosophy there is another foundation on which science has been established - that is the practical point. Beside the truth man was also always interested in how to control nature, how to do something as practically as it can be done. Some chemistry for example was based on alchemy. But it is due to philosophical aspect, to the questions of truth and thinking of the first philosophers that science succeeded in such a way as it is.

4. Metaphysics

Still, some of the philosophy (as a universal science) remains only philosophical. Metaphysical explanations are still present today although science is taking over the question of truth. And that is why some hold the belief that it is useless and not needed. For example logical positivists claimed that it had to be ruled out of scientific field (they claimed that something is either true or false (analytically or synthetically checked) or nonsense - and by this criteria the metaphysics is therefore nonsense). Wittgenstein, from whom they got the inspiration, held the view that all the philosophical question arise from misuse of language and should be therefore abandoned. But if his advice was listened to by the ancient philosophers, than we would have never came this far in science (if it could even be called science then). And if the questions of philosophy has encouraged mankind to think and to come to some scientific discoveries ones (well in fact many times until now), than they can definitely contribute to science in future (or, to put in a logically valid form - there is no reason that they cannot). Therefore metaphysical thinking should be retained, if not even encouraged - philosophy is needed for the scientific advance.

One reason more for this is the astronomy dealing with the question of the beginning of the universe. It is publicly accepted as scientific, although the line separating it from metaphysics is very thin - all the theories are in a way metaphysical. Albert Einstein, responsible for one of the major physics advance (he developed a relativity theory), also emphasized the importance of metaphysics - because it frees the human mind of prejudices - that is of a specific, used way of looking at the world, which limits us).

5. Logic

Logic is the basis of human thinking - it is a formation of reasoning, which is the basis of all knowledge we have. It is a description of reasoning; it sets out the rules for it and distinguishes inductive and deductive reasoning. And it was founded on the ground of philosophy (rational thinking). Logic is a part of philosophy that is accepted as a formal science. The first who put it in a set of rules was Aristotle. That it is a science is also confirmed by the fact that progress was (and still is) needed. Some logical problems were resolved as recent as in the beginning of twentieth century (by Bertrand Russell or Alfred Tarski). So the position that philosophy is not needed in science is in a way a contradiction, since that would require abandoning logic too.

6. Philosophy of science - the explanation of explainer

The task of science is to explain the world, predict the events according to this explanation and use the results in benefit of human. The successes of science are definite - we are able to predict many things (so the explanation is also believed to be true) and the usefulness are well seen in the very fast technological development. The philosophical question here is obvious - how is this possible? What is in science that works so

well - what is the scientific method? Epistemology has always been dealing with the question of how to attain knowledge. Then science happened - knowledge was somehow attained, and we are now concerned with the question of how did we attain knowledge. (Of course the original question of epistemology still remains, that is the question of real ultimate knowledge).

From the empiricism, which emphasize the importance of sensual data - the facts, comes the idea that scientific theories are generalizations of these facts. Scientists should observe the nature without any presumptions and collect data, on the ground of which he would then form a general theory (using inductive reasoning). This view was held by many scientist (for example Newton) and philosophers (Mill), yet is suffers a very big problem, (first pointed out by Hume), known as the problem of induction - one the ground of finite observations I cannot form a general law, which would refer to every possible event (inductive reasoning is not logically valid). Karl R. Popper solved the problem of induction by rejecting it - instead he set the theory that scientific hypothesis is constructed by the scientist (using their imagination and intellectual skills), and then tested with observation (test is an attempt of falsification for Popper). If it is falsified, the theory should be rejected; otherwise it is established true (not as absolute truth but as the best available approximation of truth). Also, pointed out that an observation must always be leaded by a theory - because only that way scientist can establish what actually he is observing, what is relevant for him. This account of science is much more comprehensible, although it also suffers some shortcomings - it can correctly describe the relationship between observation statements and scientific theory, the question of objective reality still remains (because sometimes the theory is true but the observation statements are false).

However, one might ask what is the point of seeking the method, since science obviously seem to be working just fine without it. But it could be of help at the question of demarcation of science (the distinction between sciences and non-sciences). And also, it uses the concepts of truth, which encourage philosophical thinking and that could lead to some new scientific discoveries.

7. Science and the meaning of the life

As I mentioned, beside the truth philosophy is also very interested in the meaning of life. Science can be also looked at from this point of view - is science good, does it brings happiness to the mankind, is the purpose of life hidden in science, and so on. Nowadays it is of course generally accepted that it is positive, but what if the purpose of our lives is elsewhere. Due to that reason to philosophy must remain present in our mind.

8. Ethical problems

In scientific advance, especially lately in genetics, we have come to some very difficult moral questions. Their answers will have major influence on the future progress of the science in this are. And it is a task of moral philosophy of science to deal with them - that is another reason more for the philosophy to be needed in the age of science.

9. Conclusion

Ass I showed philosophy and science are deeply related - science started from philosophy, some scientific problems are dealt with metaphysically, philosophy liberates the mind which necessary for the scientific advance, logic (formal part of philosophy) is used in every science, philosophy is also dealing with the question of science itself, it is needed to establish (or reject) positive effect of science on our lives, and to cope with some ethical problems provided by the science. From all this I conclude that science does need philosophy.

German Diaz (Argentina)

Sartre shows us a common-sense truth, which simply states that we are not free. The reason for this assertion is somewhat easy: how can we be free -how can we decide and change at our whim- if we just cannot change the situation we are into? At first sight, this might sound reasonable -why not, if it is common sense?- but there are some problems with this conception that we should consider. First of all, this popular opinion seems to match freedom with "whim", that is, with a totally subjective election. And, secondly, here the other people appear as obstacles to my personal freedom. The question would be: can we be free living surrounded by other people?

We cannot decide whether to live with other people or not, that is, we are always involved in some kind of relationship with other human beings, we always live in a human world. There is always someone next to me. But what does that someone mean to me? We can name and explain two different opinions. One of them says that other men are the worse thing that could happen to my freedom. The other one says that, on the contrary, there is nothing better for me than the existence and company of other men.

The first one shows men as selfish individual who only want to achieve some personal goals and satisfy individual needs of their own. But as everyone whishes to get what he wants, it is impossible that the "needs" of the members of a group do not get into conflict among themselves: it is almost certain that someone's wishes will be opposite to mine, so there has to be a struggle to achieve personal goals which will end up with

someone not being satisfied. This person, thus, will not have been free to choose and get what he chose. This is, more or less, Hobbes' idea.

On the other hand, Spinoza says that, in fact, other men are the most useful thing for me. As Hobbes, he also says that men try to satisfy certain personal desires, and that this originates a conflict between men. But, as the only thing that prevents us and stops us from achieving our goals is that constant fight and opposition (because, according to him, one is entitled to everything one can), when we get together and find the way to solve the conflict -when we make that conflict disappear- we can be absolutely free. That is, as there is always some kind of conflict that challenges freedom, the only way of being free is solving that conflict, and that can only be done by those who are therein involved. In this way, there is nothing better than the others.

So, we see that men can be either "wolves" or "gods" to each other. This two ideas seem to be completely opposite, but they are actually not. They have in common a conception of man always acting "at whim".

Now, before going on, let us remember one of Charles Taylor's ideas. This Canadian philosopher establishes a difference between convergent and common goods . The distinction is related to their characteristics in relationship with other people. A good is convergent when it does not depend in itself of being shared with someone else. Taylor gives the example of the relationship with the State and the Police service: the Police is a good for every citizen, but as individuals (it would make any difference if I could accomplish its functions by myself, but, as I cannot, I have to make use of a public service like the Police). A common good, on the other hand, can only be achieved when it is shared with someone else. For example, political autonomy.

The point is: is freedom a convergent or a common good? If we accept that we always act because of individual preferences ("at our whim"), we can only say it is a convergent one. Why? Because thus we only care about our own interests, and we are only interested in other people when we need them to achieve our goals. Let us see in the examples we gave. The gathering Spinoza recommends is only "good" because it is the only way in which individual persons can attain what they want and are entitled to, but not in itself. The same happens with Hobbes'. But can freedom be reduced to simple "acting at our whim"?

This idea of freedom can be called (to give it a name) "individual". But it is certainly not the only one. We can find another conception: "political" freedom. Political freedom, as such, is a common good. Politics implies human groups, so it would make no sense to think of individual political action. But does "political freedom" mean? We can find an answer to this question in Hannah Arendt's work. Developing the whole of her analysis (namely, an analysis on the classical Greek thought about freedom) would make this too long, so I will skip it and only state those of her conclusions

that can help us. The political sphere is the one that is placed above and goes beyond all natural and biological needs and determinations, and, as it is not determined by anything, it is a sphere of freedom. Here men have no reasons for not being equals (as they do have, for example, when performing those actions meant for the maintaining of life), and they are not only able to be equals, but they can also decide on any subject, for as we have just said, here there is not any kind of determination.

We have these two ideas (the individual and the political forms of freedom). They both seem to be legitimate, so the alternative is not easy. Which one should we choose? We said, in the beginning, that man is always involved in a human situation, in a human world. And I think that the conception that best suits this is the political one. The human world is a common world, there is no human world without a group of men. And the same happens with political freedom: it is a common good, whereas individual freedom could easily subsist in a world in which there is only one person: it does not (let us say it again) require the presence of other human beings.

The question we asked was: can we be free living surrounded by other people? Well, if we accept what we have said up to now, the answer is quite simple: it is not only that we can, but we can even be freer when are freedom depends of the other people.

Now let us go to Sartre's sentence. The "common sense" he talks about says we cannot act at our whim. And so what? We are not supposed to act at our whim. We are supposed to act regarding not only ourselves but also everyone else. It also says that we are not "free" to escape from those who surround me. I would rather like to change this sentence: we are not free IF we escape from them. And at last, I am not so sure that the kind of freedom we have been talking about does not allow us to "conquer our (¡!) appetites or habits". The only thing it makes reference to is the way in which we do it, given that we cannot disregard the rest of the community.

As we can see, I think the opinion of the common sense Sartre refers to is wrong. Perhaps the problem here is that "common sense"

Valeriya T. Vitkova (Bulgaria)

Man is historically determined. Before we come to existence in this world, there are already established and acknowledged values, virtues and ways of behaviour. This has been done by the societies, civilizations that existed before us. We are inevitably exposed to their pressure. They influence our identity. In fact, in a way, they pre-determine it by taking part

in the process of its creation. Therefore, we come into being that is already structured, constituted and determined.

The lot of my class, family, nation etc. has in itself already established a kind of "identity field". This "identity field" consists of the various, already acknowledged, identities I can choose for my-self. From this viewpoint I can conclude for myself that I have been deprived of my freedom, for I have the ability to choose amongst already determined field of possibilities. Thus I lack the ability to create my living self because the "identity field" has been previously established by other people. It is like a law to which I must conform to. Therefore, I cannot create my own truths and values, to define and re-define my individuality. I cannot change my existence and choose personally what is significant for me. If I conform to these already existing and defined patterns of conduct, if I follow them blindly, I would entirely lose my human freedom. And freedom is an "a priori" category for defining my individuality- the unique personal characteristics that constitute my very human nature. If I deprive my consciousness of freedom, I deprive it from the ability to choose and change. Thus I deprive my mind from the ability to think, for it would be a process no more useful in a determined and acknowledged world. Hence, it would not be possible for my very "I" to change itself. But if I lack this fundamental ability to change my-self as an existential being, then I entirely deprive my whole life, my living existence of meaning. I lack subjectiveness, I lack freedom, hence I turn my human quintessence into a lack. I transform my very human nature into the so called "being-in-itself" (Sartre). Since the "being-in-itself" is neither active nor passive, never-changing and non-personal, it remains closed in itself and cannot acquire being. It cannot surpass itself, it is a self-sufficient constitution and thus it cannot create its own existence. It cannot develop itself.

In order to save my individuality and fight the enslaving power of the determined world I should try to re-evaluate the already acknowledged virtues, values and ways of behaviour. I should have the power and courage to overcome the obstacles set upon me through history, to remove the boundaries of the determined world and re-gain my freedom. Finally I should be strong enough to free my consciousness and to provide my-self with the opportunity to produce its own personhood and uniqueness. Through freedom meaning "enters"(Sartre) my world. Since "existence precedes essence" we might as well conclude that freedom precedes meaning. That is why, when I find my-self into the hitherto state-of-affairs, I should be able to choose freely among the array of possibilities that occur at every present moment. Precisely this unique process of choosing is what enables me to create and define my essence. I exist and I acquire an extrovert stance towards the outer world. This means I am ready to communicate with the simultaneously existing beings in the outer world. To establish relationships and to re-define my personality. Thus, my very human nature becomes susceptible to change as a self-determining process.

This free stance of acting provides my existence with the aspiration to create and complete its essence. Therefore the aim to realize my human quintessence to the full becomes the main stimulant for my activeness and energy. Thus I turn into a "being-for-itself". My "being-for-itself", through its every act, strives after achieving completion of its essence. Thus I become a "being-for-itself" with the primary aim to become a perfect being-in-for-itself (Sartre). If my self achieves this level of existence, it would mean that my free consciousness would become the foundation of a totally new being-in-itself. This is so because the totally new "being-in-itself" would be able to think of itself in a reflective manner. It would be able to "bend back" its thoughts towards itself. Through this "bending back" my "being-in-for-itself" would be able to critically analyze its own essence and develop itself in a positive direction. Since this perfect and fully completed being is not achievable I can only define it as my ultimate goal. A goal, after which, I will strive through my whole life.

Having in mind the previously mentioned arguments, I would conclude that being able to escape from the enslaving effect of the historically determined world is being able to impose my very existence on it. To transform the world so that it is possible for me to be free. But transforming the outer world is identical with transforming my internal world, for it is my mind that creates the surrounding being and through its knowing manner. Changing the knowing manner of my mind would actually mean changing my consciousness. Thus I compel the already established values, truths and ways of conduct conform to my being as an individual. This means that I change them and create new ones. Through this act of changing I gain power to conduct my personal existence.

Through this fundamental activity I provide my self with the opportunity to create new values and gain significance. Precisely such values (which I have created all by myself) determine me as an individual.

The above described fundamental processes give positive direction to my existence. This means that although perfection is not achievable, I still have the privilege to choose to aspire to it. Thus I master my destiny and I undertake the responsibility for my future actions. But choosing for my self is equal to choosing for the whole humankind. (Sartre) Therefore I undertake responsibility for all humankind. And my responsibility turns into commitment to the other. This is my final "yes" to the world "here" and "now" and my final choice to struggle for my individuality and freedom.

Elena Bellodi (Italy)

The question proposed requests, first of all, the explanation of the terms called to our attention, science and philosophy. Philosophy, in the

etymological sense of the word, means "love (philie) for knowledge (sophia)": this implies the speculative direction it took from its origins (*). Science, on the contrary, comprehends the theoric knowledges which are of the base of the practical applications, indicated under the word "technique." In both cases, it appears clear the involvement of human person: who does philosophy? Who contributes to the development of science? The answer is the same, the human being. So before entering the question of relationships between science and philosophy a clarification about "what man is" is necessary, and we can find this one in the Western thought.

This clarification refers at old Greek philosophy: one of the first definition of man dates back to Alcmeone, who individualized what was under and above man: man found himself in the middle between God and animals, because he was able to deal with reason empiric data, to elaborate a technical knowledge (Anaxagoras) which allowed him to modify nature. Then was formulated on anthropological paradigm with the characteristics of human species: Thales formulated an axiological scale where man was followed by woman, barbarians and animals, like Aristotle recognized in the fundamental characteristic in the intellective potentialities besides the vegetative and sensitive qualities in common with plants and beasts. His physical peculiarities came from the environmental influence, according to Aristotle, so that Greeks, living in temperate climates, were perfects and couldn't establish relationships with barbarians; with Sophists we find one of the most important definitions of anthropological relativism by Protagoras: "man is measure of all things."

As it appears from this short explanation, the definition of the concept of man was elaborated by philosophy and it contains a reference to the practical approach of man to nature (as in Alcmeone and Anaxagoras). The strict connection among these three terms - science, philosophy, and man - will be the key-point of my analysis.

The intimate structure of science shows, as I have hinted, presents a double face:

1. the rational procedure followed by scientist to come to new theories. (theory)

2. the translation of this theoric whole into "praxis", into the concrete environment where the same scientist lives.

1. If science has to develop herself, it has to follow some rules of procedure, which I call "method." About the method of science philosophers of all epochs have discussed, and this shows a first interconnection between the two terms. Decisive positions, from this point of view, were taken by empiricists and rationalists. Empiricists, as Locke and Hume in the XVII century, exalted a construction of science beginning from experience: man's mind is a "tabula rasa", an "empty box" which

must be filled with empiric data picked up with objective behavior. This procedure, going from "singular assertions", where the importance is attributed particularly to observation, to "universal assertions" (hypotheses and theories), is called inductive-categorical process. In opposition to this, a rationalist as Cartesius sustained process from rational and universal hypotheses existing a priori to the particular assertions in touch with concrete reality: this is called hypothetical- deductive process. But, as Aristotle had given importance to the "right mean", I think that the best scientific behavior was theorized by these philosophers who saw the indissoluble relationship between the two aspects: the first was Galilei, who sustained that the observation of nature can't be direct, but mediated by preliminary conjectures, and that empiric data are necessary to improve and correct the waits(*). Now that I have indicated the 2 directions which can be followed by science, a question emerges: can these methods considered rigorous? Or, Can the scientist be absolutely sure of his results if he bases himself on one of the 2 methods, empirical or deductive one?

Here I see the first intervention of philosophy into science, which was asserted by Immanuel Kant. Kant, as a follower of Enlightenment, based his philosophy on the Critic of Pure Reason and Practical Reason, and also he brought the reason itself in front of the tribunal of reason. While metaphysics appeared to him a building without foundations, mathematics and physics appeared a rigorous knowledge, as Newton had showed it, but it was necessary to demonstrate how their process made them absolutely sure. His answer prospects a science made of "a priori synthetic judgments": through the a priori forms of space and time the scientist "absorbs" the empiric data from observations, which are filtered by these preliminary forms existing in the intellective knower "I". These observations, as they are in touch with nature, are called synthetic, because they join together the different natural particulars. Another, more recent example is represented by epistemology, which is properly philosophy of science, whose best representative is Karl Popper. Once the rigorousness of science had been founded and it legitimated the process to formulate a theory, now another problem was represented by the way a theory develops itself and a theory is surpassed by another. I think that Popper elaborated one of the most relevant discourse in this sense: he searches for a falsification, according to which a theory is scientific if it can be denied by base-assertions coming from experience. More "potential falsifications" allow a theory to become more precise, and so riskier, but at the same time with more empiric and scientific contents. This doesn't mean the exclusion of a theory after it has been falsified, because it is requested a better theory, in fact in Popper we find a multitheoric system based on the three-way comparison between two rival theories and experience. But the importance lies especially in the fact that on the methodological level a theory is never definitely denied, because scientist must consider all surest(*) falsifications always falsificable. Popper is father besides of the falsification theory also of fallibilism, which means the self-corrigibility of science, which is a non-definitive knowledge,

(episteme)(*) trying to approach to truth, as a regulating principle: this is the essence of scientific progress, a darwinian selection of the best theories, in base of their proximity to truth.

2. A more complex field is opened when science becomes technique, that is application of theories. I think that to understand the deep connections with philosophy we have first of all to consider the human spirit who subtended the development of science. If in the preceding treatment at point 1 man presented himself as a mere scientist who uses reason, now reason is overcome by the passionate trust into human potentialities, that is the trust in progress. Beginning from Bacon and his "Novum Organum" (XVII century), the figure of Prometheus embodies the human capacity of making new conquests, the main characteristics of progress are indefiniteness, unlimitednesss, the possibility of improvement in opposition to the ancient Greeks who had a static conception of knowledge. Also philosophy of history, founded by Voltaire, presenting history not as a circular movement but a progressive linear succession of facts which are determined by men and not by a superior destiny holds a relevant place. With the positivistic culture, according to which science is the unique possible method of knowledge, metaphysics is denied, the term "positive" means factual and ameliorative, we have the relegation of philosophy to a mere general union of principles and results of all science, it owns no more a own statute: this determination of ambits between philosophy and science at the end of XIX century will bring to see only the economic-scientific development of men and set aside values. This brings to a second consideration of philosophy and man besides the first about method. Beginning from the 2nd Industrial Revolution, science and technique new an accelerated explosion, which, sustained by the positive thought, has brought nowadays to a transformation of nature and man. Some scenarios are illustrated by Jonas, who underlines that nature, if before was able to reconstruct his order when it was modified (but man created little changes to it), now technique elaborated on the base of science allows to destroy it; also man, if before belonged to the limited sphere of political and social sphere, is now able to modify his own essence through, for instance, the genetic engineering. From this point of view, science needs inside itself a non-scientific orientation because if it's able to interfere with human essence, another discipline must protect it: that is philosophy. Human nature is axio-logical and logo-theoretical, as Gilbert Hottois wrote: human is sense, that is union of value and symbol, which depends on his history and culture: "culture is a specific characteristics of man, as the neck of the giraffe (Dobhzansky, "Evolution")" and the widest system of symbols is language, the origin of definitions on man, the "being's house where the man takes shelter" (Heidegger): So language can be connected with "ethics" in its meaning of "permanence". Besides this axio-logical nature man has also a logo-theoretical one, which begins from the consideration of man as "look", attributing meaning to what is; so vision and symbol are strictly connected. Language and symbol exist before the technological world, but if the science of the beginning of XX century now allows to modify the

same human nature, since man acts always in reference to values so that humanity and ethics are inseparable, I believe the same possibility of ethics is at risk: man has to choose between ethics and the other of ethics (the technological improvement allowed by science). Ethics means the choice of moral values which have been rejected in this "rationalized" world (Weber), the possibility for man to be still man and not to transform in a machine. In my opinion this problem must be faced by philosophy, both for the present and future time. I see in language, as I underlined above, the main instrument of a philosophical ethics of present, under the form of discussion, because discussion represents my opening to the Other: an ethics "of difference", like that of Levinas, elaborated after the violences of totalitarian regime, where the other isn't reduced to my interpretative categor

ies, but only for the fact he exists needs my responsibility to the point to put myself in his place. It's a condition of dis-inter-estedness, where being deprives himself of his ontological conditions of being: consideration of man is determinant and priority for the conception of all his relationships with the world, in this case in its scientific and philosophic aspects. The value of discussion is admirably stressed by Apel, with his ethics of global macro-responsibility, which, proposes three assumptions: the value of universality for the concepts of justice and solidarity, the possibility of all men to express their opinions, the collective resolution of human problems, in opposition to deontological ethics (Kant), utilitarian ethics, teleological ethics. The essence of Apel conception is the necessary permanent tension between a "real community", which makes factually possible the realization of problems, and an "ideal community", a regulative principle constituted by all humanity involved in these problems. Philosophy has the task to refound ethics, after the scientific transformations on society and nature, stressing the importance of truth, sincerity, collaboration (because problems are extended to the global sphere) and especially dialogue, a typically human characteristic. Individualism should be refused, and at the same time the refoundation of ethics needs the support of educational means, because man isn't influenced only by temporary rational speeches, but by a long forming based on the action models received with childish education. Also democratic open societies are requested, where a meta-structure surpasses the causes of the dialogue incomprehensions. I believe philosophy, as I mentioned before, need to have a look also at the future, at the possible consequences of technical-scientific process, as Jonas convention ("the principal responsibility. An ethics for the technological civilization") about an ethics of responsibility: his maxim is "in his year actual choices considers the possible repercussions on future generations" (fiat iustitia ne pereat mundus, in contraposition to the "principle hope" by Bloch, based on the wish of a best future. Jonas' maxim introduces a new subject of right, man of the future.

Science needs philosophy both for his objective method of development, and for his subjective and unforeseeable consequences on humanity,

showing still once the interdependence among these three aspects. Philosophy represents the conscience of science, theoretical-methodological and ethical; the couple science-philosophy is the couple theory applied to practice - moral reflexion, that is the man himself.

On the changed notion of freedom in the postindustrial age of biotechnology

David Kovacs (Hungary)

The question of freedom is one of the most ancient questions in the history of philosophy. It is connected with morality, history and its lesson (and that is this even possible or not), the "human nature" (and thus mankind's relation to the natural world), art and modernity (and - again - the connection between them), and many other questions. At first I would like to divide some different notions of freedom. "Freedom" is used in varying senses, and it is important to clarify it, because many debates about it are partly based on the ambigousity of this world. I regard "freedom" to be used in the following meanings in the history of philosophy:

1. Metaphysical freedom. This is the traditional notion. Especially the existentialistic direction used the word "freedom" in this sense, however it looks back to a long past. Philosophers like Kierkegaard, Pascal or Schopenhauer meant under freedom an independence of nature, of the external world. In this meaning freedom means independence, indetermination - from a strictly meant metaphysical-ontological point of view. A main principle of every existentialistic metaphysics has been that in this sense human is free, or to use Sartre's paradoxical expression, 'is sentenced to freedom' (and responsible for his acts). This makes it probable that Sartre did not mean under "I am not 'free'¡¡" a metaphysical determination but rather he disclaims freedom in the word's 2nd and 3rd sense.

2. Historical and social freedom. Despite these notions do not mean the same, I took them under one category, because both refers to a more practical point of view (and because the historical state has a strong effect on social freedom - for example, freedom in the ages of feudalism meant else than in the early capitalistic England.)

3. "Genetical freedom". This is a typically modern contemporary meaning of freedom. In the 17th - 18th century there was an essential question, are we born with "withborn ideas (idea innata)" (like according to Descartes) or our mind is a "clear paper", like according to Locke, for example. We would say nowadays: are we genetically determined (or, to be more

radical: predestinated) - or not. The modern sciences tend to show the second. We are submitted to our genes, and our ability to change ourselves is very limited.

4. Political freedom. I left this last not by accident: in many languages, freedom has a political meaning. English is suitable to make difference (like Locke) between political liberty (simply expressed: everyone does what (s)he wants to - until (s)he does not harm the interest of others) and the wider sense of freedom. However political liberty is also a kind of freedom, it is evident that in the quotation Sartre did not use freedom in this sense, while the other three interpretations, that human beings are socially (therefore historically), genetically or metaphysically determined are not surely (however the 1st is likely - only likely: we should think on the late marxizing Sartre's philosophy, which I think did not succeed to resolve the contradiction between Marxistic determination and existentialistic freedom - to be) excludable.

The end of this essay is to raise the attention on the actuality of this Sartre-quotation from the point of view of modern biotechnological progress and bioethics, therefore I will deal further mainly with the 2nd and 3rd notion of freedom, which are getting nearer and nearer to each other. The main problem is the following. The biological revolution of Darwin has radically changed the picture of man. In one respect it caused a really deep (and at first hardly acceptable) disillusion. Man has been no more considered to be the creature of god "after His face" but simply the creature of evolution, an inheritor of some "bestial" features, too. On the other hand, man has got nearer to know himself better. The biological revolution has radically changed the thinking of man and his history.

We know that our behaviour is at a significant degree directed by our genes. The reason why it restricts freedom - according to the present state of science - is that genes do no behave "for the sake of us" but "for the sake of themselves." The end of all genes is to copy its genetic program, and our body and thinking are submitted to this: that is the primer reason why we want to have children, to dislike snakes, to avoid loneliness etc. For a long time, the absence (or, to be more punctual, the limits) of freedom meant also that we cannot behave differently than what is permitted by our genes. The essential question is raised by the results of Human Genom Project: we have got known our "genetic map" and still we can modify them - therefore, we might be able to modify ourselves, the human nature (this was at first claimed by Francis Fukuyama). Our history can be considered to be logical and inevitable, like Hegel, Marx or Dilthey thinks or irrational and unforeseeable like according to Spengler or Tocqueville. In both case it is evident that the history (our political and cultural history) is a product of humanity. Our thinking about morality, law, history, arts etc. is tightly determined by our genetic construction. Although this construction slowly changes according to the evolution, the history of human kind is roughly 100 000 years old, and our political and cultural existence is even shorter: by no means longer than 6-8000 years,

which is an insignificantly short period of time from the point of view of evolution. On the other hand: if we can modify ourselves through our genes, we can fasten and radicalize these changes. The solution of technical difficulties about it - it is just question of time. What does it mean that we may take the role of nature and of evolution? We might become the lords and creators of ourselves? We might create a "superior man", getting nearer to Nietzshe's prediction than we have ever thought? Does it mean freedom? It could be logically claimed that the ability of modifying our genetic construction would mean freedom, if the lack of it means "slavery".

On the other side I would like to raise the attention on the fact that before the discovery of Human Genom Project, it was also possible to change human nature for a short time through medicines: hyperactive children can be transformed into calm and attentive ones due to Ritalin, antidepressant tablets can cure depression, etc. We can decide not only how we would like to behave, but that how we would like to feel and think, too. But is this really freedom? It is alarming that medicines may endanger personality in a really treacherous way. In the modern society, some ways of behaviour are condemned and some are preferred by the common thinking. This means that all our feelings and emotions get an implicit moral sign: aggression, hatred or the feeling of pain are "bad", love, calm and feeling pleasure are "good". However, "negative" feelings had (and maybe have) their own role in our lives: to mention two example only, aggression was needed to defend ourselves against beasts, and pain is important to raise the body's attention to dangerous things (like fire). The reason why "negative" (maybe it is more precise to say sympathic, in the meaning of a part of our nervous system) and "positive" (parasymphatic in the similar context) feelings are judged so is that the balance among them has tipped over now. We especially experience the disadvantages of aggression, hatred etc., because the contemporary social ideal is kind, lovely and able adaptable. But in other historical states (for example in the 11th century's intolerant religious battles) these ones were not so evidently desirable features.

Medicines, which has an effect on consciousness, are in the hands of society, a "mega-self", which has a strong pressure on us. Though hyperactives, for example, feel the adventages of correcting their behaviour through medicines, significant is the temptation to use medicines like drugs, not to cure but to bring our features to perfection. Is it still freedom - not rather the press of the mega-self, society's macro-will on the individuals own will? Genetic modifications may have an uniformalizing effect on humans, much stronger than the one medicines have. We have the power to modify ourselves, but after this we cannot predict anything surely about the future, because what could be produced might be not human any more.

It is likely that if we step on the road of biotechnology, that would bring the posthuman epoch of "our" (how far can we claim community with the

future "man") history. With a special attention on the meaning and possibility of freedom, there are many possible scripts of the future. I would like to just give a schematic of the main ones.

A) A possibility (a not very nice one) of the future is a genetically determined hierarchy among people. We know that we are different: people are born with different qualities, in families of different social state. But until now, the social and genetic lottery has been independent of each other. A more intelligent person, of course, has better chances to earn much money, to be reach and powerful, but (s)he cannot ensure the same to his children. The biotechnical revolution might change this. Anyone who had the ability to give his/her children the most advantegous genetic features (intelligence, good manner, beauty etc.) would do that. It is a serious reason for fear that rich people will have better chances of doing so, hence, in the long run, a genetically insured aristocracy would be created. Aristocracy is not unknown in history, but there are a big difference between this predicted and the in the past appeared aristocracies. In the past, however the supporters of aristocracy referred to their descent, the source of their power was rather their authority, their better education - so, social-historical reasons. They were not "better" genetically. In the later - still not existing - aristocracy, the referring to descent would be relevant because the advantages of this leading group would really be genetic. The ideas of the French revolution, the American Declaration of Independence, all the special human ideas of freedom and equality would loose their basis, because even in genetically people would be no more equal. Actually, such pessimistic visions were seen but Aldous Huxley in Brave New World. This book is especially actual nowadays. In Brave New World, Huxley draws a world based on castes: alphas are the intellectual leaders of society, betas are a bit less intelligent etc., eventually the semi-bestial epsilons do those works which a person living nowadays would find disgusting and shaming. Brave New World is a posthuman world: while the reader may think that world horrible and empty, everybody is contented with life. For the exceptions, there is soma or a separated island for the remains of humanity meant in nowadays sense.

B) Less pessimistic predictions are also taken. The other famous negative utopia, Orwell's 1984 has not come true. His dark predictions' starting point is not the biogenetical but the informatical revolution. Orwell was afraid of informatic revolution's possible antidemocratic consequences. Fortunately, he was not right (which of course does not decrease his artistic values). The informational revolution has not brought slavery but still more freedom to humanity, 'Big Brother' cannot rule people but people can rule 'Big Brother'-s. This is seeable on that more and more countries turn to democracies.

Maybe Huxley was not right, either. Genetic modifications on humans may bring us more freedom instead of a new kind of hierarchy, too. For this serious restrictions are indispensable, only international union can prevent

the horror drawn by Huxley

From above it is seeable that Sartre's assertion is to be re-explained nowadays. Sartre - and the whole existentialistic direction involving Jaspers, Heidegger, Camus, Berdiaev or Gabriel Marcel - was a historically understandable reaction on the social changes from the twenties to the fifties: the crisis which followed the first and the second World War and the moral question raised by industrial societies. Now we live in our postindustrial age. Industrial age brought with itself a curious system I would call "three-'I'-method": a) industrialization, b) integration, c) instrumentalization. I mean under this progress: the industrialization caused that the spreading of similar ideas brought a similarity in thinking and economic structures, too. Integration in this sense is wider than globalization, because it is present not in the economics and cultures only, but makes a circle with the 3rd step instrumentalization: as economics develop themselves, in the thinking of people ends are transponated by time into the non-existing, the ambiguous far future (and this could be a special demystificated sense of existentialism's nothing-notion in industrial societies, bringing industry into a contextual role). People loose their end, they see instrument in everything, goods but not values. Of course, it is hard to accept: thus demystification is followed by "re-mystification", the reborn of idealistic mythos. This is exactly able to keep an eye on the thinking of many modern philosophers, Kolakowski for example, whose former Marxistic - later neomarxistic - attitude has started to get nearer to a catholic resignation.

The sense of freedom has essentially changed, and I am not sure that it is relevant in its classical sense - the Sartre-quotation is to be interpreted differently than earlier, too, because it is no more relevant to the present state of human beings. Parallel to MacIntyre, who claimed that the notions which classically used ethical categories referred to, do not exist any more, I would say that the notions of freedom strictly distinguished in the beginning, can be no more so separated to each other. Historical-social and genetic points tend to have one source: they are in a difficult interaction. Our history has led to the time when we are able to change human nature, but history has always been determined by human nature. This "equation with two unknowns" must make us thinking of our future - and of that will this future really be our one? Due to the Human Genom Project, we have come to a head, but - we should never forget this - this did not transform us into gods. Our responsibility is that how can we make the best of this opportunity, and the future will show, do we decide right.

On the changed notion of freedom in the postindustrial age of biotechnology

Andreea Elena Simion (Romania)

The human inside the human being reclaims its priority! The history of humanity reveals its own concept as the history of modifying the man like the concrete expression of human a priori in the human like the characteristic of one's epoch-man. But the essence remains the same, even in an unconscious way : the human is free above all¡¦and it gives man his independence.

But to be free also means that the individual can't be sure of his identity. The uncertainty of his Being is the first temptation towards surrender. The human impotence becomes a political instrument for domination. The man is convinced that he can't escape from his class, his nation or even his family. He is condemned to give up a part of himself for the sake of the social consent. His so-called "primary aggression" is used to legitimate the control of his appetites or will and the instauration of habit. Habits give our life the certainty we need and produces the illusion of the impotence to change ourselves. In consequence, the theme of the quotation which I have chosen is the freedom. Can be the man free inside the social system next to the others?

The common sense sees freedom like the absence of constraint. On the other hand, a society is firstly a system and, as a system, it reclaims the existence of rules. More than that, the statistical system proves our previsibility in our actions. So, in appearance they are two different areas, which are mutual excluding. In consequence, man as a social being can't be free. On the contrary, I think that the man is fundamentally free, but taking advantage of "memory abuses" (P. Ricoeur), the political domain denies it in order to follow its own interests. Free doesn't mean isolated.

The first argument which I like to invoke is the definition of freedom not as the lack of exterior constraint or causes, but the action in accordance with man's whole personality (Bergson). To be free means not to surrender to the world but to participate in it with one's interior structure. The fallacy of modern society took the rationality as the domination of desires, so, as the premise to liberty. But rationality eventually lead to irrationality and gave birth to the anguish. In fact, freedom includes human interests and desires as taking part in his personality. A first counterargument that could rise is that this definition isn't applicable in experience, due to the fact that following personal interests means harming the others. But I think that this affirmation mistakes individuality with egoism and altruism with collectivity. Even so, a consent is possible from the perspective of the "invisible hand" (Smith). A second counterargument is that man's entire personality is a social construct and the liberty is because of that just an empty concept.

The answer to this counterargument takes the form of another argument in favour of my thesis: it makes difference between the "empirical ego" and the "profound ego". The first one is a social construct; it represents

the premise for the construction of the group. But the interior ego, the profound one, which is synonymous with the human, is in fact his real nature, whose characteristic isn't temporality such as we understand it, but the duration. So, man's interior structure isn't a copy of the exterior world; more then that, the duration is a form of freedom. An objection to my argument is that human nature doesn't exist than such as an instrument of uniformization, being the expression of the "hard thinking" (G. Vattimo), and those who sustain it are just expressing their "pretensions of knowledge about the human nature" (Rorty). I agree with the affirmation, but I must add that in my opinion, it refers to the rational knowledge about it. I think that not this is what does matter, but the fact that we have a certain intuition about it (not necessary logical). It isn't our conscience which surprises our essence; it's a feeling. And the felling of freedom is individual, not collective, so it doesn't hide a will to power. The freedom is the condition for the legitimitate existence of differences between human beings.

The third argument is the difference between sociability and socialization. Our nowadays societies are the result of socialization: the human has step out of his own world in order to dominate it by imposing different rules-social ones, political, in science and other types. Man's primary aggression is what makes it legal and it supposes his entire dedication to the norms. His freedom isn't useful in a practical society. On the other hand, sociability is the original characteristic of man: is what Heidegger called the "opening-towards-the-others". The human a priori isn't rational, but moral: it isn't about following rules, but a free choice between different ones, in acceptance with his interior essence. The moral sociability is the condition for forming a "communicative community" (Appel). A counterargument is its own impossibility to put in practice, and so, being just another speech four an utopia. First of all, I think that the great impact and the impossibility itself of utopia is what it's important of it. It's not a plan of action. But has practical influences in the critic of the existent society. Today is the domination of the common area- even the private is defined as the negation of it. More then that, technology increases our dependence for the common existence, especially with giving birth to new needs. In this context, the solution is to remember our humanity. The anguish will get smaller with the recuperation of the balance of relation between ethics and scientific progress or technique. Second, I don't think is actually utopia, in its exact definition, because it isn't an impossible society.

The fourth argument is the continuation of the previous: the political and social system is just a convention; it isn't natural (the essence of the social-contract theory). So, we can imagine an originally community, where man was both social being and a free one. It's the effect of his ambivalence : to have his own interests to follow and also to feel concern-with other words, the kindness- related with the other. The whole dedication to the general purpose is only the premise for the totalitaristic government and not a fundamental structure. To be free means to take the step out from the

impersonal mass and the social role , to respect not what the collective conscience calls like the " human specific" , but to respect one's interior humanity. Going along with the judgement of Spinoza, I affirm that this way, we are the most useful to the other than if we renounce to ourselves for their utility.

The fifth argument makes also a difference between Force and Violence. The first term is the capacity to make a virtual future real. It's the condition for creating values and rights. In this case, the Violence becomes its failure. The concept of the impossibility of putting in practice a free society (of course, in a limited way) and man's impotence is owe to their confusion, by a process of metonymy. In a society in witch the force has failed, violence needs rules for man's self-preserving, due to the many conflicts, like crimes, wars and revolts. But human fundamentally structure is based on force, so it can fail, that is true, but it can't be destroyed. The force means that man is free to chose his sense of life, to project himself in the future; he is not just actuality, but also potentiality (Sartre). I think it needs a critical attitude in order to express itself in our daily activity and thinking. It's similar with what Popper called " the open society". An objection is that man is a conservative being, he prefers the stats-quo once a basic certainty is assured. He takes his decisions in relation with the past, that I accept, but he can't be reduced to its own history. It would be the domination of the past in the so-called "obsession of commemoration" (Rabossi), a political way to control.

The opinion which I have sustained puts in the first place not our welfare, but our individual rights. But if I want that my position itself to be legitimitate from the point of view of the postmodern philosophy, I have to admit that it isn't an universal situation and it depends of the contextually differences (a society's reserve of goods, for example). Even so, the political does not have the right to deny human freedom for imposing a general purpose-in fact, the expression of its own interests. He can take advantage of the "positive rights", beside the "negative ones", where the situation reclaims it. If not, I agree with Nozick that the state witch doesn't commit any abuses is the "minimal state". However, nowadays, the technology reclaims our attention and the liberty at a formal level is turning into "relations of series" (Sartre). Are we really free in the social domain or we mistake the absence of direct constraint with the absence of an unconscious one? A discussion can take place just on a conscious level¡¡

---

*
*
*

International Philosophy Olympiad since 1993
www.philosopiad.org

Hosting Country of This Year

WRITING SUBJECTS for 13th IPO

1. If I had to choose between betraying my country and betraying my friend, I hope I should have the guts to betray my country. (E.M. Forster)
2. Today, the truth is dispersed across many universes of discourse which can no longer be arranged in a hierarchy. However, in each of these discourses, we search tenaciously for insights that can convince all. (J. Habermas)
3. Hedonism, pessimism, utilitarianism, eudemonism - all these systems that measure the value of things taking into account the pleasure or pain that go along with them, that is to say, according to any non-core condition or facts, are seen as if they do not go in depth and being naive. Any man with his constructive faculty in place and a conscience of an artist can only regard this with irony and pity from a distance. (F. Nietzsche)
4. Language is a labyrinth of paths. You approach from one side and know your way about; you approach the same place from another side and no longer know your way about. (L. Wittgenstein)

IPO 2005 AWARD ESSAYS

- Gold Medal
   ○ Mikolaj Ratajczak (Poland)
   ○ Tomasz Przezdziecki (Poland)
   ○ Alexandru Marcoci (Romania)

- Silver Medal
   ○ Marta Sznajder (Poland)
   ○ Antti Saarilahti (Finland)
   ○ Nora Labo (Romania)

- Bronze Medal
   ○ David Himler (Austria)
   ○ Patricio Kingston (Argentina)

- ❍ Woo Chan Lee (Korea)
- ❍ Jutta Obertegger (Italy)
- ❍ Jae Won Choi (Korea)

- Honourable Mention
  - ❍ Roberta Di Nanni (Italy)
  - ❍ Agnieszka Kurzemska (Poland)
  - ❍ Marcin Kotowski (Poland)

Gold Medal Essay

On Topic III
by Mikolaj Ratajczak (Poland)

In "Also sprach Zaratustra" Nietzsche wrote, among many others, one famous sentence, very similar to some of Christ's: now you all should forget about me, but when you'll find yourselves, I'll come back to you once again (it's not a quotation, but the sense was like this). And some might say, that Nietzsche did return, but not in the way he intended to - with the help of Hitler. And some might say, that the return of Nietzsche is only possible by the "eternal recurrence" that Nietzsche's demon speaks of, but it is not his thought that can be revived within the history of mankind.

What I'm trying to stress here is the fact, that the main body of Nietzsche's philosophy turned out to be impossible to be imposed on the culture. And this is not only the problem of Dionis himself (and his followers) but this is an issue that concerns more and more people all over the world. What do I mean by that?

I think (or, rather, I hope), that I couldn't find nowadays an educated person that wouldn't know Nietzsche's writings, or just the general outline of his thought. But what is strikingly common is the fact, that it is the critical part of Nietzsche's elaborated philosophy that had its influence on world's culture, not the positive one. There would be probably a large group of people that would say: "Nietzsche had some positive ideas? I think he was only impugning the basis of metaphysics and culture." And the way we percept Nietzsche's philosophy today shows the pitiful state of our contemporary culture.

It is the question of ethics, culture, philosophy, but mainly, it is the question that millions of people demand answer to: "What do we have left?" Is really hedonism, pessimism, utilitarism and eudemonism the only paths we can follow today? Today, after the second World War, today,

after the evolution of critical and deconstructive thought and finally, today, when, as the song tells as: "All faith has been washed away". Nietzsche, and many great philosophers .that spot this problem before it has occurred so distinctively didn't want to leave us hopeless and their intentions were to show us the way we can place ourselves over the values and over ourselves.

We have to admit, that today world lives with no values that would be, firstly, respected by all humanity and secondly, built over a sacred authority. They are not transcendental, they are not given to humanity by a God. Of course, religions still have many believers, but nowadays there is no religion, that would, like Christianity during the Middle ages, create one, general version of a culture for many nations. Even Europe, the most religious and fanatic continent in history renounced with its tradition and heads towards secularism (like France). The works of such a philosophers like Nietzsche, Marx, Freud, Stirner, Camus and Sartre managed to debunk the religious values and the tradition of ethics. So, is the humanity, with the field of thought totally wiped of any authority and any imposed way of development, able to "overturn values", to make their existence beautiful and not senseless with no imposed or bequeathed values and without escaping into hedonism or pessimism?

For me the problem is, that we can't almost find something that we can dedicate our lives to without metaphysic, and not making it humanity. It is obvious, that if we reject redemption and such terms like heaven or hell (or any other religious terms of prize and penalty for our lives), only two contradictory ways of living will be left: an egoist and an altruist. It is obvious. But, the problem remains, how we can define "an egoist" and "an altruist". With religious way of thinking, "the egoist" and "the altruist" are not easy to define: for example, how would we call a monk, that spent all his live in a monastery? An altruist? But he wasn't doing it for others. An egoist? But its hard to call one, that has rejected the pleasures of the world for his God, an egoist. Is a monk in Tibet an egoist? It is not so distinctive. But when talk about egoism and altruism without any religious and metaphysics terms, they are still hard to define. The easiest way would be, if we call an egoist someone, whose priority is to satisfy himself (make him happy). An altruist then would be someone who tries to make happy as much people as possible (it can also includes him, but he doesn't situate himself over others - his happiness is of the same or lesser importance than the happiness of others).

It might seem, that the problem of definitions is solved. But does it mean to serve yourself, to make yourself the most happy one? Or, can we call an altruist someone, that rejects himself and dedicates his life for something better than people (from his point of view). Who is an artist? Who is a scientist? Who is a philosopher (Nietzsche called him a combination of beast and God)? Are really hedonists and eudemonists the only possible egoists and are utilitarians the only possible altruists? Are people unable to find within the boundaries of this world something more

than themselves to dedicate their lives to?

It is a dangerous question. Nowadays culture teaches us, that we should be the goal of our lives. Our happiness and the happiness of our relatives and friends is what counts the most. I think, that this way of thinking has evolved mainly due to many psychologists' works (but not Freud!). They assert, that an unhappy man is a sick man, mentally ill, and that their job is to analyze his character and make him less alienated from the society. Treating great artists and writers as neuritics explaining their genius as a sickness leads to conceiving them as unhappy people that tried to gain some happiness or tried to fight their demons with the help of a pen or a pencil. This way of thinking leads to them being declined in our eyes. The genius is no longer someone that we should cherish, but he turns out to be someone that we should generally help, not listen to. Since Freud, that did his best to ensure people, that culture is needed and that man is nothing more than a animal without it, psychologist tried to impose on the culture their concept of an ideal human: happy with his wife or husband (no lovers), with some children, working hard and taking pleasure from it, spending rest of his time on leisure activities. If you're not in this scheme, you are bound to be treated as neurotic and other people, tempted by nowadays experts' of human psyche promises of easy luck will try to make you undergo a therapy. Remember, that psychology is a science, so they have scientific basis for their words. Maybe I do show it in a exaggerated way, but in my opinion, the trends in psychology nowadays tends to kill the diversity of human nature, treating more or less each person, that is not satisfied with his or her existence, in the way he or she feels the need of an Absolute or misses the mysticism of religion (one of the sources of philosophy) as a neurotic that should undergo a therapy. Thinking this way, will soon turn all philosophical universities into hospital for mentally ill people.

The other problem is the answer of today culture for the question: either to have or to be? The issue raised by many philosophers, among them the most famous like Fromm or Marcel (and also by the pope John Paul II) shows the problem of fast enhancing and rich societies. If there is no reasons for me to elaborate myself, I can stick to the easiest way of gaining pleasure - to buy it. Two problems: the term of perfection and the way of gaining pleasure. The perfection is hard for us to understand if we made the renunciation with the values. The perfect man is of course someone who fits the best the pattern of a culture. If we are religious, the one that fulfills the will of God is the perfect one. But who is perfect when the religion is no more and when people have no respect for the tradition? If the society doesn't share some general values, the perfect man (or the best among them) is the one, that can make his perfection more visible. And if they can't see the values (like Scheller would say), the only thing they can see distinctively is splendor, physical beauty, richness. In time, those easy to see characteristics become the respected values, because they are easy to be recognized, and within this new tradition it is easier for one to become perfect (better than others). And because people have the

tendency for the will to be better than the others, the mechanism is almost fully explained. With the death of the general, sacred values together with the death of the values of our ancestors we have no way of proving that we are better than the others by being better, because being better needs certain rules that we can fulfill. So, we have to be better in some visible way, ind it is to have more than the others. Its easier to say who is richest when I have one car and he has four cars. But it is harder to say who of us is better. And though is it hard to say now, which of us is better, we are making the possession, that is easily comparable, the criterion of perfection. The result is, that people today are searching for perfection in the material world - world of money, to be explicit. We have lost the will to be perfect in the world of Spirit, even if its no longer metaphysical.

The easy pleasure is a problem combined with the problem of having or being. The easy pleasure, such as eating, sex or plain talking with friends might not be the best sources of eudaimonia, but they are also very distinctive. In the times of multiculturalism we suffer from the feeling of alienation, perfectly described in Fromm's "The escape from freedom". The process of individualization leaves us alone, apart from the society, and we want to restore those binds. One of the ways to do it, not mentioned by Fromm, is to search your escape from freedom in easy pleasure. When you can no longer exist in the world of cultural pleasure, where such a high kinds of pleasure were to be found like art, poetry etc., people tend to look for the easy pleasure, with no cultural attachment, because it is easily recognized by others, no matter what culture they are from, and they get the message: look, I'm happy! And when you no longer cherish the religious values of afterlife prize and penalty, the happiness here and now turns out to be the only value. So it is the way one can feel better than the others, and the others see the way of being better the the other others, and in this way, the easy pleasure, like the material perfection, leaves us a way to escape from our freedom and from our egos, by making us easy to compare with others and making us exist in the world of values cherished by others. The bad thing is also, that the easy pleasure made its position in today culture, mainly due to popular culture from rich countries, focused on profits (sex sells itself great), but also, in my opinion, due to psychologist, the priests of today culture, who would treat their patients by making them happy. And if, together with the decay of traditional culture and cherished values, the way to be happy is either to feel pleasure or not to feel alienated (which are nowadays combined), the treatment might go only in one way.

The sad conclusions are, that people could easily destroy the tradition of values and debunk the basis of those values, but it is hard for them to create new goal for their existence. Nietzsche knew, that people need to "overturn values", to put, by themselves, something that oughts to be cherished in the place of old gods. But what can it be?

The four ways mentioned by him: hedonism, pessimism, utilitarianism and eudemonism, are all focused on a man - single man or all humanity. As I

have said before, with no metaphysics there are only two general choices for a man: to be an egoist (than he'll either become hedonist, or pessimist or eudemonist) or an altruist (that he'll either become hedonist or pessimist). What do we have to concentrate on to abandon ourselves and the humanity and find a goal that humanity is worth of?

We can make ourselves a goal, but not in the way contemporary culture mentions. We can try to rebel again the material perfection and restore the term of a perfection of a spirit. A perfection of a man that is perfect and not only has perfection. I will focus here on existentialism, especially on that of Heidegger's, that I find the most suitable as an answer to this demand. But of course, the last word will belong to Nietzsche, as it should in this matter.

If you make yourself as a goal of your existence you have to think about your life in a certain way. The way for example Stirner proposes is not enough - we need an ontological basis to treat our life as a piece of art, like romantics would say. And the fundamental ontology from Heidegger's "Sein und Zeit" gives us such basis. A man is being that is under the process of temporalisation. It means that we are not fully what we are or what we could be in every moment of our live. And that we exist in time, what also includes the possibility of reference to our being (this way of being Heidegger calls "Dasein"). Thus "Dasein" can think of itself as a being in time and that is sees its own death as something unavoidable ("Sein - zum - Tode"). With the consciousness of its certain death it can finally live an authentic life. Such questions arises: what is the authentic life and is my life now in the way I let it be worthy the fact that I live and that I'll die? We often do not think of our death as certain, but hen we do, we think of the way to make this life as much valuable as possible. And we soon find out, that pleasure and pain do not make our lives worth living or not. Like Sartre would say, we are not what we feel or think, because than we are nothingness, but we are what we make ourselves to be.

One way to live an authentic life, and this is also a goal for all humanity other than humanity itself, is of course art. By expressing your emotion or making our "Weltanshaung" objective to others we are making our existence a source of beauty, and beauty, in every culture and times, was also conceived as metaphysical value, sometimes even as the only one. Even if do not get closer to truth by thinking about the world or making art, it is still my victory over the element of life, like Dilthey used to call this process, that we could create beauty and add it to the beauty of life and world. The art truly has the element of Dionis in itself, and when we do feel abandoned by God, when we feel like orphans, alone in the universe and with no clear concept of the meaning of our existence, when we renounce with the optimism of the past, that we are able to ascertain the truth, we enter the path of Dionis and with no hope for us, we start to create art. And this is our victory, and this is gaining the perfection in the world of Spirit, the world that we create ourselves. The art is also a better way to create new criterion of perfection than the material ones (the ones

of having). Every artist is an artist and whoever creates is already better than those, that do not create at all. It's only his decision if he wants to be judged by others, but it is still the judgment of what his art really is. And he still is an artist. Existing as an artist in a world of Spirit, the world of beauty, restores the basic criterion of perfection as being perfect, because as an artist in the world of Spirit I am beautiful thanks to the art I create.

But our existence may also gain meaning if we dedicate it to something else, maybe even more noble - the search of the truth. The decision of that kind of living is very hard, from many reasons. If you are an artist, you are an individualists, but although your activity is followed by lesser or higher degree of usefulness, it has usually only the aesthetic value. If you create only for yourself you win with the feeling of loneliness, because you live in the world of Spirit and through this medium you can communicate with past and future artists. But if you create for others you are a better or worse artist, because you create for them and they can judge you. It is a risk. But you can also work both for human, for yourself and for something more - for the truth. This is harder, because if you remain just an artist with the consciousness that you create beauty and nothing else, you can decide whether your work is to be judged or no, but in any case it has sense. But a philosopher or a scientist must have the faith in something qualitatively better than anything from the world of matter, even the humanity - the truth (even the truth - it - self). Many philosophers treated philosophy as a kind of philosophy, that shows only the "Weltanschaung" of a certain philosopher (like Dilthey) but some even conceive science as a discipline of solving riddles, not ascertaining the truth (like Kuhn). We can always say, that their philosophy is thanks to their critical thought a part in our way to the truth, but what if there is no truth? And, what is more, nowadays any philosopher or scientist is bound to work in a team due to enormous amounts of knowledge he would have to otherwise ascertain, ant by that, he works with humanity and is automatically judged by it. He cannot remain anonymous, and remain in the world of Spirit (the world of humans' creation), but he has to work in the medium of the rest of the people. And it sometimes may be harder.

But nevertheless a man who menages to see the reality of his existence and the certainty of his death, will seek for the meaning of his existence either in religion or in altruism or somewhere else, but he will never be satisfied with hedonism or eudemonism. That is what I think and what I feel, and although there were hedonists like Epicure, who treated life like something, that is and that will pass, and that we shouldn't pay much attention to it. These are the thoughts of someone that is afraid of life and that is weak, like modern psychologist suggest us to be, taking care only of our happiness and not mentioning the fact that life is something to be made worthy, it is not worth living it just by itself. And some may point out the eudemonism of Aristotle, but remember: in his philosophy searching for truth gives us the most pleasure. It is not the easy pleasure.

Summarizing, I think that if we are truly aware of what we are as a

humans, we'll see, that there is, or there should be something more than our simple lives that we can dedicate them to. Some find it in religious promises of heaven or nirvana, some will find it in art, some finally will try to understand why is it like that and ascertain the truth, with faith that it is somewhere out there. If we are looking for a criterion of what makes an existence authentic, I think we'll find it within Nietzsche's thought. It's the positive answer for demon's answer: "do you want your life to be your eternity?". Can we sacrifice our eternity to something that might be only "human", bur not "all - to - human"?

Gold Medal Essay

On Topic III
by Tomasz Przezdziecki (Poland)

Nietzsche is probably one of the most subversive and critical philosophers. He deprecates systems of values. He claims that they are shallow and superficial. They take into account merely pleasure and pain. What's more, their intrinsic trait is the fact that they are utterly theoretical. Nevertheless, human actions, people's behaviour is visibly practical. Bertrand Russell asserted that we have two moralities - the one we preach and the one we practice. Nietzsche opposes these highly theoretical constructs and proposes a new vision, which is no more ethics as such.

What Nietzsche suggests is the expression of pure individualism. He claims that people should relinquish the ethics imposed on them but, in contrast, immerse in their own axiological activity, which is the expression of the will of power. Ethics suppress the will of power, being shallow, deprived of uniqueness, and, what's even more significant - conformist.

The main distinction of the statement consists in the dichotomy between shallowness-conformism and individualism - so far on the field of ethics.

Nevertheless, Nietzsche is known as one of the three masters of suspicion (along with Marx and Freud) of the Modern Epoch. It is requisite to discern that the ethical dichotomy between shallowness together with conformism to old philosophical systems and indvidual axiological activity has much deeper implications.

Conformism and individualism constitute two attitudes towards reality that can manifest themselves on various fields-such as social-political matters and cultural issues

The main questions that Nietzsche's statement gives rise to are:

- what are the reasons for which the old ethical systems should be deprecated? Or maybe they can still be accepted?
- Is individualism and one's own axiological activity better then compliance with old systems, and why?
- What are the social-political and cultural ramifications of the two attitudes: individual and conformist?

I. What are the reasons for which the old ethical systems should be deprecated?
(faults of conformism and shallowness)

There are manifold systems of values that have been constructed throughout the history of philosophy. They have constituted coherent, cohesive systems. It is possible to make a distinction within these systems- there are:
-deontological systems of values, ethics-these claim that ethical acts demand a duty or standard. Kantian ethics belongs to deontological systems.

- teleological systems of values, ethics-these appeal to the objectives and consequences of one's deeds. Utilitarism, hedonism belong two this group.

Another imporatnt distinction is the distinction between morality and ethics - ethics is a theoretical system, nevertheless morality does not have to correspond to ethics - morality is the real practical system of values.

What are the reasons why ethical systems should be deprecated?

1. They are excessively theoretical, they are never abided by in reality.

Ethics is considered to constitute practical philosophy. Notwithstanding, ethics is still theoretical, it is in many cases composed of stringent rules and nobody really conforms to these rules. Sometimes it may be virtually impossible, for various reasons. An epitome is hedonism. This ethical system consideres the fulfilment of pleasures as the most significant objective of a human being. It turns out that the practice of hedonist philosophy would be almost impossible in a society, as a complete lack of interest for others and thorough egoism could lead to its disintegration.

What about other systems? Let's consider stoicism. It recommends apatheia and atharaxia. One should restrain oneself and not get overwhelmed by emotions. It is possible, although very difficult to attain. It couldn't work as a philosophical system for the whole society as it appears to be too strict. It turns out that ethics is mainly a theory. Some people claim to stick to certain systems of values and regulations, nevertheless rarely do they practice them fully.

2. They impose regulations on people, thus precluding them from acting freely.

Only free will is ethical per se - contended Kant. He found the realization of the idea of freedom in the autonomy of a human will. If one's maxim conforms to the categorical imperative and does it not because of external influence but on the basis of his/her own decision - it is possible to say that this is freedom. Hegel shared similar viesw.

History is the realization of the consciousness of freedom. In ancient far-Eastern countries people were free in-themselves (an-sich). They were ont conscious of freedom and only specific despots were free. In Greece and Rome citizens were free, but not slaves. In the German-christian epoch the spirit of the world became free for itself, fully aware of its freedom. Freedom was, according to Hegel, achieved only in a state.

But is this vision of freedom really free? In Kant's and Hegel's philosophy one is free with lots of impositions and duties. Such freedom is veri idealistic, but indeed still leads to conformism.

What has freedom to do with ethical issues? Nietzsche contended that metaphysics, religion, ethics deprives people of freedom and endows them with slave-morality. If something can be called good-it is the expression of onesels. Thus Kantian ethics does not provide preedom in Nietzschean sense.

3. They prevent the discovery and implementation of new ideas.

I deem that we can extend the thical understanding of Nietzsche's statement so as to make it encompass also other philosophical issues. Nietszche himself was also an opponent of metaphysics and some interesting parallels can be percieved between ethics and other domains of philosophy in terms of the dichotomy: individualism - conformism.

Obsolete theoretical systems preclude and hinder the discovery of the theories. If we were controlled by one ethical system, it would be impossible for us to consider some new ideas and concepts. It is even more distinct in the theory of knowledge. Induction dominated methodology until the beginning of the 20th century. It was contradicted by Karl Raimund Popper, who propounded a new methodology-the hypothetical-deductive method. Thus ideas can be derived from many sources, it is possible to create new theories and supersede the old ones with better new ones. Therefore we need tolerance, to be able to search for better solutions to problems. Theories should be exposed to as much criticism as possible and there should be numerous attempts to falsify them. If it gets falsified, it can be replaced by a better theory. Thus knowledge can develop.

Cannot ethics be treated in a similar way? Maybe there are better ethical

systems, which will be practicable and agreable for more people? Or maybe they will have other good points? This is why we shouldn't stick dogmatically to one system, but develop. However, many philosophical and ethical systems are dogmatic and announce that only they are ethical. There is a clash for instance between Kantism and Utilitarism(especially its brench emphsizing individual advantage) as Kant claimed that only good will is ethical. Utilitarists maintained that what should measure actions are the consequences. Kant's theory appears rather dogmatic. There are arguments that prove that the search for better theories should never be abandonded.

4. In fact, they are morally corrupted.

This argument is derived directly from Nietzsche. Religion, christian morality and most other ethical systems are the creation of resentment. They can exist only in hatred and opposition to other people - masters. Moreover, ethical systems usually accentuate certain values- such as freedom, apatheia, compliance with divine will. Nietzsche refuted the concept of metaphysical truth. Therefore ethical sytems that are imposed on people have been constructed solely to ensnare them and make them reactive - make them represent resentment. They preclude individualism, pluralism and self-expression, which are the characteristics of the morality of masters.

5. They have deleterious social, political and cultural effects.

This argument stems from the previous one. The fact that ethics and rekligion are products of resentment implicates that there are reactive forces within a society. This causes animosities. Conformity has another drawbeck - it creates masses, people deprived of individuality. This, in turn, also prevents the development of new ideas.

I have reached the conclusion that ethical systems are in many cases excessively theoretical, they preclude people from acting freely, preclude the search for better theories and might be considered to be immoral themselves as reactive and constraing (in Nietszche's view). Conformism and dogmatism are deleterious not only on terms of ethics, but also on other fields- for instance science. There are, on the hand, certain practical benefits from ethical systems- for instance social order. They can't be criticized in all respects, nevertheless while thay become dogmatic they become dangerous.

II. Is individualism and one's own axiological activity better than compliance with old systems, and why?

The problems stemming from old systems, not only ethical, but also political, scientific and philosophical are: conformism, shallowness, dogmatism. Nietzsche was one of the first philosophers to demonstrate that metaphysical systemats are futile and pointless. Truth can never be

attained, it is relative and depend on interpretations. His philosophy advocated the refutation and rejection of dogmatic metaphysical claims which made people conformist. This idea has been realized in Postmodernism. Wittgenstein created a theory of language games, which announced that there are pluralistic maifold language games. Philosophy belong to noe of them. The benefit that seems to accrue from postmodernism is that is has emphsized the relavence of certain ontions and the possibilty of the creation of one's own syncretic perception of the world. What are the benefits stemming form individuality:

1)unrestrained intellectual freedom

Individualism in Nietszcheam view consists mainly in construction one's own system of values. Nevertheless, it can be syncretic, variable, adjusted to an individual. This is why he mentions an artist's conscience. Wittgensten's conception of language games says that everyone may find themselves in a language game appropriate for themselves. Therefore postmodernism touches upon the issue of freedom- freedom is here not compliance with the categorical imperative, but arbitrary self-expression. I deem it is a more thororough realization of the idea of freedom. It is also highly intellectual. It consists in the opportunity to share one's own views. It surmounts conformism and dogmatism.

2)The emergence of new, avant-garde ideas
Individualism leads to the emrgence of new art, new forms of culture. Cubism, Futurism,
Surrealism would never have been fathom if artist had clung to obsolete ideas and norms.
If culture is to develop, individualism is requisite.

3)self-acceptance and self-expression

Individualism enables people to express themselves. In Nietszchean interpretion it is the expression of the will of power. Otherwise, people can't express themselves and become reactive. Lack of self-expression and fulfilment may also lead to frustrations and mental problem, according to Freud.

4)the possibility of further discoveries.

Again, there are parallels between axiology and the theory of science. Individualism and lack of dogamtism enable new discoveires and theoretical progress. Feyerabend claimed that there should be no limitind, especially inductionist methodology, but there should be Epistemological Anarchism. He adduced the case of Galileo. He conducted research counter-inductively and broke the contemporary paradigms in science. His individual effort proved better than conformism to contemporary paradigms. Thomas Khun constructed the thoery of scientic revolutions. It

turns out that if science is to proceed, there have to be room for indivisualism, otherwise there may come a stanstill.

The above-mentioned arguments prove that individualism is a better policy than conformism.It enables development and self-expression. Of course, we need a criterion to evaluate these consequences as benefits. It may seem that some ethical code is indispensible. I deem that we can expound the attribution of the name-benefit to these consequences. We can treat our curerent theoretical level as metalevel from which we evaluate other ethical thoeires.

III.What are the social-political and cultural ramifications of the two attitudes: individual and conformist?

The individual attitude towards values and the conformist one have deeper implications.In the previous sections I noticed that there are parallels between the theory of science and ethics in terms of dogmatism and conformism. Conformism precludes the search for better ideas. Similarly, conformist conscience is not only conformist and shallow in terms of morality, but in many other ways. The clash between individualism and conformism is present in a mass society. In a mass society there are increasing masses of undistinguishable people who do not attepmt to be individual but prefer to be like the rest of society. What is the link between ethics and social matters?

The same realtionship emerges. Conformism to old ethical systems deprives people of axiological individuality. Conformism to political systems also deprives people of individuality.

1) Social consequences of a mass society

Nietzsche himself presented an etimological and historical account of the genealogy of morals. It is sometimes believed to be exaggerated. Nevertheless, there are contemporary political theories pertaing to the rise of a mass society which are based upon the Nietzschean concept. One of such concepts has been presented by Oatshott.

Individulaity appeared at the beginng of the Renaissance. Certain individuals stared to develop their own views, attempting to be outstanding. Before the Renaissace, people would identify with communities, but didn't intend to stand out. Whaen individuals appeared, the members of the past communities found theselves lost. They did not belong tio ythe emerging class of individuals. Therefore their policy became reactive. They detested individuals because of their own lack of uniqueness. Therefore they could indentify only with groups. They needed a leader- but the leader had to be a reflection of those common people. It can be exemplified with Stalinism and the working class. There were very scarce diveristies among the society. Unindividuals people could not decide about themselves and needed a leader who would rule them but would be a reflection of the

mass. Such conformism prevent the development of any new ideas, any new concepts, any individuality.

Such a situation is lethal for development. It leads to a standstill in social development. Popper contended that tolerance is indispensible and a tolerant - open society is a better solution as it guarantees the search for the better. Individuality and new initiatives should always be approved of.

Ortega y Gasset claimed that a mass society can annihilate itself. It depend upon individuals who care for technology that sustains the society, however when there are no individuals buy merely mass people who do not show any effort, don't get educated and nevertheless are allowed to politics and social mattersm, then this society won't be able to control and develop its technology and politics.

2) Cultural consequences of a mass society

a) the creation of culture
A mass society appears to be incapable of developing a unique culture. It is deprived of individuals. Therefore its culture, its art is also mass culture. Mass culture doesn't go beyond its surroundings but aesthetizes the elements of the contemporary world. An epitome is Pop-Art. Of course, it had quite many faces and in certain respects it was a very intellectual formation, but tha fact is that it incorporated everyday-use items into the world of art. To attempt to transcend reality was made.
b) the reception of culture

A mass society's attitude towards art is also discrepant from that of a balanced society.

Hannah Arendt distinguished three stages in the development of the relationships culture-society. In the first stage, art constituted a virtue in itself. Later it became a means of ascending social hierarchy. Arendt called this phenomenon philistinism. People used art to become more educated, more valuable. Thus art was subject for a certain purpose. The situation deteriorated further in a mass society. Art and culture are no more a value but an object of consumption.

It turns out that individuality is necessary both for creating art and culture and for receiving it.

IV. Conclusion

Should we really look at hedonism and utilitarianism with pity? We should try to evaluate each theory critically and assess what deserves depracetion and what is satisfactory. We should never tolerate dogmatism and conformism. Conformism leads to a stanstill in social, cultural and political development. It is not only a question of ethics. An ethical attitude affects

social, cultural and political matters.

We should, however, advocate individualism. Self-expression leads to development and progress - also social and cultural. Nevertheless individuality cannot become dogmatic itself and produce even more conformism. There are many games - as Wittgenstein claims - and everyone should be allowed to have his/her own.

Gold Medal Essay

On Topic IV
by Alexandru Marcoci (Romania)

PRELIMINARIUM

I intend to analyse, from a critical standpoint Wittgenstein's conception on language. Some may consider this absurd, but it is my firm conviction that only integrating fragment 203 in the framework of Wittgenstein's thought will we be able to properly understand the meaning of this excerpt. In order to achieve this goal I will analyse some key concepts in the austrian philosopher's theory of language and I will even try to make a brief comparison throughout my essay between his mature text, "Philosophical Investigations", and a very early book of his, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.

EXPOSITIO

The first and only book Wittgenstein published during his lifetime was Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Though this is a very controversial book, many scholars have agreed on some points on the theory of language presented in it. Therefore it is well known and widely accepted that Tractatus is a book defined by epistemological optimism. When we speak of language there are two poles to be taken into account. First of all, there is the objective pole, represented by reality, i.e. the world around us with everything in it, from inanimated objects to animals, plants, human beings, chemical reactions and so on. Secondly, there is the subjective pole, represented by the perception of the objective pole in the mind of a certain epistemic subject. For the young Wittgenstein a proposition was true or false if and only if there was a perfect compatibility between what a person was thinking about the world and the way in which the world was. This theory is considered to be optimistic due to the fact that it emplies that our mind has direct access to the objective pole so we can know reality as it really is in itself.

This way of seeing the relation between the self and the non-self (the self

being the subjective pole, and the non-self the world, i.e the objective pole) determined the way in which lanuage was conceived. As I have already said earlier, a proposition was true or false whether it did or it did not match the fact it was reffering to. This way of thinking was very common among philosophers. It was first developed by Plato in the Sophist where he defined this concept (which we can name Epistemological Realism) as follows: to say about things which are not that they are or of things which are that they are not means saying a false proposition and to say about things which are that they are and of things which are not that they are not means saying a true proposition. So it a was big tradition in thinking in this way , a tradition which started with Plato, continued with Aristotle and Chrysippos, in Ancient Greece, Thomas of Aquinas, in the Middle Ages, and continued with Frege and Wittgenstein.

Tractatus was first published in 1921 and until the 30' it remained the written form of Wittgenstein's conception of language. Starting with the Brown and the Blue Books and some letters to Moritz Schlick from 1933, Wittgenstein's conception of language changed. And fragment 203 is part of the most important work of the second part of Wittgenstein's philosophy. Now I shall introduce all the essentialconcepts in order to make fragment 203 clear.

II. ii) For the older Wittgenstein the objective pole had become ocult. No longer could anyone establish whether a proposition was true or not just by comparing a certain sentence with a certain objective fact. Let me give an example. If a person enters a dark room with black shades covering the windows and tell the people inside that outside there is a sunny day, to establish the true value of that sentence one has to go outside and look to the sun. But if for the traditional thinkers this act of looking to the sun would have meant that that person who was looking was simply comparing that other person's sentence with the objective fact, for the old Wittgenstein this only meant that the person looking to the sun will form his own conviction of the real world in general, and of that day in particular, and then compare his own conviction with the conviction of the person who entered the room and declared that there is a sunny day (conviction expressed through the sentence he addressed the people in the dark room). This will at first seem silly, but Wittgenstein proved that this change in perspectives is a crucial one. What if the person going outside to check whether there was a sunny day or not had learend as a child that we call "sun" the star that shines from 7 p.m. to 3 a.m. each night and that we call "moon" the star that shines from 6 a.m. to 7 p.m. each day. Then, that man would have declared that the person pretending that there was a sunny day was wrong (supposing that the time was 3 p. m.) because, in fact there was a "moony" day. From this type of arguments Wittgenstein draws the conclusion that we agree with one another only because we have all learnt the same code (a certain way of connecting words and sensations). This is quite the opposite of what the Tractatus told us (it is very interesting to read Wittgenstein's work, as he is

one of the few philosophers who changed their view so dramatically during their lifetime). This theory implies a great deal of pessimism. The objective pole is no longer accesibile to us, not by direct, nor by indirect means. We will understand the world around us not by understanding the way in which it really exist, but by understanding what we were taught the real world is when we were little (so we don't understand the objective pole but only the way in which we were learnt to think).

III. iii)To fully understand the way in which this proccess takes place I will like to comment a little bit on what Wittgenstein called "language game". This concept is one of the most problematic concepts in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (and of all his works after 1930, and I need to say this because the concept first appeared in the Brown Book). I would like, based on a couple of texts, that I will shortly indicate to analyse this concept by means of another concept which is much easier to understand. The relation between "language game " and this other concept I tend to believe is a relation of isomorphism. The other concept is the concept of "paradigm". There are two main sources for supporting this isomorphism between "language game" and "paradigm"; one the one hand there is a book by Wittgenstein called On Certainty, edited by G.E. M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright representing Wittgenstein's last notes from the last 18 months of his life, and an article called Patterns of Discovery written by Karl P. Feyerabend. In On Certainty, Wittgenstein, trying (and, to my mind, even succeeding) to give counterarguments to G. E. Moore's articles supporting common sense, uses the expressions "language game" and "system of convictions" as synonims. His argument, in this book, is based on the fact that, indeed there are facts that seem obvious too all of us, e.g. we all agree that the Earth existed 100 years ago, but this is so only because we all have been taught the same thing when we were little children. We accept certain facts as obvious and true because we have accepted a certain language game. In what determinig the truth value of propositions is concerned, in order for a proposition to be true/false we have to compare it to the other propositions we have already accepted as true, so, if it is in contradiction with one of the propositions from our "system of convictions" then that proposition is false, but if it is in agreement with all proposition of our "system of convictions", then that proposition is true.

Feyerabend notices that the way in which Wittgenstein uses the term "lanuage game" is similar with the way in which the term "paradigm" is used in the philospohy of science. Thomas Kuhn, in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions first defines the concept of "paradigm". In science, the paradigm represents the system of convictions that, for a period of time, are accepted by all the scientists of a certain scientifical community. This "core" is not to be questioned by anyone , on the contrary starting from the propositions contained by this core, all other propositions, experimental facts, etc. are given a truth value. A scientific revolution is when such a core is denied, but after a period of chaos another paradigm is accepted. A very important aspect of a paradigm is that it is not nor true

not false, nor right nor wrong. In order to have science a paradigm is necessary, but which paradigm no one could say, not because we don't know yet which paradigm is the right one, but because, according to Kuhn, it is impossible to take such a decision. The same thing with the language games, there are essential to comunication. A proposition which is not addressed to someone who has accepted a language game, will be totally useless, there can be no communication without language games, as there can be no communication between people who have accepted different language games. The famous example for such an inter-language games communication is the example given by Kuhn in the Essential Tension in order to illustrate that there can be no communication between members of different paradigms: he tells a story about what happened to him when he was student. He had read Aristotle's Metaphysics, which he found very well written and then he decided to read Aristotle's Physics. After reading it he was amased how can the same person write a marvellous book, as the Metaphysics were and a book full of absurdities, like the Physics were. He then realised that Aristotle, in treating nature was trying to answer to different questions, very different to what scientists are trying to answewr to nowadays. Then, he realised that he and Aristotle were placed in two different paradigmas.

iv) I think that we can now move to the interpretation of fragment 203 from Philosophical Investigations by Ludwig Wittgenstein. There will be a very brief interpretation as I have already explained above all the key concepts from the text, and what is left is to indicate these concepts in the text. So, first the excerpt:

"Language is a labyrinth of paths. You approach from one side and know your way about; you approach the same place from another side and no longer know your way about."

I have identified three concepts within this excerpt:
1. labyrinth paths
2. side
3. to know your way about

First of all, the "labyrint paths" represent the different language games that can coexist within different communities in the same time, or even within the same community at different moments in time. Secondly, "side" is in the logical structure of this text an equivelent of a labyrinth path, so it stands for a certain language game. And in the third place, "to know your way around" means accepting a certain language game. Let me enlarge a little bit on that. People who accept different paradigmas are totally different. They have different ways of looking to life, to determing the truth value of certain propositions, and so on. Hence, if it were to be confrunted with a certain proposition that has meaning in their language game they will know how to deal with it, but, if, on the contrary they encounter a proposition that has no meaning within their language game, then they will not know haw to react, in other words they will not find their "way around".

There is a very common example of such cases, when a children askes why is the mountain higher than a house. The parents usually answer by telling him that the height of a mountain is larger than the height of a house, and so on, and the child will continue to ask for clarifications, and at a certain point he will ask why is 2 larger than 1. And at this point the parent won't "find his way around" any more, as such a question is unaskable (I am sorry for this silly form, but I believe it to be the best way to deliver you what I want to say) according to his "system of convictions". These type of propositions are those that are always to be accepted as true by every member of that language game, just like in the case of a paradigm. Questioning the truth value of such questions mean questioning everything we believe in and it means supressing any form of communication. (Even though the change of a language game is possible, it is very difficult, and therefore it is very rare) These propositions are what Plato would call ananche stenai, meaning the necessary stop in argumentation. No argument can go ad infinitum, and the concept of "language game" is the Wittgenstein's way of expressing the ancient ananche stenai.

CONCLUSION

Even though language games, as paradigmas, can neither be right, nor wrong, and despite the fact that there is no strong argument for choosing a certain language game, language games are essential to communication. Therefore, in order to establish an intersubjectivity, to establish interpersonal relations, it is essential for us to be members of the same language game, or, as it is written in fragment 203, to walk the same labyrinth paths.

POST SCRIPTUM

In the end, I woulkd like to justify my choice of presenting the traditional theory on the relation between language and reality, as I did in Expositio (i). Having been the dominant theory, the epistemological realism was very well known, thus those who began writing another sort of philosophy of language presented their concepts, mostly in contrast with the traditional concepts. Therefore, I am firmly convinced that only a cronological approach to the theory of language can clarify some otherwise very difficult issues concerning the terms and their definitions.

Silver Medal Essay

On Topic IV
by Marta Sznajder (Poland)

The attempt to discover not the object of human understanding, but the true structure of its subject - man's reason with its boundaries and opportunities, came into fruition in The Critique of Pure Reason. Kant's concept created a new answer to one of the oldest questions of philosophy. Do our senses provide us an exact image of the world? No, but not because they're misleading us, but because our reason is built as it is and nothing can change it. We receive some sensual data, but the world emerging from them is mostly our own creation, shaped under the conditions of categories of human reason.

World created by a human mind - not some solipsistic idea, but honest try to explain the most surprising fact that our thoughts, which use general notions (like 'a chair'), fit and can describe the world made by always particular things (like that chair I am actually sitting on now). This was the question Ludwig Wittgenstein was trying to find an answer for in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. As for him then, there exists a part common for our minds and the outside world - a logical form.

This concept led to a vision of a totally logical language, using strict rules and clear definitions - the language that Schlick, Carnap and Neurath were calling for. But also this concept gave raise to one vivid difficulty: it didn't fit the actual language, with all its misconsequences. The usage of language is something really different than its grammar and its dictionaries. And that's why Philosophical Investigations are so different than Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.

A language is a living structure, not a system of written words, but a sum of all meaningful behaviour. Man lives within it from his first breath. The way we are learning our mother tongue (and this is our real language, the one we live in, no matter how many others can be taught at school) is still obscure. A child does not learn words - it doesn't even have an idea what a 'word' is - it learns some basic 'particles' of behaviour. Throughout our lives, we learn so much forms of life: how to declare war; how to buy five red apples (which is a whole different action than buying pears!); how to order and to apologise. Those are safe ways of communication, learned by usage - safe paths through the labyrinth of language. In day by day living they are just at their place, ready to be used again, ready to cause expected reaction in other people. We know how to respond to them when somebody else uses them. It has been all exercised millions of times: after 'How do you do?' say the same; after hearing the price, give money; and so on.

This idea was caught by some English philosophers and linguists and was called 'the speech acts'. Austin and Searle were the first after Wittgenstein to maintain that what we say consists of not only the literal sense of the phrases (locutive act), but also of what we want to say (illocutive act) and what reaction we want to hear or see (perlocutive act). When somebody is leaving home while heavy clouds are gathering, by saying 'It's going to rain' we do not only inform our comrade about this fact, but we are also

making suggestion about taking an umbrella and we expect him doing that.

The use and understanding of whole our behaviour is based upon habits and habitual reactions. But sometimes this familiar scheme can be broken. Let's imagine such a situation. In the middle ages throwing a glove upon somebody's feet was a sign for a desire to fight with that person. Now that tradition is absolutely useless and forgotten outside the theatres and cinemas. A student says something rude to his teacher. What would happen if the teacher took his glove, threw it to the student's feet and cried: 'I call you for a fight'? People in the classroom would start to think: what does it mean? And maybe one or two of them will follow this first surprise and proceed their thoughts?

Astonishment, perplexity - this is the moment when philosophy is being born. Under normal conditions of daily usage, the language is transparent for most - or every one - of us. We follow well-known 'paths' of speech and don't think too much about them. But sometimes comes this moment when we find a difficulty in our way. When we come to a familiar place and don't know which side to go next. 'I had to say something - but how to do it?', 'Isn't that funny, the difference between the figurative and the literal meaning?' - those questions can start an investigation that can turn into a philosophical investigation.

That first confusion can lead into serious and deep questions about man's comprehension, about our way of existing in language. In my opinion, one of the most important of them is the one quoted here before: how it is possible that, in spite of the fact that it is absolutely different, our language can correspond with things it is referring to? So, firstly: what does it mean 'to mean'?; and secondly: how the notion can describe a particular thing? An attempt to answer those questions can be found in every stage of history of philosophy.

The problem of meaning would be easier if there existed only non-abstract nouns. We could then treat the language as some kind of mathematical function, which matches words - written signs and spoken sounds - witch material objects, in a one-to-one pattern. This is, obviously, impossible, since we have words like 'love' or 'wisdom', whose meanings cannot be shown in a material world. On the other hand, there remains the 'universal-particular' problem of non-abstract nouns. We have one word for infinite number of objects (as in the previous example of chair). That is why we need something more than ostensive defining by pointing a thing with a finger. The problem of plurality in matter and identity in thought can be resolved as Plato did it - by claiming that there exist some ideal entities - ideas, the notions brought into sovereign exixtence. But this is not a only answer, Aristotle gave his own, and so Locke or Hegel did.

The whole problem with language is that we cannot discuss it from a position of an independent investigator. We cannot leave it for a moment

to watch from outside, like we observe plants or animals. To say anything about language we have to use it - it is impossible to escape from it. The only way of winning with our languages is surprise and confusion about them - and tracing new ways through the labyrinth.

Silver Medal Essay

On Topic IV
by Antti Saarilahti (Finland)

Language is an area of philosophy that has got the attention it deserves only in recent times. In fact, before the 20th century, there hardly even existed an area of philosophy that could be called the "philosophy of language". The course set in philosophy by such highly influencial characters as Rene Descartes with his rationalist epistemology and later Immanuel Kant with his revolutionary ideas regarding metaphysics, dominated Western thought for hundreds of years: it was taken as self-evident that language is merely a tool with which to convey ideas, and more precisely, a tool whose effectiveness need not be questioned. Is it possible that no one simply came to think that there could be something very interesting and very critical in this phenomenon we encounter daily? Possibly; perhaps language is so closely intertwined with thought that taking a critical stance towards it would have been uncomfortably similar to criticizing one's own capability to think. Nonetheless, it was only decades ago that a certain Austrian engineer brought about a major revolution is Western philosophy.

If Descartes can be called the father of modern epistemology, Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) can with no qualms be called the father of analytic philosophy. A pupil of Russell's before the First World War, whose thoughts he influenced greatly, he completed the only work to be published in his lifetime, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, as a soldier in the Austrian army. It dealt not with how we are able to say something meaningful about the world and what that would be - the legacy of Descartes -, but rather how we are able to say anything at all about the world. Written in extremely concise numbered sections rather than in the standard prose format, the Tractatus as it has come to be called explores the limits of meaningful expression and the form that underlies it all. The emphasis is on the relationship between language and reality: what are we doing when we say something about the world, how do we do it? How are we able to do it? He presents his famous picture theory of representation, a sort of a special version of the correspondence theory of truth, claiming that logic is what unites the expression and the expressed. This relationship cannot be described, however, for to do so we should have to be able to explore "both sides" of expression, which is a logical

impossibility: we can only show what this relationship is.

Expression cannot be expressed; this, and his cryptic remarks about what he calls the "mystical" - namely, ethics, aesthetics and religion - prompted him to write the well-known conclusion of the book: What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence. Philosophical problems arise when we attempt to transcend the boundaries of expression, and thus the correct task of philosophy is to clear language of all such nonsense. While I have given here only a brutally simplified version of Wittgenstein's thoughts in the Tractatus, it can be said that with this, he thought he had said all there was to say about philosophy.

Following his own teachings, Wittgenstein did retire from philosophy after publishing the book. The book's initial impact was rather modest: it was mostly Wittgenstein's colleagues in Cambridge who read and discussed it. However, for the group of logical positivists called the "Vienna Circle", the Tractatus was a godsend. It provided the answers to certain crucial questions that had plagued the radically empirist agenda they advocated, namely their problematic relationship to logic and mathematics. Wittgenstein hardly agreed with all of what logical positivists had to say, however; it suffices to say here that through the Vienna Circle, Wittgenstein's thoughts about language and logic became more known. As well, discussions with the Circle's leader, Moritz Schlick, contributed to Wittgenstein's eventual return to philosophy.

Wittgenstein himself tells a following story: When he was explaining his ideas about language and logic to a friend of his, an Italian businessman, he got an unexpected retort. The man brought his hand up to his jaw and brushed it with the tips of his fingers; a sign of serious disdain where he came from. "What is the logical form of this?", he asked. What indeed? It became to dawn on Wittgenstein that perhaps there was something important he hadn't thought about when it came to language. He died of cancer before completing his work, but two decades of thoughts with renewed philosophical vigor were published posthumously. In 1953, two years after Wittgenstein's death, the world was presented with Philosophical Investigations (from now on to be called simply PI), which contains the bulk of what he had come up with during this time. Another philosophical revolution followed.

The quote given is only one of the many metaphors with which Wittgenstein describes his new attitude towards language. Language is no longer the perfectly logical construction with clear limits, as in the Tractatus: rather, it is now something very vague that adapts to fit people's needs in different situations. He starts off PI with a citation by Saint Augustine where a view on how language is learned is given: as infants, we notice other people pointing at certain objects and uttering their name - that is, language is learned ostensively. Wittgenstein retorts to this with an example, a shopping list. You enter a shop with a shopping list that says "five red apples" and hand it to the shopkeeper. How does

the shopkeeper know that he is supposed to hand the customer five red apples? Of course he would know what "five", "red" and "apple" mean, if Augustine's explanation is correct - but it is only the meaning of the words on their own. The point given here is that how we really use language in different situations has very little to do with simple ostensive definitions.

Wittgenstein introduces the idea of language games. The use of a word is entirely dependent on the context it is in; the same sentence can have entirely different uses in a school, during a dinner, in a funeral, in a play, in a casual conversation. Language comprises of different forms of life that evolve constantly. Some are born while some others die out. Philosophical problems are now seen as arising out of different uses of language: we no longer are on a "quest for truth", but rather, "quest for meaning". Clarity is the proper task of philosophy, Wittgenstein asserts.

It is interesting to note that despite that many contemporary philosophers praise Wittgenstein's achievements and hold especially PI in high regard - make no mistake that the Tractatus still has its own share of faithful followers as well, however - no one really knows how to apply the book's message to philosophy. We still discuss the the same subjects in the same manner, as if they were real problems: the view that philosophy cannot seek out truth, only clarify the mess of language we are tangled in, is not one that many people prefer. Is this simply a question of intellectual integrity, or are there real philosophical problems? Where could Wittgenstein have gone wrong if that is the case?

Wittgenstein never gave any concrete support for the generalizations he made, neither in the Tractatus nor in PI. He seems to have assumed without a second thought that what he says applies to all of philosophy, and it is this that I hold to be the greatest flaw in his works. Yes, there are many situations where philosophical debate is going nowhere because the debaters do not "speak the same language", so to speak - but what about those situations where enough common ground is shared to have an understanding of the other person's views, do such not also exist? Are language games not more of a communicational problem rather than an obstacle preventing traditional philosophy altogether? A hilarious example would be the so-called incident of Wittgenstein's poker, of which even a book has been written. Karl Popper, a contemporary philosopher of Wittgenstein's, met with Wittgenstein and his students as a visiting lecturer and got into an argument about this very problem - whether there are real philosophical problems or not. It is said that Wittgenstein, known for his temper, grabbed a poker and insisted that Popper give an example of a philosophical problem that is not merely confused use of language, waving the poker at him as he did. Maintaining his civility, Popper answered: "Visiting lecturers should not be threatened with pokers." Wittgenstein, enraged, threw the poker on the floor an stormed out of the room.

Just how enlightening Popper's retort was is certainly debatable, but it

begs an important question: why should we not be able to find real problems under all the "bad language"? Why is it that visiting lecturers, and fellow human beings for that matter, should not be threatened with pokers? (Or with anything else, for that matter) Where do such rules originate from, whether they are only rules of conduct or written in law? Moreover, what kind of rules would be optimal for a given society? How am I being "bewitched by language" if I want to know such things?

Moving onto epistemology, let us ask the core question: what can we know? We shall certainly have to define very carefully the words we used - define them in this context only, mind you - so as to prevent the kind of linguistic mess that Wittgenstein warns us about, but is the problem not real after that? We could say: "we" refers to human beings overall, and "know", or "knowledge", refers to true, justified beliefs, as per the classical definition of knowledge. We then have to define even more words - "human being", "true", "justified", "belief" - but it is clear that, in order for these words to mean anything at all, we are capable of stopping the chain, else we would be going round. Wittgenstein would say that once we have done this, the problem has disappeared, that the answer is already evident. If that is the case, I must congratulate him for eliminating an entire branch of philosophy with a relatively short chain of analysis. That is the problem - philosophical questions are not purely analytic, they grope for an understanding of the world we live in. Problems regarding the world we live in are quite synthetic, in my opinion, and not all of them belong to the field of the natural sciences.

Wittgenstein's merit as a philosopher is impossible to doubt. The problems and views he has presented were unique at the time, and he in effect gave rise to the whole tradition of analytic philosophy. I maintain, however, that to believe everything he has to say about philosophy is a mistake: philosophy does have problems of its own, even if it is a problem in itself to make sense of these problems.

Silver Medal Essay

On Topic II
by Nora Labo (Romania)

In a way, today's world is literally breaking to pieces from a philosophical point of view: all great metaphysical concepts which have served as a guideline for centuries of philosophical inquiry and political thinking and action are now proven either void of meaning or completely inadequate for thinking the world as it is today. On the one hand, philosophers such as Wittgenstein have clearly shown that metaphysical questions like the ones concerning the meaning of concepts such as 'time' are actually false

problems and that the whole of speculative philosophy originates in a poor understanding of the way our language works and in a faulty use of language games; this means that such concepts can no longer serve as a solid core on which to build our view of the world. On the other hand, beginning with the revolutionary thinking of Nietzsche, who stated that truth does not have an objective criterion on which to be established, but rather that it is a question of perspective, philosophers such as Heidegger and, later on, Derrida, have proceeded to the systematic deconstruction of the main categories and structures of Western speculative philosophy. Thus, today we have no universal criteria or concepts left, but instead we rather see the world as a place where different paradigms and knowledge-power structures compete with one another.

The quote from J?rgen Habermas my essay is inspired by acknowledges and takes into account some of the problems that arise from this new epistemically fragmented world, but unfortunately fails to face up to this entirely new situation that we are living nowadays, when, paradoxically, as the world is becoming more and more globalized, our perception of reality is becoming more and more fragmented, as I will explain throughout my essay. The main point I will be trying to prove is that, while Habermas is trying to suggest a way of establishing truth through dialogue in a world of differences and his intention of doing this is admirable, he is operating with concepts that can no longer find support in contemporary reality or which, at least, belong to a paradigm which we have already left behind (and I will show why) - the project of the Aufklarung. Throughout my paper, I will be discussing the possibility of finding criteria for truth and establishing authentic communication between different cultures (and universes of discourse) through the perspective of the knowledge-power pair, which functions as a whole, and I will try to propose an alternative model to that of Habermas's. I also consider it important to mention that, although the quotation from Habermas might initially seem to strictly refer to epistemology, at closer reading it becomes obvious that it has deep connections with social and cultural issues related to culture clash in the contemporary world.

Baudrillard uses a very expressive term when he refers to our status in today's world: he says that all people are now 'indifferent paroxists', meaning that we are realizing that modernity, with all its desire of establishing universal values and strong fundamental truths is coming to an end, and that we are living the moments right before its final breath, so that is why we are paroxists (this word coming from the Greek word 'par?xiton', which means 'the one before the end'); on the other hand, we refuse to acknowledge these changes and we go on living completely indifferent to these changes, as if they wouldn't affect us at all. In a way, Habermas falls into the mistake of being an indifferent paroxist, as he admits the fact that truth is today dispersed into many universes of discourse, but at the same time proposes a solution which is possible only within a single universal pattern of discourse.

Firstly, let us see what Habermas correctly notices and how this affects the way we can interact with our fellow human beings: it is true, truth is today dispersed across many different universes of discourse, which of course implies a thing that Nietzsche first explained and was later considered a milestone on the difficult effort of parting with speculative metaphysics - that there is no absolute truth. Stating this is common sense today, but Nietzsche's development of this idea is worth a closer look, as it can give valuable insights both towards Habermas's opinion and possible solutions of dialogue. Nietzsche states that truth does not have an origin - 'Ursprung', thus that it is not a value apriorically given to us, but that truth is an invention - 'Erfindnung'. Truth is a fiction invented by human beings in order to help them exert their domination, truth is actually a matter of power. Nietzsche's follower in developing the relationship between knowledge and power, the French philosopher Michel Foucault, takes this one step further and states that any order of discourse and, of course the criteria for truth it gives through its laws of discourse, is generated by power and domination structures within society; from this it is then easy to imply that Habermas is again right when he says that it is impossible to establish a hierarchy between different universes of discourse, as we know know that there is no other criterion for truth, which is a fiction anyway, than the way it serves this or another power relationship. A hierarchy would require some common ground, some trait that all universes of discourse should share in order to be compared, but such a common definition of truth can never be found, as truth is produced by social and political power structures whose criteria might be very different from culture to culture. This means that, Nietzsche's work having been written and us having realized that there is not one truth, but as many truths as there are ways of exercising power, we cannot go on living with the belief that some universes of discourse are more prone to produce the truth than others.

Moreover, as I have stated before, the later Wittgenstein showed how all talk about defining absolute values and concepts which could then be laid as foundations of our conception of the world is useless and impossible, as it is originating from a fallacious perspective over the world, induced by our misuse of language, of our overstretching the borders of certain language games' area of use. Coming from another domain of philosophy, but still attacking the same ambition of metaphysics to find originary, absolute concepts, the French philosopher Jacques Derrida proceeds to the systematic deconstruction of metaphysical concepts, doing this in two ways: first, by proving traditional oppositions suck as mind versus body, subject versus object, immanent versus transcendent not to be as clear as they were once thought, but on the contrary, being able to merge into one another (and he shows this through the analysis of 'les indecidables', concepts which belong to both the opposed categories, such as the pharmakon, which is both poison and medicine, while still remaining the same substance); second he does it by introducing the concept of 'differance', which comes from a Latin word stem that means both 'to differ' and to 'send further to'. The importance of this concept is that it

refers to the fact that such a thing as an originary concept/idea/truth does not exist. Every concept sends you further to another one which explains it, another one that is both similar to the first one and separated from it through this 'differance'. Thus, we must accept the idea that we can find no absolute origin of truth or any other origin whatsoever. At this point, it becomes obvious why, in the contemporary world, we must redefine our criteria for dialogue and for analyzing discourses different from our own, as we can no longer count on having established an universally applicable 'origin' of truth.

However, up to this stage of my essay, I have only shown what Habermas rightfully accepts when stating that truth is no longer unitary, no longer belonging to only one universe of discourse and that it is impossible to compare or establish a hierarchy between two different truths which are the product of two different orders of discourse. Maintaining the need for a hierarchy implies establishing an universal criterion which would call for a 'totalitarian' view of truth we can no longer accept. But a problem appears here: the presence of involuntary double speech in Habermas's quotation, because, while stating the fragmentation and relativisation of truth, he then uses some notions which he does not define and which he takes as granted from the same metaphysical tradition that is made impossible by giving up the possibility of an absolute truth. The problems I see in this text connected with what I have just stated are:
1. what does Habermas mean by the word 'all' (is an 'insight that can convince all' an absolute truth? - but he has just admitted that this is impossible; are all people endowed with the same kind of rationality? - and if not, does he mean by 'all' only the ones who posses a similar kind of rationality and truth validation patterns to the ones we use?)?
2. who does the word 'we' that Habermas uses in the same quote refer to (is it people who belong to the Occidental civilization? Who share the same opinions as he does? Does he refer to humanity in general - and if yes, what guarantees the possibility of setting a common ground of dialogue on the basis on which 'we' could 'all' search for the same kind of persuasive insights?; who gives him the authority to speak in the name of humanity?)?

These two points I consider very problematic because they perpetuate what Lyotard calls the 'great stories', the great eshatological myths of Occidental philosophy, which believe in an universal and continuous progress of the whole humanity, and instead of considering individual communities and historical moments in their uniqueness and individuality, analyze them as parts of a great progressive destiny of humanity, which is all encompassing and demands universal recognition. When Habermas takes for granted the fact that, although truth is dispersed in many universes of discourse, it is still possible to get to an insight which could convince all (and since ' all' has no other determinant, we are suggested to take it in its widest possible sense), and that this is the ideal which guides our discourses, he implicitly assumes that there is one and only one reason that is common for all people and all types of discourse, and

which is like pole of stability and a common trait in a world otherwise such disbalanced by relativity. This assumption is very well criticized by Lyotard, who argues that one of the greatest mistakes in philosophical tradition is merging of all the varied and different kind of reason that exist simultaneously under the absolute concept of a single Reason; if we keep our minds open, though, it appears quite obvious that the type of reason guiding philosophical inquiry is a very different kind of rationality from the one guiding capitalist economies. It is a specific trait of these 'great stories' of modernity, whose failure Lyotard argues, that they are trying to reduce diversity, multiplicity and difference to the unity of some originary concepts (the ones Derrida was deconstructing), which can then be made to play a part in the great stories of progress and emancipation, which actually are used by Occidental civilizations to legitimate their own power structures. Lyotard states that these myths of emancipation, initiated during the Aufklarung, have been proven wrong by recent history, and that atrocities such as Auschwitz prove that humanity is not in a continuous process of progress and improvement. But Habermas argues that the Aufklarung has not failed, but has not yet been accomplished, this also being the reason why he sticks on to concepts such as humanity seen as a whole, which are highly specific to the Aufklarung's project of emancipation.

I find Habermas's opinion in a way inadequate for the era we live in. In the first place, it is very risky to reach for 'insights that can convince all' when it is becoming more and more uncertain whether there are such things as humanity as a whole or human history as a whole. As Lyotard again smartly argues, now that the great stories of legitimation are dying out, legitimation is beginning to be made through an intricate net of small local stories, which are all connected, but at the same time distinct. Lyotard only says that this is a process that is taking place right now; but if we judge it by the Occidental values of tolerance and mutual understanding, I guess it can easily be argued that this a desirable situation too. A culture lives through its stories, and its universe of discourse is what defines it. But different universes of discourse are incommensurable, as are different language games, so it is impossible to compare them and, thus, to even hope of convincing all people of the righteousness of an opinion. This means that Habermas is developing an utopia of dialogue through his theory of truth through consensus; but then again, does that mean communication between cultures is impossible?

Hopefully not. Although Habermas's talk about humankind in general is too anchored in a paradigm of the past - the one of the Aufklarung and of modernity's tales of progress in general, it could somewhat be amended through the mediation of Rorty's pragmatism. Actually, although Lyotard is basically right about the difficulty of comparing different cultures' universes of discourse, two such universes might be able to interact, while still without any common ground shared by all cultures; but it is obvious that there is no such thing as a power structure not suffering any influences from outside itself: such self-sufficiency is impossible and, even if

possible, probably deadly to the culture which would apply it. So if a breech were possible so that participants to a certain order of discourse could enter another one, communication would be possible. But in order to be able to develop this idea, we must give up concepts such as that of a single reason common to all humankind. We must, as Rorty teaches us, become self-aware of our own unsurpassable ethnocentrism: however much we try to be open to other cultures, we still perceive their values through the perspective of our own society's values, which formed us as made us, in a great degree, become who we are now. But this is not a tragic limitation in any way, and we should neither feel ashamed that we have an ethnocentric perspective: we should take advantage of the fact that one of the values valued by the civilized societies we live in today is tolerance and dialogue and rejoice at the fact that we see the world through the prism of this value. Still, we have to remain aware of two things: that our perspective is not the only one, and that it will never be possible to make all people share our perspective, because some belong to universes of discourse that have no breeches between their universe and our own (for example, it would be impossible to convince a Ku Klux Klan member to accept that black people are humans too, because it would simply be impossible to find any common values on which to establish a dialogue). Thus what we must try to do is not, as Habermas says, try to reach an unanimous truth, but do something more modest, which kind of continues the German philosopher's idea, while also truly taking into account the relativity and fragmentariness of today's world: we should try to augment the extension of the word 'we' that we use when referring to the community within which we share the same rules of dialogue as far as possible - or, said in another way, try to obtain the widest possible intersubjective agreement. But this should not be an absolute ideal: there are situations in which an intersubjective agreement simply cannot be reached. In this kind of situations we should try, as far as our values permit it, to arrive at a situation of mutual tolerance and respect and to the acceptance of differences.

Thus, in a world in which truth has long been proved to be multiple and historically determined and in which the great universal stories of legitimation are being replaced by a mosaic of local stories, when all the concepts of speculative metaphysics are shown not to be able to serve as an originary basis anymore, it is irrational and naive to keep searching for an objective truth, as if this truth could exist outside human dialogue (and without dialogue, the notion of truth does not make sense). But this should not depress us or demotivate us from our exchange of ideas with other people: we must appreciate the fact that postmodernity has freed us form the the domination of unique criteria and values and opened our way to the true appreciation of the otherness, and not of the identical. If the capitalist mechanisms of globalisation are threatening our identity, what we have to do is resit to the totalitarianism of absolute values, and cultivate difference and relativism.

Bronze Medal Essay

On Topic II
by David Himler (Austria)

Some time ago, a man - dressed like a gold-digger - came running towards me, crying from the top of his lungs:"I found it! I found it!". Trying to calm him, I asked:"What did you find?".
"The truth", he answered exhausted, "I found the one, the only truth...".

Although I must admit that, as you might already suspected, this incident never actually happened, it is nonetheless a handy way to approach a very complex problem and as a result of that problem a very difficult question: Does the one truth, which the gold-digger claimed to have found exist? Is there an insight, which, as Habermas stated, could convince all?

To me, the idea of one particular insight in a discourse, which would convince all persons, groups, or even cultures involved, is a very troubling and, more important, unrealistic concept, because it is based on the asumption that there actually is one answer, one truth, or one insight to each question to be found, or at least a compromise which would satisfy all partys involved.

But could, for example even only two people (which is most likely the smallest group), engaged in a discussion, be expected to end up with one statement, one opinion, or - as stated before - one compromise, which would convince both of them?

We find ourselves not only asking "How could they?", but as a result "Why should they?".

Is a compromise, even if it is a shabby one, always the goal we should try to achieve?

Far from it.

In the search for thruths or insights in a, for example, philosophical discourse the aim to reach a compromise is not only a big hindrance to the discourse itself, but it also, probably unconsciously, causes a serious lack of variety and "substance" of the conversation, because it reduces the value of all views and ideas involved before the discussion even begins.

So, what should be the goal in all these discourses about the truth?

To answer that question, it is essential to answer another - fundamental -

one first: "What is the truth really and how is it formed?"

Of course, the mere try to answer that question properly would require another essay, but just like the gold-digger, another picture could provide a sufficient answer for our cause here. From the day they are born, all humans try to define their place in the world, or more specifically, in the systems (like family, neighborhood, professional environment, etc..) they are a part of. Humans therefore create (influenced by culture, social background, education, etc..) a picture, or a map of the world and how it works, or should work, in their minds combined with a legend to read that map to provide them with the orientation they are looking for.

This "map", which inculdes our views, opinions and values, form our truth, which is the way we see world and also a set of instructions on how to react to this world and its inhabitants.

This image is very helpful in discovering that there is more than one truth, just because there is more than one map for every human on the planet. Every human has his/her own map, which is constantly developing and changing based on the experiences humans make every minute. What we come to realize is the mere impossibility that two people on earth share the same map.

Is it therefore likely to find a way (i.e. an insight) that would find its place on both maps (of the two people engaged in a discussion)? Not at all.

We must realize that this "way" could not just be drawn on all maps involved without affecting other parts of the map as well, which are very likely to be important parts the map's owner is not willing to abolish.

That means, to leave the picture's sphere again, that no compromise works without more or less radical incisions on both sides.

Why should the compromise be then the desirable goal to look for, if it is that unsatisfying?

That is the point. It is not.

The first and foremost goal in a discussion must not be to agree on one shared insight but to agree on differences between our insights. That might sound rather troubling, but it is the only way to create a basis for a desirable discourse, which moves beyond mere tolerance, which is likely to turn into a "false friend", when it is reduced to just the acceptance of the existence of another map, or like J.W.Goethe put it: "Tolerance has to be a temporary view (...) to tolerate means to insult."

Therefore the goal should not only form a basis made of tolerance, but made of respect for the other "maps" we are facing in a discourse. This

simple presupposition enables us to evaluate the map without obligations to find a shared view, to question it and even include parts of it into our own map, if we feel like those parts would enrich our views.

The one insight (of this particular discourse) is getting clearer and clearer: The one truth in a discourse does not exist, because there are as many truths as there are participants, which, when combined, examined and shared enrich all people involve, much more than the lowest common denominator of their views.

So the goal is not to find the one truth, but to find as many as there are. Those, who are looking for the truth are no gold-diggers, but collectors who seek to not only see the whole world with their own eyes, but with many others as well.

After thinking about it for a while, I said to the gold-digger: "You found the truth? Great, let me see it, do you want to have a look at mine?"

The gold-digger smiled a knowing smile

Bronze Medal Essay

La Patrie, plutot mon ami
Les limites de la Philosophie
by Patricio Kingston (Argentina)

" Si j'avais a choisir entre trahir mon pays et trahir mon ami, j'espere que j'aurais les tripes de trahir mon pays ", soutient E. M. Foster. Cette phrase me souvint de la conception camusienne de la Guerre d'Algerie. En effet, quand on demanda le philosophe et ecrivain franco-algerien son avis sur le conflit belique entre la France et l'Algerie dont l'origine etait les demandes d'independance d'un grand secteur de la societe algerienne, il repondit: Justice, plutot ma mere. Voila pourquoi on a appele cet essai: La Patrie, plutot mon ami.

On est certes souvent tempte de condamner ses positions au nom des devoirs civiques face a la Societe, a nos responsabilites face au corps social dont on fait part. On voit l'egoisme dans ses positions, mais, par contre, qui pourrait repondre a une telle question sans hesiter un moment? Mieux, qui pourrait repondre a cette question et soutenir universellement cette reponse?

Voyons un cas concret, raconte par Sartre dans son oeuvre L'existentialisme est un humanisme. L'auteur de L'Etre et le Neant y

raconte qu'un eleve lui avait demande pendant la guerre comment pouvait-il savoir s'il devrait rester chez lui en accompagnant sa mere (et donc etre susceptible d'etre accuse de colaborationisme) ou bien joindre la Resistance (et laisser sa mere toute seule).

L'etudiant avait parcouru toutes ses connaissances de philosophie, tous les systemes ethiques dont il avait la connaissance, sans arriver a une reponse universelle qui lui convainquit. Il eut donc recours a son professeur (Sartre), et celui-ci lui repondit qu'il ne trouverait jamais la reponse dans les livres de philosophie. Etant libre comme il est (Sartre defina l'homme comme pure liberte), c'etait a lui de choisir, de faire son election.

Evidemment, cela ne voulait pas dire que n'importe quelle election que l'on fasse soit bien (selon Sartre, on doit choisir toujours la liberte pour l'Humanite), mais qu'il faut etre authentique, reconnaitre que c'est soi-meme qui fait l'election, et ne pas chercher a la situer dehors, en essayant de trouver une reponse automatique dans un systeme donne. Chaque action, c'est une election.

De toute facon, ce qui nous interesse de cet exemple, c'est la difficulte posee par le probleme lors de sa traduction - s'il m'est permis d'ainsi m'exprimer - en faits concrets. Parfois on peut bien repondre - et meme presqu'automatiquement - a la question theoriquement, mais dans la situation concrete on commence a douter de toutes nos connaissances, et l'on a recours souvent au simple sentiment.

Que peut donc faire la Philosophie pour repondre a cette question? En principe, la Philosophie a elabore a travers son histoire des differents systemes ethiques qui reglent le comportement de l'homme. S'il ne peuvent apporter automatiquement la solution, parfois ils peuvent nous illustrer sur certains aspects en nous aidant a choisir.

Ainsi, les ethiques qui font part des systemes organicistes sont contre la position de Foster: elles soutiennent que le Tout (dans ce cas, la Societe - soit, le Pays -) precede la Part (l'Individu - soit, l'ami -), alors ces-ci doivent etre sacrifiees a celui-la. Deja Aristote (Politique, Liv. I Ch. I) avait ennonce la subordination du bonheur individuel au bonheur publique, soit, la subordination de l'individu a l'Etat.

Ces conceptions holistes - dont on rencontre Hegel et Taylor parmi ses representants les plus importants - concoivent la Totalite comme une entite distincte des Parts qui la conforment: la Societe n'est pas la simple addition des individus; au contraire, elle est une entite independant et superieure, meme dote de son propre esprit (le celebre volksgeist si apprecie par l'Ecole Historique du Droit d'Hugo et Savigny). Etant donc une entite superieure, son bonheur est plus important que celui des individus qui y sont compris, alors s'il faut sacrifier son ami ou sacrifier son pays, on doit toujours sacrifier le premier, puisqu'il est moins

important que le Tout.

Neanmoins, parfois ces conceptions subordonnent insupportablement l'individu a l'Etat (le fascisme aussi bien que le communisme ont ete les champions du holisme): l'homme n'est pas un esclave de l'Etat, une simple part dans mecanisme absolu (tel que le pretendait la Sociologie de Duguit). Ce type de systeme ne peut qu'engendrer la tyrannie, et donc ne doit pas etre approuve (personne ne suivra jamais les schemas de la tyrannie que lorsqu'il est surveille, donc personne n'elirait pas librement cette version extreme du holisme). Meme Hobbes, qui a ete le theoricien de l'Absolutisme monarchique, soutint qu'il y avait des limites pour l'Etat, soit, la Loi Naturelle qui emmene a l'homme vers sa conservation physique.

De l'autre cote, on a les conceptions atomistes ou individualistes qui font de l'individu le centre de leur pensee, et de la Societe la simple addition des individus. Cette conception n'offre pas une reponse unique non plus. En effet, d'un cote quelques individualistes soutiendront que l'homme est libre de trahir son pays lorsque ne pas le faire lui ferait miserable d'apres le sacrifice de son ami. On ne pourrait exiger a un homme qui soit malheureux, qui tue son ami, son frere, ses parents.

Pourtant d'autres diront que la Societe doit rendre heureux le plus grand nombre de gens, alors si trahir le pays ne rendrait heureux que le traitre et son protege, et le sacrifice de celui-ci, la majorite de la Societe, alors l'homme doit agir pour le bien du majeur nombre.

En outre, d'autres systemes tel que celui de Kant nous exigeront choisir la reponse que toute l'Humanite en agissant rationalement choisisserait. Voila l'essence de son imperatif categorique. Le probleme, c'est que l'Humanite generalement n'agit pas rationalement dans ces situations, et il faut avouer que c'est assez difficile de trouver une reponse universelle pour cette question: choisisserait-on toujours l'ami ou l'Etat?

De toute facon, en parcourant les differents systemes philosophiques on se rend compte que l'on ne peut arriver a une reponse unique, universelle et eternelle. C'est une veritable question de sentiments que l'on ne peut repondre a priori, et surtout pas in abstracto. On pourrait bien dire que l'on croit que l'on doit respecter ses devoirs civiques, mais on ne cesserait de comprendre, dans certains cas, ceux qui s'ecarteraient de cette voie. Par contre, on pourrait aussi bien dire que l'on sauverait l'ami, mais le plus probable, c'est que l'on ne pardonnerait pas celui qui nous aurait condamne comme societe pour sauver son ami.

Ainsi, je crois que Foster se trompe en affirmant universellement de trahir son pays plutot que son ami: on finit par approuver les deux cas, selon les circonstances. Que peut donc faire la Philosophie pour quiconque se trouve dans la malheureuse situation imagine par Foster?

En fait, je dois avouer que je ne trouve pas une reponse qui me convainque pour cette question: d'un cote, je trouve que l'elle pourrait clarifier les principes qui gouvernent les differentes choix, mais d'un autre cote, je sens que cette election, malgre le temps qu'on lui dedie, finit par etre la decision d'un instant. Apres on trouvera les arguments pour justifier la decision, mais au moment de l'election, ce n'est qu'un acte de volonte, un sentiment.

C'est a peu pres comme la methode de jugement decrite par Cardozo: on decide d'abord la sentence, et apres on trouve les arguments pour la justifier. Ainsi, l'aide que la Philosophie peut nous donner dans ce domaine est indirecte, a travers nos structures mentales, qui voire inconsciemment conditionnent quoi que ce soit partiellement nos choix.

Il y a certaines questions qui peuvent etre resoutes philosophiquement, mais il y a d'autres qui nous posent dans des situations dans lesquelles il est impossible de raisonner. C'est ainsi que Saint Thomas d'Aquin a tres bien dit que l'on n'a pas de foi avec la raison, ni raisonne-t-on avec la foi.

Ainsi, je conclus que la Philosophie n'a pas d'outilite directe pour la resolution de la situation proposee par Foster (soit, je crois que son affirmation est un simple discours depourvue consequences pratiques). La situation proposee trouve sa solution irrationellement, donc je crois qu'elle est au-dela des limites de la Philosophie. C'est-a-dire, la solution peut etre justifiee par la Philosophie, mais elle ne peut etre directement prise par elle.

Finalement, il faut acclarer que cela ne veut pas dire que la philosophie morale n'ait pas d'outilite, c'est-a-dire, qu'elle soit " seulement theorique " et ne puisse etre applique. Je crois que la Philosophie (Morale) est donc similaire au Droit tel que concu par R. Dworkin: en general, elle nous permet de resoudre assez facilement nos problemes, mais il y a certains hard cases (cas difficiles) qui ne sont pas gouvernes par les regles generales, et donc la personne (ou, dans le cas de Dworkin, le juge) n'a pas une election unique.

Il n'y a pas, donc, le bon choix.

Bronze Medal Essay

On Topic III
by Woo Chan Lee (Korea)

Evaluation of things according to the pleasure and pain they accompany-at first hearing, it does strike one as naive. What harsh prejudices we

reserve for those playful Hedonists: immature, vulgar... "Sensuality" and "pleasure", is automatically oriented with lowly sentiment. We've been reared in an environment in which we are constantly urged to hide our instincts- to curb our desires for pleasure in the name of courtesy and wisdom. Society and culture around us continuously condemn actions based solely on pleasure, and those who evade pain willingly are called cowards. Nowadays, one can never be too noble as to face the world with sight devoid of pain and pleasure, and to act as as subjectively as he can in estimating the value of an object.

This exercise of trying to eliminate the instinct that leads us towards and away pleasure and pain compels us to abandon a perception based upon feelings, and emotion. Those who seek the value of an object by pleasure and pain, resort to emotions. A man does not think that it is painful when he steps on a pin, but he feels. Pleasure and pain are not decided after a process of reasoning, but are communicated directly in form of feelings and emotion. Childhood revolves around this system. What is pleasurable is good, and the child demands more, and what is painful is bad, which the child would try to evade.

As we age, however, things become significantly different. One ceases to rely on emotions. Life becomes more complicated as a process of thought takes place of spontaneous feelings. We refrain from acting by whim. Our education compels us to think before taking action. Reason! If feelings are of emotion, then reason, or thought- the thing of the mind! The Apollonian exultation of stolid reason as the tool towards the truth and value of life, which Nietzsche believes to have begun with Socrates, has led to a direct line of rationalism through Descartes and Russel/Whitehead. How Socrates preached the power of mind to Plato who was once a Dionysian poet, but later became the first great analyst. Before thought, the Greeks were men of pleasure, extolling sensuality through tragedy and comedy. After Socrates, the Greeks became Plato, Aristotle, and Euripedes. Life that once sought meaning in pleasure became the culture of dialogue and reason.

And this is precisely what the lonely German abhorred. True- from the unorganized, illogical philosophy of Heraclitus to Aristotle's canon of knowledge, mankind has certainly made a step forward by adopting mind as the most powerful tool in life. Yet, so Nietzsche argues, the transition from emotion to thought leads to decadence, as is what he thought happened to the Greeks. The lonely German loved the early Wagner for his apotheosis of untamed passion in music, which had previously been marked by the classic organization of Mozart. Once the great musician turned to dialogue from drama, Nietzsche abandoned him. Such was Nietzsche's love for human emotion. Such was his respect for the "artist" who can regard the shunning of emotion "with irony and pity from a distance."

No one can disagree with the fact that emotion has been constantly

undermined for a large part in the stream of history. He who can suppress his desires and emotions, and revert himself from pleasure, has been praised ever since the ascetic teachings of Christ. Buddhism, too, and other religions, ask of men to seek a goal higher than immediate pleasure. And yet how natural it is to desire pleasure and abhor pain, that even the compensations that come for heeding the religious doctrines is in fact eternal pleasure in the fields of Heaven! Behind the complex reflections and thoughts of the messiah, what can lie there except the eternal satisfaction of the emotions? Experience surely tells that emotion is Man's first tool. As children, we rely on feelings and not thought. Before civilization and even language, the earliest human being struggled for survival with the doctrine of pleasure and pain. It is through his preference for pleasure that mankind lives today.

But why this dependence on reason? The truth is, despite all its powers and merits, we know that emotion alone is not a sufficient key to life. One might make connections between the lack of rationalism in both artists and children, but all of those who linger in childhood are not certainly bound to become artists. Emotion is a powerful determinant- but it must be channeled. Culture, to a certain degree, is incorporation of rationalism to the barbaric mind. And even within art, where there is no dictated rule, a certain order is present.

So Nietzsche, in his passionate disgust towards Apollo's harmonious order, overlooked the fact that Siegfreid would not have been possible without Wagner's mind aiding the musician's emotions, and that even his Zarathustra would not have been as great without thought organizing and weaving the threads of inspiration. Order created by the mind does not always overshadow the explosive beauty of the heart, nor eliminates pleasure, but crafts it into presentable form.

All forms of development may be viewed as this incorporation of thought into primal emotions. As one grows older, he realizes that his actions imply more than a choice between immediate pleasure or pain- that behind a thing, there is something more that does not necessarily involve his individual emotions alone. He gains this knowledge, as the term knowledge itself implies, through thought. A man is capable of sacrificing immediate pleasure, not because he does not desire it as much as a child does, but because (through thought) he perceives a greater pleasure in the long run. All that a child knows about running around in a restaurant is that it is fun. He does not perceive that it is disturbing to others, and his loss of reputation does not present itself to the child as pain. Neither can he perceive, due to underdeveloped reason, that it will happen. A grown man, however, sees that people around him do not appreciate noise, and remains in his seat. His pleasure is derived from knowing that people will think of him as a man of etiquette. On the contrary, one's inability to channel his desire for immediate pleasures may well lead to more pain. It is common that we laugh at he who cannot curb his desires when restraint is polite. We call such a man naive, and condemn his lack of morals.

So, much to Nietzsche's pity, we may say that hedonism that does not pursue beyond immediate pleasure is naive and shallow- and the same for utilitarianism. But what else can we say of the above mentioned development of morals, of a certain behavioral code set by society on what is wrong and right, except that it is utilitarian? Surely, if everybody acted without moral code and indulged in whatever rudimentary pleasures that came to mind, that would be damaging to everybody's pleasure. We cede to moral laws because we know that, by following them, life on the whole will become more pleasurable. Wait then! If the development of order is led by thought, as from a meaningless jumble of words to a carefully crafted essay, and utilitarianism must accompany a certain degree of a process of discerning and organizing what the ultimate pleasure for the majority is, Nietzsche was certainly wrong to dismiss systems such as hedonism and utilitarianism to be devoid of thought and reason.

Nietzsche failed to grasp that those who devised hedonism, pessimism, or utilitarianism, are not all "artists" who advocate the superiority of pleasure over order, emotion over mind. The British utilitarians were people of the business class- those who desired pleasure of the majority to be the right course of actions did so because they themselves were part of the majority, not the artistic few. He was right to divide the world into Dionysian and Apollonian forms, but he fell into that dogmatism which he so hated, and forgot that both passion and order are necessary.

We should not overestimate the power of thought- and it may well be that rationalism is an exaggeration of the faculty and importance of mind. But emotion is not an omnipotent key to the world either. Not that we should all concur to the saying that "agnosticism is the only true philosophy," but wouldn't have Nietzsche and humanity on the whole done better if they had searched for the Golden Mean? Wise was he who turned our attention back to pleasure and pain, but it was his blunder to miss the ubiquitous power and necessity of human reason.

Bronze Medal Essay

<div align="center">

On Topic IV
by Jutta Obertegger (Italy)

</div>

NOMENESTOMEN

Once Aristoleles established a discriminating feature for living beings: movement. Every being that is moved by itself can be considered living. Things like stones are not capable of moving, they are just the object of

the action which makes them move. So Aristoleles said that every living animal must have a soul because only the soul is capable of moving itself. This tendency comes from the desire of the soul because the soul wants to take part in.the great harmony, which is perfect and eternally moving. At this point we could add that an exzpression of this moving soul is the language because only living creatures are capable of speaking, but not all in the same way, as Darwin noticed. Plants are moving verz slowly, and so they are not forced to deal with each other in a fast and not always direct way. So they use other ways of communication, like hormones. On the other hand animals and exspecially the human being have to communicate directly because they can change their position and so they have to organize their meetings. For this these beings created or expressed a communication which should express their desires and their needs, that is why a lion rows and a human being shouts. The human being is a creature which establishes states and so the tendency to organisation is a necessary conclusion.

As we said before that living animals or their souls want to express something, language is the sum of different sounds put together. The members of the language group give meanings to the different combinations of the words, so that they can use them in an universal way, they think. In addition, humans have elaborated and specified the language in a special way: When animals, like lions, have concentrated their communication on special sounds or expressions, human beeings have given their ;anguage an abstract sense. Human beeings established certain rules or laws, like in mathematical sciences or in logistics, by using their language, so that they have been creating new combinations of sound for new contants. So no person of the middle age would be able to understand a theory about radiation or could understand the word "computer" because these things did not exist at that time. So the developmtent of the human is also a developmtent of his language because he is adictetd to use words as his way of communicating.

Nevertheless it is obvious that language can not be seen in an absolute way because there are many circumstances which have their influence on language and no thing that depends on something else can be considered as a basis: There are some primary influences: Every individuum is influenced by its family because before an individuum startes to make its own experiences it needs a guide, as Augustinus said. And so every persons learns the first words directly from its family. The necessity is after that the most important feature because the capaticity of speaking depends on your own ability to it, that means that if there is a lot of dialogue in a family the children or the members of this family are trained by this so that they can deal with other people well.

Secondary, language depends also on education. People who have the possibility to go to school or to university can often much better express certain things than others because they confronted theirselves with such things.

Tertiary, it depends on the direct culture area to which an individuum belongs because you can find special words just in special parts of the world because the culture which lives there has found a special expression for it. Every culture area has got a specified number of expressions, which are the result of historical development. So for example, in certain parts of Asia there exists no word for "love" because the marriages depend on social circumstances, not on personal agreements. This makes translations also very complicated. Thats also why some jokes can not be translated because the combination of the difFerent words expresses the joke.

In addition, we found also the "enlarged" culture area as a discriminating feature because the language depends also on the personal development. If a person speaks to people of other countries, of other cultures there would may be found some differences in expression and then these persons can explain why they are using these expressions. The contact with other language groups gives an essential influence on the way of thinking of a person or a culture because every "historical grown" word has a specified content and a meaning behing its "normal" meaning. The most difficult thing is nonetheless that diffenent countries have created difFerent languages and dialects, so that not national, but also global communication is very difficult to establish. If every word is the result of a "movement" of the soul, and if every movement is equal to an idea, every word must have its origine in an idea. So the differences in language are also the differences of ideas of an area. So that we can say that the language is the expression of a culture and everything is related to it, for example art. Before an artist can start his work, he must think of it, he has to express his vision, he has to form the basis of his work. After that he can start to elaborate and to concentrate his work. Before the human is HOMO FABER, he is HOMO COGITANS. So it is necessary to enlarge the vision of Descartes "Cogito ergo sum " to "Cogito ergo loeuor". The human reason tries to organize the world in a way that the human can understand the world and so does also the arist. In life many different feelings and much information comes to the ma?, but the artist can filtrate this information and send a message to the viewer. But before you can send a message, you have to form this message. Referring to Wittgenstein, you can just speak clearly obout things, if you have a clear vision of it.

So that every artificial expression is first an coginitive action, which is controlled by the language which speaks your reason. It is obvious that the active thinking depends on language and the words a language uses. Thats also why Chinese art styles more are connected to philosophy and religion and poetry than the European and American styles because these three topics has been ever together in this land. So for example retained the exams for the civil servants of the imperator not only poetry, but also painting. Exspecially poets use the huge crowd of expressions to create a special atmosphere, for example Edgar Allen Poe was very good at it, for

example in his ballad "The Raven": "But the silken sad uncertain rustling of each purple curtain". He takes human expressions to describe the movements of things which created these feellings in the reader. So you can see, that, as long a culture could form its own language and writing, language correspondes to the way of thinking. So it seems like every idea forms a word which has an influence on the actions of the person who has thought it. The transformation of this thought returns in this way again to the mae who has thought it, like Cusanus noticed, that the human being creates a whole world out of his soul and this world returns to him again. Language is not a "causa sui", but a "creator sui" because the human innocation corresponds to the creation of new words for a new part of the human world. Also language is a part of this world, but many often some words are misunderstood. This phenomenon has started by the beginning of language because language is not necessary for an individuum, but it is essential for a group of at least two people. Because as Cusanus said that every human being is the centre of the universe because every individuum creates his own world, every human being has similar, but always different ideas or expectations. So that we must say that every person in his personal thinking is like an elemental wave similar to the elemental waves of the light: You see every point as the starting point of such a wave, but every point of this wave is again the starting point of a new wave. So that the visible light is nothing else than the intersection, the coincidence of all these elemental waves. A culture and its language can now be considered as the coincidence of all the single expressions of society, which is the sum of all the individuals. And the yisible wave is the language which this society speaks. But the danger is that all these waves do not correspond totally to each other, so that sometimes a group has different visions about the same thing. So that we must admit that the human as a creature is a universal creature because he is able, he forces himself to this, to try, to explore many things; the ma? must have some own yisions which are fixed, which he cannot change, Heimito von Doderer calls this " Befangenheit" (diffidence), but in this state the ma? is or should be always totally able to take something in. At this point we see that language is not universal because it depends on certain things, there is and there can not be a common basis because language is a very big part of the identity of a nation or a group of people. That is also the explanation why the assimilation of people is always or nearly ever the reason for terrorism orthe soure of deeply hate against the "con?uerer". If somone is forced to speak another language which is not his native language than he has also to refuse some parts of his own thinking and the meaning of the words are known, but did not become content. So Hegel said that you just can understand something when you can connect the sensual imputs, the feelings with the word itself. Otherwise you have no clue about it because you do not understand the content. This could also be the reason, why Wittgenstein said, that little children can speak, can communicate much more better to each other than scientists who have studied at university. Wittgenstein called the use of language "Sprachspiel" (game of language) because we are not able to transform an idea 100% to reality, to words because, as Plato said, ideas are

perfect, they are a part of this transcendental harmony. Nothing real, means part of our reality, can be considered as a perfect thing because also a diamond can be destroyed, but it is not possible to destroy perfect, eternal things. Even Goethe in his great work "Faust" said: " Das Wort erstirbt schon in der Feder" (The word is even dying in the pen). So you can think of a perfect thing, but you can not establish it because you are not able to do so. Language is not able to show realitiy, to express it, so we just can play these game, but we have always to be very careful that we know, which game we are playing. Society gave strict rules which control these games, so that people get lost, misunderstood, if they are playing the false game. So these games try to lead us through this labyrinth called language, called life because language is the nearest and directest connection to life because life is the source of language. And so we must confess that the limits of our language are the limits of our world, but these limits do not mean that the world behind them does not exist, only that the "universal" human has refused of some part of his universality and has so refused wisdom. So language can be considered as a sum of different historical, social and economic developments, it is ergo a result called "a posteriori" because it depends on the experience, on the big memory of a culture. That is the reason why different cultures have problems in communicating with each other. Different countries speaking different languages are the starting points of different elemental waves and so they have not the same basis. There can be some coincidences, for example is or was the ma? in almost every culture considered to be the leader of the family. But nevertheless some features are incompatible and then, when different elemental waves meet each other, there almost happens a collision (arguments, fights, war). Sometimes language can m?k? it worse because often some word are similar to word in other languages, but they often have different meanings. Sometimes the meaning of one word is exactly the opposite of the other word and then there can happen a collision, like once it was after a Yolleyball- match between two countries. In an interview a player wanted to say that she liked the game, but in the language of the other country the word for "good" means "bad" and so the other country became really angry and this conflict still goes on.

So, as Wittgenstein noticed, language can give different basis because of its yariation in view or starting point. You can speak to a person of your own language and not understand this person, not only because you have different visions, but also because you started from different exspectations and meanings. The Greek colonisation and the their trading power was just an result of their politics because the Greek men were very elitist, but nevertheless they were trading a lot with other people and cultures. The reason for this is because merchants are always openminded for new ways of trading and new goods. They have the intention to do a good swap and for this they want also to meet other cultures, to study their languages and to understand their way of life. The common basis, respecting each other, is the universal basis. Even Wittgenstein warned, that if rwo people say the same things, it means not, that they have the

same intention. Language can also manipulate the sense, when you, for example, want to say that something is ugly. Then you can say that you do not like it or you say that you hate it.

So we need for the dialogue between different cultures a common basis because once it was possible to say that other countries, which are far away do not belong to our "little world" because they are in Afiica or somewhere else. Today every country is a string in a very complacated and complex in structure net. Otherwise it would have never been possible that the Second World War has influenced so many countries. Almost every country was connected with annother one and so it is not possible to say during the time of globalisation that some things do not belong to "our" world. "Our" world does not exist. The word "our" expresses just the simulation of a subjective world, "our" is just an elemental wave which can not be considered to be the whole yisible wave. An individuum or a single state can not distinguish which parts of the world take part in the word "world". So a dialogue between diferent countries is necessary, is essential not onlz for our future, but also for our present because we can have more influence on our present than on our future. That is also why Goethe"s Faust trasnlated the Greek word "LOGOS" with "action". This word, logos and action, is a part of this common basis, This common basis must be "a priori" because it is the pre- cognitive state of the human mind, that exists apart from language because it is universal. It can not be transformed into language, it can only be described. Language gives just a sign of this awareness. This pr?-cognitive thinking is a feature of every living beeing, it is the soul who moves the materia©© and it is the common basis which is necessary. During the Italian "Risorgimento"-Wars the famous writer Manzoni said that every nation (in this case the Italian nation) should have its own state, based on a common language, but in the end h? had the romantic opinion of a united Europ?, of a united world, and every state is a part of it. The pr?- cognitive thinking is the essence, the ?uinta essentia, which is the feature of humanity.

Bronze Medal Essay

On Topic IV
by Jae Won Choi (Korea)

Is true communication of humanity through language possible?

Sound communication between people is a crucial basis of the establishment of a peaceful society. Moreover, the importance of communication has been increasing in the 21th century where the world is working tightly together and needs mutual understanding through

communication. And along with gestures, tones, or emotions, communication includes the use of language with which we deliver our thoughts to other people and listen to different thoughts of others. Yet, despite the desperate need of well-functioning communication, I believe perfect communication through language between individuals, societies, or even communication within an individual himself is hardly possible.

Wittgenstein vividly shows a reason why communication through language must cause difficulties and misapprehensions by comparing language to the image of a labyrinth. One characteristic of language he presents here is that language is complicated. The other characteristic, which I believe to be more reponsible for the miscommunication, is that language has different meanings to each individual. Not only different person but also the same person can perceive words differently as he changes over time. I will discuss furthur about the role of language in the society, and how the characteristics of language make the perfect communication impossible.

Whether men form a society to oppress inate evilness and aggressiveness inside humanity as Hobbes insisted or whether men form a social contract to maintain natural peace and benevolence as Rousseau said, men are now living together according to the rules of the society. And the role of language in the aspect of social life is crucial. Language is the method with which people express themselves. It is the main root of interactions. Also, language enables the transfer of knowledge and wisdom of contemporary society to our descendents so that the society continue developing on the accumulation of knowledge. Much of the knowledge and wisdom pondered, discovered, and studied by one generation could not have survived if there was no language. Language is used to make laws, the social agreements. All the functions and roles of language can be summurized into one: communication. And It can be communication of different generations or communications among different cultures. The bigger the role of language in the society, the more conflicts arise when the language fails to clearly convey meanings.

And the failure of language in communication is inevitable. First of all, language changes, becomes obsolete or even becomes distorted. words, the cells composing a great universe - language, are begun to be made from the ancient times. Objects must be named after complicated agreements to the question, "what is this?". It is unlikely that people suddenly established all the names to all the objects on one day. This gradual, and complicated formation of each word unavoidably causes the gradual changes in words. Some words people used long time ago, such as 'thou or thee' are not used anymore. Some words people didn't use before such as 'missile, nano technology' are frequently used. Some words, such as 'hedonism', the meaning of the word is distorted and misunderstood from pursuing sound, everlasting peace to blindly desiring physical ecstacy. This incessant transformation of language creates gaps between meanings and the word.

Secondly, connotations of words are different. When a person who lost his finger from a dog bite will think of fear, hatred, or evilness when he talks about dogs while a person who loves and lives with ten dogs will imply adorability of his dogs. To old people, climbing a mountain may cause a feeling of strenuousness and fatigueness while young, active people may imagine how the sunshine penetrates through the forest like spears of light. So, according to the differences in age, experience, culture, and personality, just as every individual is different from one another, the concept and feeling one has about a word are completely different. Even the same person would perceive a word differently if he changes over time.

Thirdly, in case of abstract words, the exact definition is limited. As Schopenhauer said that "a person's limit of perception is the limit of the world", no one can set the definite, concrete, exclusive definition of words such as happiness, freedom, and love. According to the limited experience of their own, people give definitions regarding some aspects of the word. To a man whose fiancee elopes with another man, love is no more than a betrayal. Yet, if he falls madly in love with another woman, and at that moment, nothing can be sweeter or more important than love. Even great philosophers who proposed conclusive theories regarding the definitions and explanations of the world, human, free will, or death, cannot escape the limited human experience and perception. They are all bound to 'their' experience, and concepts attained from 'their' experiences. And as Bertrand Russel said all questions are bound to be asked once more, people change over time and their definition of words change which prove that their previous meaning, and potentially their new meaning they came up with is not perfect. Even Wittgenstein himself proposed another theory, a game theory, refuting his previous picture theory about how language was formed. Concepts and meanings of abstract words are imperfect and incomplete.

Plato and idealists would say that there exists an idea before the objects and words. An apple, a dog, love, and freedom exist as an ideal concept, a concept that everybody must agree, and the concept which is perfect that there is no room for misunderstanding. However, language, and our everyday use of words do not coincide with this ideal. "Truth is the correspondence to reality by words", said Nietzsche. And we know our words are not perfect. When we perceive this ideal, the reality, the ideal goes through the process of digestion with our words. With language, we redefine the reality as we see it. This process, rather than to just swallow whatever concept you are given, gives you the power of creation, and novelty at the expence of deviation and misunderstandings of language.

According to the reasons above, because there exists subtle, but inevitable gap between concepts and definitions of words people use, the perfect communication through language, which is crucial for the society to be maintained is almost impossible. And we can easily see the

outcome of the failure of languages in our society.

Since language's most important role was to enable communication, it's greatest failure is the miscommunication. In our everyday life, we encounter misunderstanding. The first step of speaking is to form what is going on in your head into a language, to a generally agreeable word corresponding your thought. This is the first gap in communication. We often say "I do not know how to say this", or "This is really hard to explain" meaning that changing abstract 'thoughts' to 'words' is very difficult and there will always be a gap, no matter how small it is, between your thought and what you want to say. After you succeed in finding the word closest to your meaning, you will start communicate. And on this course, since your concept of the word and your partner's is different, what you say and what your partner understand is different. This, is another gap in communication. In broader sense, wars between countries or terrorism arise due to both lack of communication and miscommunication.

The public is being isolated from the knowledge. Since the academic fields develop, the become more and more fractionalized. Each subdivided field has it's own language which people who did not study the field thoroughly would understand. As people do not know the language, they do not understand the concept, and they are being separated from their reality. When their cellphone is broken, they cannot fix it themselves. We use computer everyday, but we do not know how semiconductors or transistors work or even what they are. Philosophy, despite it's importance, is only shared among a very limited people because concepts and languages are hard to define.

To sum up what happens because of the impossibility of a perfect communication, the society is being partitioned to groups of people who share similar language and concepts. The conflicts arise between these groups. Within the group, each individual has conflicts with each other. And within oneself, one may suffer because he knows he cannot explain the reality with his limited words and experiences.

Gaps caused by different concepts of the word will always there unless we think everything uniformly, meaning we should be all the same as a manufactured robot to have a homogeneous thougt. So, at the expense of the miscommunication, ambiguity, subtlety, and different perceptions of language ensure the uniqueness of an individual. Moreover, the fact that perfect communication through language is impossible does not mean that people should give up communicating with each other. We shall not and cannot elliminate the gap by inducing people to think in a uniform way.

The miscommunication can, and should be minimized by our understanding, concession, and accomodation. When a person who thinks love is painful betrayal talks about love with a person who believes that love is like a piece of chocolate, since their concept of the word, love,

is completely different, they will face difficulty communicating. However, through understanding and accepting other concepts, each will accommodate their original concept to a new, broader, and more inclusive one. They will understand each other by thinking that "ah, love can be both sweet and painful". This should be how the humanity continue to communicate to each other even though language is imperfect. We should expand, accomodate and concess to new concepts by our limited, imperfect but still, hopeful chance of understanding.

---

*
*
*

International Philosophy Olympiad since 1993
www.philosopiad.org

Internationa
www.philosopiad.o

What is IPO? | Hosting Country of This Year | How to Participate? | Let's Talk | Q&A | Site Map

Themes for 14th International Philosophy Olympiad (English)

1. **Ludwig Wittgenstein,** *Philosophical Investigations* **#43**
   For a large class of cases ? though not for all ? in which we employ the word ¡°meaning¡± it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.

2. **Karl Marx,** *Thesen uber Feuerbach,* **XI**
   The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it.

3. **Kitaro Nishida,** *An Inquiry into the Good*
   To know a thing we must love it, and to love a thing we must know it.

4. **Holbach, Paul-Henri Dietrich,** *System of Nature*
   In short, the actions of man are never free; they are always the necessary consequence of the temperament, of the received ideas, and of the notions, either true or false, which he has formed to himself of happiness; of his opinions, strengthened by example, by education, and by daily experience.

IPO 2006 AWARD ESSAYS

- Gold Medal : BALIKCIOGLU EFE MURAT (Turkey)
- Silver Medal : CHABERSKI MATEUSZ (Poland)
- Bronze Medal : KAKKO SAILA (Finland)
- Honourable Mention (in alphabetical order)
  - BUSTI MARGHERITA (Italy)

- CONRAD KRAUSCHE (Switzerland)
- DROZDZOWICZ ANNA (Poland)
- GOGIANU FLORIN-RADU (Romania)
- KAUTTO CARMEN (Finland)
- HUBER MAXIMILIAN (Austria)
- MUSI SARA (Italy)
- SHIRI SHAPIRA (Israel)
- SCHULLER ANDRAS (Ungheria)
- STEINLECHNER JOSEPH (Austria)
- THOMS DANIEL (Germany)
- UJMA PETER (Ungheria)
- VATCHKOV CHRISTIAN DANIELOV (Bulgaria)

Gold Medal Essay
On Topic I

The Resurrection of Man by Constant Madness:
From ¡°Meaning As Representation¡± to ¡°Meaning As Use¡±,
Dismantling the Systematic Code by Its Own Means

BALIKCIOGLU EFE MURAT (Turkey)

The painting collection of Goya, Los Caprichos and one of his masterpiece, The Madhouse, depict the lowest possible position of man in his course of history: the depiction of the mad. Though some may consider this disgraceful moment as a way of man¡¯s incapability of his expressing, some may also consider it as man enjoying his dark freedom and culminates his position during the course of expression of his own thoughts: the incapability of expressing, which is portrayed by the mad, is a way of expressing without limiting one¡¯s self within the language itself.

As Wittgenstein pursues to perceive the notions of ¡°understanding¡± and ¡°meaning¡± in his masterpiece The Philosophical Investigations, he comes to the point where he admits that when a person reaches to the moment in which he transforms his thoughts into one of the elements of the language transformation process, such as reading, writing, speaking, he will capture the real meaning of what he intends to say, fitting it to the systematic code of the language and transforming the use of the meaning into its representation: according to Wittgenstein, in the very minute of adapting a

thought into the systematic code of language, we lose the meaning itself. Therefore, in order to understand the thoughts that wanted to be expressed, the silence and the moment of expressionless are more valid than the total control in the systematic code of the language itself. Stemming out from his investigation of the notion of ¡°understanding¡±, Wittgenstein comes to a point where he explicates his notion of ¡°meaning as use¡± as opposed to ¡°meaning as representation.¡± This shift from the use to the representation is solidified by his exemplification of the game of chess, in which the player moves its pieces according to the bearer of their names rather than the nametags of the pieces, meanin that for example, when the player moves the king, it is moved according to its function/role (the bearer), not according to its name. Therefore, the difference between the bearer of a word (meaning as use) and just the nametag of a word (meaning as representation) supports his point in which we empty the meaning of a word as we use it pragmatically withi the context of our daily lives, ignoring its ¡°real¡± meaning.

As we modify our thoughts into the systematic codes of the languages, we find ourselves trapped within the grammatical code of the language, missing the meaning as use. This transforms us to build different discursive formations in our daily lives (Foucault) and therefore, create a language within language, trap within a trap, where we fail to aim at the meaning of word as use (the bearer of a word). By that way we are unable to attain the process of understanding that Wittgenstein underlines that it can be realized by the absorption of the notion of meaning as use.

Starting with the questions:

- Have there been attempts to break apart the daily language formations and let people attain the meaning of a word as use?
- How have been this mistaken sense of language (empting of the meaning of a word and acting according to its meaning) misused in the course of political and ethical senses?

I am thinking of first identifying the attempts to break this cycle and then exemplifying how it was misused, ending up suggesting some solutions for the attainment of Wittgenstein¡¯s process of understanding by the discovery of the meaning of a word as use.

II.

I believe one of the most beautiful accomplishments of art and literature is their attempt to break apart the prevailing codes of languages and trying to express the ¡°expressionlessness¡± (parallel with Goya¡¯s mentioned works of art) of the aesthetical embodiment of the stages of the human beings have lived. The aesthetic theory of Collingwood perfectly explicates this sense of expressing the inexpressible. According to his aesthetic theory, the only way to understand the work of art is to feel its compositions in our veins and to practice it by aspiring to recreation in order to fully reach our aesthetic culmination. This theory brings a moment of catharsis, in which the admirer of the art work fully works for

recreating it by producing new artworks stemming from the admired with an inspiration to attain its inexpressible meaning. Thus, the function of art and literature to attain the inexpressible has always been the very attempts that human beings have used to attain the meaning as use.

In the course of the Modernization process of the Western cannon, the dialectic clash between the avant-garde movements as opposed to the radically traditional moves, I believe has a very significant role in the evolution of this sense of breaking language codes, so that creating new ones in the attempt of expressing the meaning an use rather than the meaning as representation. However, all these trials failed to embody the real sense of the process of understanding, since the artists and authors failed to see that the new elements of language intending to break it apart, also are used to create new ones, retrapping the meaning as use that is to be emancipated. The example of the avant-garde vs. traditional clash between the Futurism and Rondo movements in the Modern period was just a way of seeking the expressing of the inexpressible within the clash of their opposite entities; however, as it was to create their own systematic codes, resulting in the failing of the aimed emancipation. For example, Marinetti¡¯s manifesto together with the futuristic works of Balla and Severini was a way of admiring the dynamism of the cultural change with the industrialization period. Their desire to mash all the traditional codes of Italian society was unfortunately transmitted into radical fascistic ideologies, which then locked itself in the radical doctrine of the fascism. Their attempts to cite the ongoing change in the industrializing world hampered by the very ideological standpoint trapping their attempt to reshape constant mobility, dynamism of the change. All those it was a movement in some ways against the traditional Rondo society, accusing its trappedness, the Futurism movement became trapped by itself.

Very similarly, the postmodern and abstruse ways to reach the meaning as use by deconstructing the language itself were also very unsuccessful attempts of emancipation from the language. The deconstruction and intertextuality in The Wasteland by Eliot, the meaninglessness for meaning as use in the context of political and economic complexity of the Second World War period by the Hermetism movement of Montale and Ungaretti, the usage of genital organs in place of paintbrush in the paintings of Yves Klein and the grammatically deconstructed word-games in the poems of e. e. cummings were just the efforts to deconstruct the systematic code of the language by eliminating it constantly to the very degree of the total collapse of it; but, as the very mentioned artists and poets could not disregard the idea of expressing when expressing the inexpressible, their attempts were just the cyclical efforts to reach their aim.

As Goya¡¯s mentioned collection of paintings belongs to the late eighteenth century, it would be illogical to consider it as a work of Modernist period. However, his works, in which he tries to depict the mad people (it is ironical that he was also working for the royal family at that time) instead of very noble Spaniards, should be regarded as his successful manifestation of the self, as he tries to break the cycle of painting of the noble, the rich, the ¡°in power¡±, by choosing to portray the mad so that he can attain the inexpressible by using the elements, codes of the language itself. This is far more successful and to the point than the Modern avant-gardes which fail to understand that in order to relieve from the systematic code of the language, one should use the power of the systematic code, breaking apart itself with the very

same tools of the language trapping the meaning in use.

By the exemplification of the Modernization period (I believe Goya¡¯s looking forward works belong to the Modern period and Goya had found the answer of the question that avant-gardist were asking for, long before), I tried to reply the very first question of my investigation, finding the answer that there were attempts galore for the breaking apart of the language for the attainment of meaning as use; however, as these attempts (except Goya¡¯s works to the same extent) failed to recognize other dimensions apart from the language itself (disillusioning the previous cycle by creating a new one unintentionally), so that the result is the opposite of Wittgenstein¡¯s theory.

III.

The constant discursive formations in our daily lives, which are drawn again by Foucault to his notion of ¡°canceral continuum¡±, are to signify that the system imposes on us its very principles, so that by the rationalization of humanity/us (Adorno and Horkheimer) and the modification of identity to the very subject (Althusser), the digestion of very original thoughts is managed and attempts to break this capitalistic (Deleuze and Guattari) systematic codes are impeded by the system itself. In today¡¯s world, rather than one whole system, the system has transferred itself to very different microsects (educational, religious, political institutions etc.), to which have its own principles that we have to adapt ourselves. By that way, as we are addicted to the capturing code of the daily language (the Wittgenstein¡¯s criticism), it is now impossible for us to realize and get rid of this capturing, since the daily discursive code is diffusing to us capturing our beings slowly. Now, it is impossible for us to recognize the meaning as use, but to accept the emptying of the words, since in order for us to exist in every single of the microsects -to be part of the system we have to obey them- and be admitted by the others, it is our only duty to act according the rules and accept the very imposed concepts as they are presented to us.

By losing control over our thoughts and being arrested by meanings as representation, the people of this microsectic environment are joined up under the power of a new concept of governmentality (Foucault), instead of the government itself. Governmentality controls individuals by one by within the different discursive formations in their microsects, so that they would obey inevitably the emptied words that governmentality offers for them in their microsectic course of discursiv formations. This creates an eternal and absolute control over people and proves a total obeying of the imposed systematic codes by them.

Considering the ¡°War on Terror¡± policy of the USA, in which the US government¡¯ality tries to legitimize the notion of ¡° state of exception¡± (Agamben), so that by abusing this right, it can take control of the whole country and create a totalitarian rule. Both the misusage of the phrases, ¡°state of exception¡± and ¡°terror¡±, is to empty the meaning of these words, so that since people, embedded into the heavy microsects of the system are failed to recognize the meaning as use of these worlds, the US government¡¯ality can drag these meaning as representation to where it wants to take. ¡°Wa

on Terror¡± definitely is a way to hail the constant misconception and misusage (by that way, abusing) in the language, which can be drawn to the annihilation of ethical values and human rights.

The misusage of the phrases, ¡°universality¡± and ¡°globalization¡±, is very common in our daily lives, a cunning indication of the diffusing of the notion of globalization into universality. This indicates that globalization tries to disguise itself by the meaning as representation of universality; thus, it will not only get rid of the meaning as use of it, but also ¡°misfill¡± it. It is a way of restricting the understanding process for the people; and even if they try to understand it, it is a way of trapping, never ending up in the understanding of the initial ¡°meaning as use¡±, not in the ¡°misfilled¡± one.

The answer to the second question is simple: Imposed misconceptions, misuses, distortions for the total hegemony of the ¡°governmentality¡±, by misfilling ¡°meaning as use¡±, totally annihilating it. Abstruse labyrinth with no way out: From one microsect to another, there is a total flux of human beings, who are inevitably captured and even if they try to break this cycle; by the distortion, misusage, misconception, the very basic rights of human beings are taken away and their ethical senses are paralyzed, not letting them to move, constantly limited in the microsects of capitalistic system.

IV.

By referring to the unsuccessful attempts of the Modernization period artists and writers in the Western cannon, I tried to come to a point, where these attempts faded away and the tragic capturing of human beings is woven by the many different discursive formations, signifying the criticism of Wittgenstein when he complains about the man¡¯s incapability to foresee the meaning as use, as man is trapped within the language. I believe, there is a way to escape from this microsectic labyrinth, in which the very same system should be used as the stemming point using and, by that way, overcoming its own dynamism to overcome this inevitable cycle.

It is only the human beings to transform the very imposed codes of the system. It is in the hand of human beings to stop the process of interpellation (Althusser), so that the imposed concept of the self by the ideology gained by misusage, distortion, misconception can be overcome. It is to reject ourselves first, so that by emancipating from the rigid systematic code of the language, we can reach to the zone of deterritorisation (Deleuze), where constant nomadic movements opening itself again constantly to new dimensions would break apart the microsectic divisions of the imposed system, by transferring its tools of hegemony for itself. This is the way to dismantle the trap within the language, which would lead us to the meaning as use.

We have to play the mad. Goya¡¯s way of criticizing the political struggle and social corruption in his own time says a lot about the tools to move up to a position out of the designated frame of human beings. It is time to insert a notion of ¡°parody¡± in place of our robotic yielding to the imposed roles, principles of the system, characterized by its many microsects: madness should be held as a virtue, so that the dynamism of the constant creating systematic principles by

the mad (similarly, as the system imposes us), can be achieved, omitting its strengths and creating of our own.

Recalling Wittgenstein¡¯s statement in Tractatus, the very thoughts that cannot be put into the systematic codes of the language or expressed, are superior to the ones that are expressed by the means of the language, I believe that being ¡° mad¡± in the pursuit of expressing the inexpressible will take us out from the context of the language itself. Madness, as a way of confronting with the imposed power on us and a moment of incapability of expressing our thoughts (which is a virtue and only way to defeat the system, in my opinion), is the only way for us to attain the meaning as use in place of meaning as representation, in which we can enjoy intensely the process of ¡°understanding¡± without the restriction of the language itself.

Silver Medal Essay
On Topic I

Was Wittgenstein fighting against himself?

Tomasz Przezdziecki (Poland)

Introduction

None of philosophers like to be criticized for his thoughts and all of them have equal right to develop in their own way. The quotation above is very good imprint of the criticism which were imposed on Wittgenstein for his breakpoint in philosophy. He went the different way then his supporters and thinkers who had had the same beliefs as he. Personally, I believe that the whole system of his is coherent and I will show that the quotation is the mature point of his philosophy. The development of his mind was gradually approaching the totally contrary state then he had had at the beginning. I agree with that though in opposite to the earlier one.

Round first
¡®Tractatus¡¦¡¯ - the flag symbol of first Wittgenstein

Essentially Wittgenstein¡¯s philosophical system contains 2 parts: earlier, which basic book was ¡®Tractatus Logico ? Philosophicus¡¯: afterward one, which centers in ¡®Inquiries concerning the philosophy. In the first part there are seen the connections with Bertrand Russell and the whole philosophy of mathematics and language, the analytic point of view and empirical thoughts. The second one is the changing his course towards relativism and pure philosophy of language in the

contemporary meaning. The main issue in Tractatus was how to use language in proper way and what kind of words are we supposed to utter. The crucial sentence was: ¡®What you can¡¯t say anything about, you are allowed to be silence¡¯ was the elimination of metaphysics from the language because of the relativity which is involved in uttering these notions. Moreover, Wittgenstein claimed not to speak about ethics and to clean the language from these absurds ? ethic and metaphysic notions. Apart from that, he formulated the criterions of uttering words, which would have any meaning. ¡®Meaning¡¯ in earlier philosophy of his was said to be a verification with experience and thing which we could find in our experience. These were the sentences about mathematics (of course with care put on the Russell¡¯s remarks about descriptions). Every word should have its equivalent in real world. The basic thing for human is uttering then. When something has its name, it exists, and the words are determining our view and the apprehension to the world, which should be empirical reasoned and plainly pointed out in the world we are living in. Aside from that, the general notions weren¡¯t devaluated; they came into the correlates of singular words. Then, Wittgenstein philosophy developed towards atomic logicism, which were accepted by him as the basis of human¡¯s uttering (so called atomic propositions) and his comprehending. When we juxtapose that with his quotation: ¡®The borders of my language are also the borders of my world, we can claim that he relied whole human knowledge on speaking and finally on meaning of the words. In spite of this there are no word in Tractatus about the nonexistence of metaphysics and ethics. Paradoxally, they are just meaningless, but they really can exist or influence our life.

Second Round
Signs of breakthrough in ¡®Tractatus¡¦¡¯

That was the first step of breakthrough in Wittgenstein¡¯s system. Plainly speaking, the metaphysical and mystical dimension of it. In the book thinker divide the world implicit in two spheres: the things which can be utter, which are setting the borders of the world as we see it and the second one, the unsaid world which in fact exist, but man cant say about it because of its relativity in the material words. He didn¡¯t tend to think that one of them is material and the other isn¡¯t. He just mentioned implicit the existence of the world of ethical ideas and generally the ideas. It points out that there is something behind the curtain of the silence. The contemporary question is whether he thought about some kind of noosphere or just it was about the intrinsic world which inevitably is a part of self. Thus he achieved the point where he divides the self into two areas: the ego, which was connected with real word by speaking and meaning and the ego which was dealing with the other, ¡®silent¡¯ world (scheme).

The other
ego also
divided

The Self divided into
over-Ego and Ego
in ordinary meaning

Real world
apprehended by
human (relative)

Other self's
world
(relative)

Undefined, 'silent'
world

It shows that not only the empirical verification is important but also, the mystical comprehension is included and grasped. It¡¯s just a small step from the view expressed by the quotation about meaning. Aside from that interpretation, Wittgenstein kept his beliefs on uttering meaningless words about our ethical problems, values etc. In my opinion he has made a room for the second part of his philosophy which will be described afterwards. I believe, it¡¯s worth telling that many of neopositivists from Vienna Association were asking Wittgenstein to join them and to create a great system which will ultimately eliminate metaphysics and ethics from the area of philosophy, according to their metaphor of philosophy as a king Lear who had given all his money to his daughters and then he became a poor man. Wittgenstein referred distantly to their plans. He was concerned about his views and he wouldn¡¯t like to eliminate the ¡®soft¡¯ philosophy (notion of analysts), but he saw an importance of it in human¡¯s thinking. It was the prospect of the new stage of his thought which

became such divisive.

Third Round

The full-fledged, philosophical system contained in ¡®Inquires¡¦¡¯

Late Wittgenstein included his thoughts in already mentioned book called ¡°Inquiries considering philosophy.¡¯ He reversed from the atomic logicism and became a pragmatic philosopher, who considered meaning, the central notion of his as a usage. That¡¯s the meaning of the quotation. Whatever you utter it depends on the situation, the person who you are talking to, context and the place and the time where it is taking place. It¡¯s obvious for Wittgenstein to notice that the word gets it¡¯s meaning while saying. Let¡¯s consider the sentence:

1. There is a hammer.
   When you are in mechanical workshop and you are asked to bring it to the mechanic, the hammer means ? the device used to stick a nail into the piece of some material. The meaning is easy to understand and commonly used. According to the first stage in Wittgenstein¡¯s philosophy, it would be named as a ordinary entity to cause some action which is properly measured, has its weight, length and it¡¯s made of the material known as wood and iron. To plainly see the difference in approach of first philosophy and the second we have to consider another sentence:
2. Give me a hammer.
   To interpret that sentence properly we have to imagine that we had made a mistake in some obvious action; we are so blamed by ourselves. The sentence becomes metaphorical owing to those specific conditions, I have described. The word ¡®hammer¡¯ has totally different meaning than the first one. It is not any type of device than. It is a fixed phrase created by us, on the field of our language to express our feelings. Consequently it becomes some kind of symbol and is changing his meaning. The situations I have just presented, in the terminology of the second Wittgenstein, are called the language-games. This notion is worth explaining closer.

Language-games were apprehended by Wittgenstein as situations in which we are using words. They have their rules, which are set by the ¡®players¡¯, their time extension and they are determined by the place where they are played. They are the moments, when words are gaining their meaning. Above we had two language-games: in the mechanic¡¯s workshop, and somewhere in space with described conditions. Wittgenstein wrote that they have also the characters of play (from German word ¡®das Spiel¡¯). It means that there is an amusing factor involved in them. The players are actually free in their game as far as they don¡¯t surpass the border between one game and the other. They are like children on the seesaw-they can decide whether they want to dangle faster or slower until they really are at the seesaw. Wittgenstein noticed some difficulties among the language-games

1. The rules are not pre-established by any transcendental entity. They are setting while playing. They can change momentarily or stay still during playing. It depends on players. In fact, Wittgenstein didn¡¯t say anything about the qualifications of people to set the rules. I think, this faculty is innate to our minds. Actually, we are born in some game, living in many of them, and staying in some of them until death.

2. The problem of changing the game is the basic one. Wittgenstein saw the task of philosophy as a therapy. It means that philosophy is able to help us to change the game gradually and foremost, not to mix the language-games; I mean not to attend to the other game rooted in the primary. We have to get use to new games. Often, it becomes easily but when we are inpatient, we can make a big damage to our communication with other people. The role of philosophy is then to teach the proper vocabulary resources and help to mark the borders of games out. It teaches the flexibility. One of the interpretations of Wittgenstein¡¯s ¡®Inquiries¡¦¡¯ is that philosophy helps t omit, so called, ¡®fly-trap syndrome¡¯. The traps for the flies are not quite visible in order to catch the fly which ha a good sight. Therefore the language-games has the borders either invisible, or very fluctuating. Philosophy should teach to make the trap visible enabling us to be taken in. The only way is to teach logics and show other points of view for the same thing.

The consequences

As I have described, the dependence of words upon their usage are also mentioned by Wittgenstein as an important problem of philosophy. It is worth considering, that his prior apprehension of philosophy from the logical point of view, ha been dwindled to the methodological usage. I believe, that is the right place for that. We cannot forget that logic is only the instrument of thinking which can¡¯t influence our world view. The gradual development of his mind is based on that point. Wittgenstein was approaching step by step, from completely logical (but not exactly analytic and positivistic!) point of view, to the idea of total plurality of instants in which the meaning can change. I think the views from ¡®Tractatus¡¦¡¯ became full-fledged in the ¡®Inquiries¡¦¡¯ Stress was removed from the real consequences of meaning to more intrinsic ones (I mean the human¡¯s condition in the world). From antipodes of human¡¯s thought Wittgenstein converged with hermeneutical philosophers. He had heralded the linguistic apprehension before Hans Georg Gadamer matured. Consequently, his philosophy is anticipation for the language strand in philosophy which has been the leading one in the contemporary philosophy.

Some remarks for the end

I find symptomatic, that he rejected logical apprehension and approached closer to the human¡¯s life. He didn¡¯t let himself being locked in a cage of logic, in which he could settle down, but he referred to practical philosophy in spite of making theories with no connections to the real human¡¯s life. The importance of language in his system was surely the most influential. The term ¡®meaning¡¯ of the word, which was included in the quotation, should have been important for him if he had pointed out so many consequences of it in ordinary life. It is empirically proved that his term of meaning is

correct what I have shown above. I agree with his belief from the quotations. I evaluate Wittgenstein¡¯s development as very important and good. I¡®m not surprised that he was commonly criticized for betray of logic traditions by ¡®Inquires¡¦¡¯ I think it is basic right of philosopher to develop his thoughts. They are not right that he made an unexpected and violent leap between his views. I daresay that they have omitted the symptoms of that change in the ¡®bible¡¯ of analytics ? ¡®Tractatus¡¦ - or they didn¡¯t want to see it for a very obvious reason.

Bronze Medal Essay

On Topic III

Alexandru Marcoci (Romania)

This sounds rather paradoxical. To know one has to love and yet to love one has to know. It appears as if Kitaro Nishida is coming to the conclusion that love and knowledge are more or less equal. No one without the other. He doesn¡¯t explain in this quotation, from which to start, the knowing or the loving, he just points out that this is how it is. Knowledge produces love, and love makes one want to increase the amount of one¡¯s knowledge on the object of one¡¯s love.

Nishida uses some wide-range terms in this quote. First there¡¯s the term ¡°know¡±. There are some definitions on the field of philosophy for knowledge. Probably the best known is Plato¡¯s classical definition of knowledge. According to Plato knowledge is a well-stated true belief. There are also some other ¡°requirements¡± for knowledge. There is the element of believing and the element of truth. This means that in order for one to claim something to be knowledge, one has to believe it. It surely affects the opinion of other party in the conversation if one was to say ¡°I know that 5-2=3 but I don¡¯t believe it¡±. In a case like this the value of the argument comes questionable. The element of truth may be harder to find depending on the question, but one can¡¯t possibly claim to know that all cats are born with six legs. The other party of the discussion surely knows at least by experience that this argument does not work in practise and is therefore untrue.

Love is another terrifyingly big term. Whether there is any basic philosophical definition for love, it¡¯s unclear. Even though knowledge and love are both uncountable things, it still seems that it¡¯s easier to try to measure the amount of one¡¯s knowledge by testing than the amount of one¡¯s love. Still even the ways of testing the amount of knowledge remain imperfect. Although for example nominalists claim that even the abstract terms, as yellow or truth, exist as independent creatures, that their existence is not based on human minds, even in that case the terms love and knowledge are impossible to measure and compare with each other in a trustworthy way. Still both knowledge and love

are a part of everyday life and have an effect on people. An average daily life is full of empiric proof of knowledge and love. One knows by experience that falling down hurts, and at the same time hopes that people close to him do not hurt themselves, which can be interpreted as the feeling of love and concern.

It¡¯s also possible for one to question Nishida¡¯s argument. To know a thing one has to love it, and to love a thing one has to know it. It seems that Nishida is referring to a complete and through-out knowing of something. In this kind of thinking the problem of many differing arguments about the possibility of through-out knowing rises. Fundamentalists claim that it is possible to know the absolute, unwavering, ultimate final truth about something. Many rationalists have agreed, that the final truth can be reached by logical deductions. Then there are some less solid sides. Fallibilists do not believe in finding the absolute truth, but they believe that knowledge is true until something comes up to tip it over or correct it to be more accurate. It doesn¡¯t become clear from Nishida¡¯s quotation, how he believes, but there¡¯s an allusion that he means ultimate knowing.

One term that also makes the argument of Nishida quite interesting, is ¡°a thing¡±. This comes back to the knowing of a thing. ¡°Thing¡± is really a wide term. There are many things in the world. Still Nishida doesn¡¯t make any limitations to what we can know if we only love it. It seems to an average person that knowing a dead leaf and knowing the main point Wittgenstein makes in Tractatus Logico Philosophicus do not have the same status. In Nishida¡¯s argument there¡¯s the element of love involved, but it feels rather unbelievable to claim that, if we assume that the final truth can be known, one can truly and trough-out know these two things similarly with the aid of something as fickle as love. Or more accurately put, can¡¯t know either without the aid of something as fickle as love. Although in philosophy all schools do not make much of a difference between material and mental things, in ordinary everyday-life the difference in understanding and knowing them is crude. In the mists of weekdays it seems that even though we might claim that we know for example our own pockets, even love doesn¡¯t help us to know whether it¡¯s right to have an abortion or whether the killing of a human being is justified. But it¡¯s a lot easier to say that I like chocolate ice-cream more than vanilla, because I just love chocolate. Chocolate ice-cream is a material thing, whereas saying whether something is right or wrong is not.

It¡¯s also possible that Nishida means a different kind of knowing. The term knowing is usually linked with studying, book and testing. The possibility of the simple love towards something bringing in the knowing of the thing makes people shrug and perhaps laugh up their sleeves with prejudices about daydreamers and romantics. However, the word intuition is not completely unknown in philosophy and could be associated with a sort of a level of knowing a priori. Whether the trigger to the intuition is love towards something seems as good of an alternative as the other possible forces.

It seems that love for something does make people think they also know the thing. Therefore it seems somewhat acceptable to claim that love increases the knowing of a thing to a certain extend. But it seems rather bold to claim that one can¡¯t know a thing without loving it. Many workers are good in what they do, and they might even like what they do, but it still doesn¡¯t mean that they love what they do. The feeling of love towards something might give the necessary

willpower to gather knowledge about something, but it¡¯s not required. Other feelings can also make it seem that one knows something completely. There are things that people know painfully clear, but do not love. It¡¯s possible for one to completely and utterly know the feeling of for example envy, and hate the fact that he knows the feeling. The fact that it¡¯ unwanted and unwelcome doesn¡¯t make it any less known or powerful than if he would love it. So maybe the more accurate form of the argument could be: ¡°To know something we have to feel something towards it.¡± Not necessarily love, for there are other powerful and overwhelming feelings as well.

Is it possible then, to know a thing completely free of emotion of any kind? The modern world has shown that it¡¯s possible to contain information completely free of emotions. That¡¯s what thermometers, books and computers do. These items have information, but whether it can be called knowledge is a different thing altogether. The term knowledge also requires a self-conscious agent in hold of information. So far humans are the only self-conscious agents that science has discovered, and emotions are essential in human existence. So for humans, to know something completely without any feeling for it is impossible. Even ignorance isn¡¯t the same as lack of feeling.

¡°To know a thing we must love it, and to love a thing we must know it¡±

For a fallibilist it¡¯s a real challenge to try to accept that something could be known through and through. For a self-conscious agent it¡¯s a real challenge to try to accept whether something could be known without feeling something, should it be love in this case. For personal beliefs and preferences it¡¯s a real challenge to try to accept that feelings could increase the amount of knowledge, but still believe in the power of intuition. Fortunately the philosophical world revolves around challenges.